Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History
Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat on 2011. aastal asutatud ja kord aastas ilmuv eelretsenseeritav teaduskogumik, mida annavad välja Eesti sõjamuuseum - kindral Laidoneri muuseum ja Tallinna Ülikooli Kirjastus. Kogumiku sihtgrupiks on sõjaajalooga tegelevad õpetlased nii Eestis kui ka välismaal, ühtlasi ka laiem sõjaajaloohuviliste ring Eestis. Väljaande peatoimetaja on Toomas Hiio. Ajakiri ilmub vähemalt kord aastas. Kõik artiklid läbivad pimeretsenseerimise. Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamatu artiklitele on ajakirja kodulehel vaba juurdepääs. Lugejad võivad artikleid alla laadida, lugeda, kopeerida või välja trükkida ilma toimetuselt või autorilt selleks luba küsimata. *** Estonian Yearbook of Military History (est. 2011) is an annual peer-reviewed journal of military history issued by Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum in collaboration with Tallinn University Press. Each issue of the journal focuses on a certain topic, which is usually determined by the topic of the military history conference held by the Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum the year before. The journal is usually divided in two parts, the first of which comprises the conference proceedings while in the second part papers adressing various other questions of military history can be found. Estonian Yearbook of Military History is a successor of Yearbook of Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum (issued 2001–2007, ISSN 1406-7625). The journal appears annually and provides an open access to its content. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, or print full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author.
In 2021, Dr Igor Kopõtin, currently Lead Research Fellow at the Estonian Military Academy, initiated the research project “Estonian Military Thought 1920–1940,” based on research contributions from scholars of the Estonian Military Academy, the Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum, the Estonian Maritime Museum, and the University of Tartu. The aim of the project was to explore the factors that influenced the content and development of Estonian military theory and art of war. The work resulted in several studies on Estonian national art of war and theory of war, focusing primarily on analyses of research papers on warfare by Estonian higher and senior officers, written in the period between the two wars. Some studies were published in the “Occasional Papers” series of the Estonian Military Academy. Two of these are examined below.
Copyright (c) 2025 Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Examining the Indefensible: Guarding Estonia in the Interwar Period and the Future
Estonia failed to take adequate lessons from World War I to defend itself from the looming threat of the Soviet Union, and instead spent its limited resources on acquisitions of marginal utility and failed to adequately reform its military. Its international position was further weakened by an inability to forge appropriate alliances due to infighting among the countries of Northern Europe. This paper will shed light on the complex interplay of geopolitical factors, internal dynamics and the strategic choices made by Estonia during that critical time and explore how these insights can inform current defence strategies. During the interwar period, Estonia sought to modernise and organise its military forces, facing constraints in arming its soldiers with a hotchpotch of equipment comprising leftover Russian and German arms, lendlease British equipment, and other sundries. Despite these challenges, Estonia made efforts to establish a defensive line in the northeast of the country and pursued alliances with Finland, Latvia, Poland and other states. It made preparations for a southeastern defensive network along the Võru axis, but ground had not yet been broken by the time of the Soviet ultimatum. Both efforts ultimately failed, and Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. Lessons from this failure can be applied to the current strategic situation in the Baltic region, given the continuing importance of NATO and the renewed military significance of deliberate defensive positions backed up by long-range precision firepower and anti-access/area-denial weapons.
Michael Calmeyer: A Dutch Infantry Officer Contemplates Modern War, 1935–1940
In the 1930s, Michael Calmeyer, a Dutch infantry officer, extensively studied the current military developments of the time and the war of the future. He based his conclusions on thorough analyses of numerous international publications, primarily in French, German and English. He concluded that modern technology, particularly tanks and aircraft, had reintroduced mobility in warfare, while also increasing its speed. Consequently, classical manoeuvre warfare was making a comeback, with the infantry still playing a leading role. While he considered extreme and one-sided views such as those of Douhet, Fuller and Liddell Hart to be impractical, he acknowledged that elements of these views did influence major powers. Calmeyer saw this view confirmed both in contemporary conflicts, and within the professional publications of Morretta and Alléhaut. Notably, Calmeyer was, between 1937 and 1939, the only Dutch officer seconded to Wehrmacht units and the Kriegsakademie in Berlin. He advised the Dutch army leadership to focus primarily on building strong defences against motorised and mechanised attacks, as well as maintaining high morale and commitment among the soldiers. After all, modern warfare would demand the utmost from every individual soldier.
Implications of General Johan Laidoner’s Active Defence Doctrine in the Estonian Defence Modernisation Plan of 1938
General Johan Laidoner’s activities as commander-in-chief during Estonia’s interwar period are often associated with his doctrine of active defence. While direct documentation is limited, scholars have reconstructed this doctrine from archival sources and analysed its defensive applications. This study examines how Laidoner’s active defence principles influenced Estonia’s military modernisation planning. Following the 1934 coup, Laidoner possessed unprecedented powers, providing him significant freedom to implement his strategic vision. The research addresses two questions: What were the main strategic and tactical principles of Laidoner’s active defence doctrine, and what were their foundations? Can these principles be identified in Estonia’s 1938 Defence Modernisation Plan? The analysis focuses primarily on the latter question, as development plans represent crucial forward-looking strategic management tools. The 1938 plan and accompanying discussions provide the clearest evidence of Laidoner’s commitment to implementing active defence principles within the evolving security environment of the late 1930s.
Polish Military Thought in the Interwar Period of the 20th Century and the Role of Marshal Józef Piłsudski
Polish military thought of the interwar period was derived from the country’s position in the international arena, its geostrategic location, the position and role of Józef Piłsudski, as well as economic and social factors determining specific development opportunities of the armed forces of independent Poland.
The Red Army Rises – the Impact of Threat Assessment on Defence System and Military Thinking in Finland in the 1920s
This article examines how the threat of the Red Army was perceived in Finland during the 1920s and 1930s, and how this threat assessment influenced the development of Finland’s defence system. The main focus of the article is on the developments of the 1920s and the solutions that were reached during that time. It primarily addresses the development of the defence system, but also considers the evolution of Finnish military thinking in its early stages. The research question of the article is: “How did the threat assessment affect the development of Finnish defence and military thinking during the 1920s and 30s?” The article is mostly based on the author’s dissertation project that examines the development of the Finnish covering troop concept from 1918 to 1942.
The Challenges of Our Defence: Military Knowledge and Officers’ Writings in Interwar Czechoslovakia
A central focus of this study is the process of knowledge creation and circulation of military texts in interwar Czechoslovakia and the role of professional officers in it. Their writings were circulated through books, professional journals and the daily press, but their ability to publish was managed by the military administration. At first, these publications provided a platform for the articulation of the role of the Czechoslovak military in an often antimilitary-minded society. Later, they functioned especially as instruments of military preparedness propaganda. This article aims to demonstrate both the societal context and the control over officers’ writings, not only in discussing military thought but also in bolstering society’s resolve, thereby contributing to the military culture of fledgling Czechoslovakia in the interwar period.
The White and Red Terror in the Eastern Part of Viru County in 1917–1919
From 1917 to 1919, terror against political enemies was used by the Bolsheviks, the German occupation authorities, the Commune of the Working People of Estonia that acted as a puppet government for Soviet Russia, and also by the young Republic of Estonia, as they tried to protect their rule. Compared to the rest of Estonia, the eastern parts of Viru County, especially Narva and Jaanilinn, are notable for a relatively higher number of victims. Estonians constituted the majority of the victims of the terror from both sides, but less is known about the fact that many Finnish members of the Red Guards were among those who fell when the Estonian Army and the Finnish volunteers liberated the city of Narva in January 1919.
Copyright (c) 2021 Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Field Courts Martial, the Cheka and Penal Policy in the Estonian War of Independence in 1918–1920
Between December 1918 and December 1920, less then 300 men and women were sentenced to death in Estonian army field courts martial. Meanwhile the Red Terror of Cheka yielded 600 to 700 fatalities between December 1918 and early spring of 1919. It’s difficult to judge how Penal Policy of both sides affected soldiers. On both sides the majority of those who received the capital punishment were civilians, not soldiers. The legal basis for both sides offered a lot of freedom of interpretation with sentencing. Four months after the creation of Estonian field courts martial these institutions received quite detailed instructions. The Cheka however continued to work on guidelines of the ‘Red Terror’ Decree dated September 5th 1918, allowing them much wider freedom. However Estonian Field Courts Martial but also local Chekas worked in various ways. Also, it can’t be ruled out that Estonian society did not get the full picture of Penal Policy from newspapers.
1921 February rebellion as a manifestation of Armenian war of independence
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence in the spring of 1918. After the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne and the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that had been agreed upon between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers, the Soviet Red Army started a campaign to capture the areas that had belonged to Russia. Armenia had to fight two enemies – the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the one side and Soviet Russia on the other. Turkey attacked Armenia in the autumn of 1920. Even though Soviet Russia had signed a treaty with Armenia in August, the Armenian Bolsheviks, supported by the Red Army, proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Armenia in November and began Sovietization of the country, accompanied by repressions against Armenian national politicians, military leaders and intellectuals. As a result of an uprising that began in February 1921, the Bolsheviks were ousted from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, but the counter-offensive of the Red Army in April restored the Bolshevik rule in Armenia.
Pavel Bermondt-Avalov and the Formation of the West Russian Volunteer Army – Warlordism in the Baltic?
Warlordism is a phenomenon that emerges in a power vacuum during wars, civil wars and revolutions. There are many examples from the Russian Civil War where military commanders amassed absolute power in certain areas, without being subordinate to any state authority, or perhaps being subordinate in name only. Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, who formed the West Russian Volunteer Army, is discussed as an example of a warlord from the era of the Baltic wars of independence. A large portion of his army was made up of the German soldiers and officers who, as members of Freikorps, had fought in the Iron Division under the command of General Rüdiger von der Goltz, or in other units in the first half of 1919. In the autumn of 1919, instead of fighting the Bolsheviks and the Red Army, he turned his weapons against the Republic of Latvia and marched on Riga.
Idealists or Adventurers? The Swedish volunteers in Estonia in 1919
Swedish volunteers fought alongside the Finns and the Danes in the Estonian War of Independence. Sweden had been neutral in World War I, but some 1,000 Swedish volunteers had fought in the Finnish War of Independence in the first half of 1918. Many of those Swedish fighters were among the volunteers who came from Finland to Estonia in 1919. ‘The Swedish corps’ – in fact a company – spent nearly half a year in Estonia and was disbanded in the beginning of June 1919. The unit did not play a significant military role; for the most part, it attracted the attention of the Swedish public with several scandals. There were quite a few volunteers who did not return home. Some men joined the Estonian Army, but some also ended up in Russian White Guard units, as well as in Latvia or Lithuania. Major Carl Mothander, the commander of the Swedish volunteers, is known in Sweden, Estonia and Finland thanks to his memoirs. Captain Einar Lundborg became a pilot after returning to Sweden. He is renowned for rescuing the Italian Arctic explorer, Umberto Nobile, from an ice field in 1928.
The War is not Over? On the Continuity and Discontinuity between the Great War and the War of Independence as Experienced by the Lithuanian Soldiers
Peter Holquist, Roberth Gerwarth and other historians argue that, for Eastern Europe, the Armistice of Compiègne, signed in November 1918, did not mean an end of fighting and violence but a ‘continuation and transformation’ of the world war. However, a precise definition of the viewpoint is important when it comes to continuity. Is it from the perspective of soldiers, civilians or war refugees? For example, many of the Lithuanian veterans of World War I did not fight in the Lithuanian War of Independence from 1919 to 1920. The exceptions included officers, non-commissioned officers, and medical doctors. As a consequence, most of the Lithuanian army in 1920 was comprised of men who had not fought in World War I. In the war experience of the majority of Lithuanian soldiers, the Lithuanian War of Independence was not a continuation of World War I.
At the end of May 2019, the Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum and Estonian Military Adademy organised the conference Independence Wars in North-Eastern Europe and Beyond in Tartu. The conference commemorated the 100th anniversary of the Estonian War of Independence. In addition to Estonia, several other nations were fighting their wars of independence at the same time, but the majority of them were unable to break away from the crumbling empires and establish national statehood. First and foremost, Soviet Russia, the successor of tsarist Russia, was able to consolidate itself after a bloody civil war, but in doing so releasing its grip on the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland.
Kolm sissetungi Saaremaale: operatsioonid „Albion“ (1917), „Beowulf “ (1941) ja „Moonsund“ (1944)
20. sajandi esimesel poolel vallutati Saaremaa kolmel korral eduka maabumisoperatsiooniga. 1917. aasta Saksa keiserliku armee ekspeditsiooni korpuse dessant maandati avamerelt suurtelt sõjalaevadelt Tagalahe kallastel Saaremaa looderannikul. Wehrmachti sissetung 1941. aasta septembris ning Punaarmee dessant kolm aastat hiljem tehti Mandri-Eestist üle Suure väina, Muhumaa ja Väikese väina tammi kaudu. Artikkel annab ülevaate kõigist kolmest operatsioonist ning hindab nende läbiviimist, lähtudes doktriinidest ja sõjapidamispõhimõtetest.
Copyright (c) 2020 Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Muutuv lahinguväli, kohanemine ja innovatsioon: Esimese maailmasõja õpikogemused
Alates tööstusrevolutsioonist ja tehnilise progressi kiirenemisest on sõjaväelised organisatsioonid seisnud probleemi ees, kuidas võimalikult kiiresti kohaneda muutuva lahinguväljaga ning viia oma relvastus, protseduurid, taktikad, operatsioonikunst ja strateegiad vastavusse tehnoloogia pakutavate võimaluste ja nõuetega. Tänapäeva sõjavägi on oma loomult konservatiivne bürokraatlik organisatsioon ja see muudab innovatsiooni keerukaks. Tulevaseks sõjaks on raske valmistuda, sest minevikukogemus ei pruugi olla usaldusväärne teenäitaja. Küll aga saab ajaloost küllap õppida, kuidas kohaneda ja uueneda võimalikult efektiivselt, kui sõda on juba alanud. Selleks on Esimese maailmasõja üle saja aasta tagused sündmused endiselt huvipakkuvad. Käesolevas artiklis on kokku võetud viimase aja uurimused kohanemisest ja innovatsioonist ning taktika ja sõjakunsti arengust Esimese maailmasõja eel ja ajal ning arutletakse selle üle, kas on universaalseid mustreid, mis aitaksid nüüdisaegsetel relvajõududel, sealhulgas Eesti kaitseväel, olla sõjakunsti uuendamisel edukad.
Ajaloolased oleviku teenistuses: ekspeditsioonivägede ohvitseride koolitamine. Ameerika Ühendriikide ja Ühendkuningriigi kogemused 1991–2008
Artiklis on käsitletud sõjaväelise hariduse ja sõjaajaloo rolli USA ja Briti ohvitseride väljaõppes pärast külma sõda. Artikli esimene osa annab ülevaate külma sõja järel tehtud peamistest ümberkorraldustest professionaalses sõjalises hariduses. Keskendutakse järgmistele teemadele: sõjaväelisest haridusest üldiselt, tsiviilerialade kasvavast hulgast kadeti- ja sõjakoolides ning professionaalse sõjaväelise hariduse õppekavade akadeemilisest akrediteerimisest. Teises osas analüüsitakse USA ja Briti sõjakolledžites teenivate ajalooõppejõudude rolli muutumist nende ümberkorralduste tulemusena, ajaloo õpetamise eesmärkide arengut, kursantide ajaloouurimuste kasutamist professionaalses enesearendamises ning ajalooõppe lõimimist professionaalse sõjaväelise hariduse süsteemi teiste õppevaldkondadega, nagu näiteks sõjamängud ja matkeharjutused. Artikkel lõpeb arutlusega nende arengute mõjust sõjaajaloo rollile sõjaväelises ja akadeemilises maailmas ning soovitab mõnda nende arengute käigus saadud kogemust tuleviku ümberkorralduste tegemiseks.
Millist minevikku sõdur vajab? Sõjaajalugu, ajalooharidus ja demokraatlik eetika tänapäeva Saksamaal
Sõjaväeliste traditsioonide loomine sõltub tähendusest, mis kaasaja vajadustest lähtuvalt omistatakse mineviku teatud aspektidele. Traditsiooniloome ajalugu Lääne-Saksamaal alates 1955. aastast on üheks näiteks. Pärast natsionaalsotsialismi ajastu lõppu eeldati, et Bundeswehr, uue demokraatliku riigi relvajõud, eristab end Wehrmachtist ja toonitab sõdurite rolli kodanikena. Ajalooteadmised muudeti osaks demokraatlikust haridusest ja need ei olnud enam sõjaliste saavutuste eeskujuks. Sõjaajaloo keskus, sõjaajaloo muuseum ja rändnäitused ning ka sõjaajaloo aimeaja kirjad andsid oma panuse selle mõtestamisse, mis on minevikutraditsioonis väärtuslikku. Siia kuulusid eriti 19. sajandi alguse Preisi reformid, atentaat Hitlerile 1944. aasta 20. juulil ja Bundeswehri enda ajalugu. Väidetakse, et sõjaajaloo tundmine aitab sõduritel lahingus paremini hoomata sõjaliste operatsioonide eetilist raamistikku, pakub orientatsiooni ja toetab nende identiteeti. Kas ja kuidas peaks traditsioone sobitama muutuvate sõjaliste tingimustega, on vastuoluline küsimus.
Sõjalise doktriini loomine ajalookogemuse alusel 20. sajandi Saksamaa, Prantsusmaa, Iisraeli ja USA näitel
Artiklis käsitletakse sõjaajaloo ja minevikukogemuse rolli või selle puudumist sõjalise doktriini kujundamisel. Analüüs põhineb neljal juhtumiuuringul: Reichsheer/Wehrmacht 1919–1940, Prantsuse armee 1919–1940, Iisraeli kaitsejõud 1948–1973 ja USA maavägi 1973–1991. Sünteesis kirjeldab autor sõjaajaloo rolli toimiva sõjalise doktriini loomisel sõja kolmel tasandil: taktikatasand, operatsioonitasand ja strateegiatasand. Hoiatavate näidetena meie kaasaegsetele poliitikutele ja otsustajatele tuuakse välja mõned sõjaajaloo kuri- ja väärtarvituse juhtumid.
1799. aasta Alpide kampaania kui Vene mägisõjadoktriini lävepakk
Keiserlik Vene armee võitles esimest korda mägedes 1799. aastal, kui Aleksandr Suvorov viis oma korpuse Itaaliast üle Šveitsi Alpide, et ühineda Vene vägedega Zürichi all ja tõrjuda Prantsuse armee Šveitsist välja. Tema sõdurid olid kogenud professionaalid, kes olid Itaalias prantslaste vastu sõdides võitnud muljetavaldava hulga lahinguid. Suvorov ei näinud ette Alpides tekkida võivaid raskusi ja oli veendunud, et ta pühib sinna siirdud Prantsuse garnisonid kergesti oma teelt. Kuid mägisõja kogemuste puudumise tõttu põrkus Suvorovi korpus tohutute strateegiliste, taktikaliste ja logistiliste probleemidega, kaotas poole oma elavjõust ega saavutanud oma eesmärke. Šveitsi sõjakäik näitas, et mägisõjas pole kohta amatööridele, diletantidele ja spontaansusele. Hiljem Venemaa piiridel paiknevates mägedes sõdides ignoreerisid Vene ja siis Nõukogude armee samuti mägisõja omapära ning võitlesid kõigil neil sõjakäikudel nagu tasandikel – koos ettearvatavalt kohutavate tagajärgedega.
Miks peaksid elukutselised sõjaväelased õppima antiik- ja keskaja sõjaajalugu?
On üldine veendumus, et sõjaajaloo õppimine on ohvitserihariduse möödapääsmatu osa. Ehkki paljud edukad väejuhid, sealhulgas Napoleon ja MacArthur, on esile tõstnud oma suurt lugemust, mis ulatus kuni antiikautoriteni välja, kirjutas Clausewitz: „Mida kaugemale me ajas tagasi läheme, seda vähem kasulikku sõjaajalugu me saame.“ Käesolevas artiklis väidetakse vastupidist: ohvitseridel on palju võita, kui nad kaasavad oma õpingutesse eelmodernse sõjanduse. Avaram ja mitmepalgelisem näidete ja juhtumiuuringute valik võimaldab usaldusväärsemat üldistamist, pakub rohkem inspiratsiooniallikaid ning aitab hoiduda küll ahvatlevast, kuid ebamõistlikust oletusest, et järgmine sõda sarnaneb senise viimasega, kui ka sama ahvatlevast ja ebamõistlikust eeldusest, et võidu tagab ainuüksi materiaalne tugevus. Veel enam, antiik ja keskaegse sõjanduse uurijad peavad toime tulema nappide ja vastuolulise andmete ja faktidega, nagu ka ohvitserid, kes rakendavad lahingus oma eriväljaõppe põhiteadmisi. Eelmodernne ajalugu on nagu sõdagi ebakindel tegelikkus: paljusid „fakte“ saab nimetada ainult tõenäosusteks. Parim ettevalmistusviis selleks, et suuta sõjaudust läbi näha, oleks seega harjutada piilumist läbi aegade sumu.
Kümnes Eesti sõjaajaloo aastaraamat sisaldab 9. Eesti sõjaajalookonverentsi „Minevik, sõjamehe teejuht? Kogemus, ajalugu ja teooria sõjalises ettevalmistuses“ ettekannete põhjal kirjutatud artikleid. Konverents peeti Tartus 2018. aasta mais ning selle korraldasid Eesti sõjamuuseum – kindral Laidoneri muuseum ja Kaitseväe Akadeemia, mis siis kandis veel nime Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused.
Which Past for the Soldier? Military History, Historical Education, and the Ethics of Democracy in Germany Today
The construction of tradition in the military depends on the meaning given to certain aspects of the past in the light of the pres- ent. West Germany’s history of tradition-building since 1955 is a case in point. After the end of Nazism, the new democratic armed forces, the Bundeswehr, was supposed to distance itself from the Wehrmacht by emphasizing the “civil” role of soldiers. Communicating historical knowledge became part of their democratic education rather than a guideline for military performance. Institutions such as the Center for Military History and the Museum of Military History, travel exhibitions, as well as popular scientific journals have contributed to an understand- ing of what is worthy of tradition – in particular the Prussian reforms, the plot of 20 July 1944, and the history of the Bundeswehr itself. Such references to the past – so the argument goes – help soldiers in combat to better grasp the ethical framework of military operations, provide orientation, and support their identity. Whether and how traditions should be adjusted according to changing military conditions remains controversial.
Copyright (c) 2019 Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Descriptive and Applied Military History – debating the utility of military history in Danish officer education
In the 1970s Danish debates on military history revealed a bifurcated understanding of military history between descriptive and applied military history. Descriptive military history was the study of military history done by academic historians, and applied military history was done by and taught to officers. The divide between descriptive and applied was rooted in the professionalization of history and officer education; it was constructed in order to accommodate the criticism that military history used in officer education did not live up to academic standards. By taking the Danish debates in the 1970s as a point of departure, this article introduces some fundamental challenges regard- ing the use of military history in officer education. Inspired by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck, the article argues that developments within academic history since the 1970s might have alleviated the conflict between academic military history and the military history used in officer education. Certainly, these new developments have opened up new approaches to military history.
Building Military Doctrine based on History and Experience: 20th century examples from Germany, France, Israel and the US
The paper will address the role (or lack thereof) of military history and past experience in military doctrine building. The analysis will be based on four case studies: the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht 1919– 1940, the French army 1919–1940, the IDF 1948–1973, and the US Army 1973–1991. In the synthesis, the author will present the role of military history in building efficient military doctrine on three levels of war: tactics, operational art, and strategy. Several kinds of abuses and misuses of military history will be singled out as a warning sign for con- temporary policy and military decision makers.
A Generational Shift: The military history crisis in the Estonian military education 1919–1940
The article analyses the teaching of military history in the Estonian army in the interwar period. It argues that the basic concepts – the purpose, thematic distribution, teaching methods – were developed by the former professor of the tsarist military academy, Lt. Gen. Aleksei Baiov. Baiov stressed that history, along with strategy, was at the core of military science. However, Baiov and other Russian émigrés came under heavy criticism from the Estonian command, particularly Gen. Nikolai Reek, who thought Estonia was too small to require a school of strategy. In the background, there was the theoretical clash, carried over from the pre-war tsarist Russia, between the old generation of bayonet tac- tics and the new generation of fire and movement. In 1926, Baiov was fired, but Reek’s reforms, which subordinated history to the needs of tactical training, remained incomplete even at the end of the 1930s. A number of questions about the utility and the substance of military his- tory remained unresolved. Indeed, they are still not settled in Estonian officer education today.
The Alpine Campaign of 1799 as a Stepping Stone to a Doctrine of Mountain Warfare
The Russian Imperial Army fought for the first time in the mountains in 1799, when Alexander Suvorov led his corps from Italy across the Swiss Alps to join the Russian forces at Zurich and expel the French Army from Switzerland. His soldiers were skilled professionals who had won an impressive series of battles in Italy against the French. Suvorov did not anticipate problems in the Alps, being convinced that he would easily sweep away the small French garrisons deployed on his way. Yet, because of inexperience in mountain warfare, Suvorov’s corps struggled against enormous strategic, tactical, and logistical chal- lenges, lost half of its manpower and failed to attain its goals. The Swiss trek shows that mountain warfare defies amateurism, dilettantism and spontaneity. Even though mountains are located on the verges of Rus- sia, the Russian and then Soviet armies ignored the peculiarities of mountain warfare and fought every new campaign in the mountains the same way they would fight on the plains, with predictably dire consequences.
The Study of Ancient and Medieval Military History: Benefits for professional military education
There is broad agreement that the study of military history is an essential component of professional education for military officers. Although many successful modern commanders, including Napoleon and MacArthur, advocated extending their reading back to ancient times, Clausewitz wrote: “The further back one goes, the less useful mil- itary history becomes.” This essay argues, to the contrary, that officers have much to gain by including pre-modern warfare in their studies. A larger and more diverse data-set of examples and case studies allows for more reliable generalization, gives more opportunities for inspiration, and helps guard against the tempting but unwise assumptions that the next war will be similar to the last one, and the equally tempting and equally unwise presumption that material strength alone will ensure vic- tory. Moreover, historians of ancient and medieval warfare, like officers exercising their core professional responsibility in combat, must grapple with scanty and conflicting evidence. Pre-modern history, like war, is a realm of uncertainty; many of the “facts” can only be known as proba- bilities. The best preparation for seeing through the fog of war, therefore, may be the exercise of peering through the mists of time.
Introduction to the No 9 (2019) issue of Estonian yearbook of Military History.