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History of Estonian Military Thought

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Arto Oll, Taavi Urb, *Meresõda*, EMA occasional papers no. 17, October 2023, 173 p.

Igor Kopõtin, *Rahvusliku sõjakunsti otsinguil: professor Aleksei Baiov ja tema sõjateaduslik pärand*, EMA occasional papers no. 17, December 2023, 160 p.

In 2021, Dr Igor Kopõtin, currently Lead Research Fellow at the Estonian Military Academy, initiated the research project "Estonian Military Thought 1920–1940," based on research contributions from scholars of the Estonian Military Academy, the Estonian War Museum – General Laidoner Museum, the Estonian Maritime Museum, and the University of Tartu. The aim of the project was to explore the factors that influenced the content and development of Estonian military theory and art of war. The work resulted in several studies on Estonian national art of war and theory of war, focusing primarily on analyses of research papers on warfare by Estonian higher and senior officers, written in the period between the two wars. Some studies were published in the "Occasional Papers" series of the Estonian Military Academy. Two of these are examined below.

Military thought in Estonian naval forces

The chapters written by Dr Arto Oll and Commander Taavi Urb in the collection *Meresõda* (Naval Warfare) are preceded by the article "Ääremärkusi meresõjalisest mõttest" (Remarks on Naval Thought) by Commander Ott Laanemets, providing a theoretical framework for the chapters and clarifying the position of Estonian military thought on naval warfare both in terms of geographical space and

the contemporary naval warfare theory. The author emphasises that, despite the widespread anti-intellectualism of the military – which tends to give a bad reputation to the word 'theory' in the world of warfare –, the practice of military decision-making has always included decisions based on theoretical notions about the future of warfare instead of relying merely on past experience. It is rare to find expressions of military thought that do not include quotes from Carl von Clausewitz. Remaining true to this trend, Ott Laanemets refers to Clausewitz's argument that theory is important for educating the mind of the future commander, so that he need not start afresh each time sorting out the material.

While the two principal questions of military thought and general war theory are "What is war?" and "How to win a war?," the thought and theory of naval warfare is mainly concerned with the second question – the strategy of a naval war. 'Maritime power', one of the main concepts in this field, refers to global naval dominance, and is also a geopolitical term. It has been a basis for Anglo-American theories of naval warfare for historical reasons, because the British Navy controlled the seas from the 16th to the 20th century – despite German attempts to undermine this dominance at the turn of the 19th and 20th century – and the US Navy, with its aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, has stepped into this position since the period between the two world wars and particularly after World War II. The Estonian theoretical approaches to naval warfare in the inter-war period were based on foreign literature as well as the knowledge and experience of the few Estonian sailors who had served as officers in the Russian Navy, including Johan Pitka in particular. Estonian naval forces carried out several maritime operations in the War of Independence, from 1918 to 1920, including landings in the rear of the Red Army.

Naval fleet is one of the most expensive service branches and, being a poor country, battleships and cruisers were nothing more than a dream for Estonia that found it difficult, in the early 1930s, to maintain even the two destroyers that had been seized by the British Navy and handed over to Estonia. Being a maritime nation,

Estonia's efforts in naval warfare were focused on defending its long coastline against the enemy, i.e., the Soviet Russia and its Baltic Fleet, and keeping the seaways open.

The overview chapter[1] by Taavi Urb presents prominent representatives of the Western naval warfare theory and their positions from the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. US Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan (1840–1914) was the originator of the modern theory of naval warfare and sea power. According to his theory, it was important to concentrate forces for a decisive battle which, if won, would result in taking control of maritime communications and key positions. He believed naval blockade to be more effective than seizing the enemy's ships. Sea power was supposed to ensure military victory and economic prosperity of a maritime nation. Philip Colomb (1831–1899), one of the pioneers of British naval strategy, identified 'command of the sea' as the main objective in naval warfare, achievable by concentrating one's own fleet to destroy the main force of the enemy. This would be followed by a blockade of the enemy's coast combined with landing operations. Underestimating coastal defences, he believed that islands and coastlines can only be defended with a fleet. Another British naval strategist, Julian Corbett (1854–1922), was a civilian and naval historian. According to his main argument, a sea power cannot defeat continental power, but it can, in cooperation with allies, determine the course of the war and the nature of the future peace.

The brief era of German Empire as a major sea power started with Grand Admiral Alfred Tirpitz (1849–1930), navy minister from 1897 to 1916. Relying on Mahanian ideas, he argued that command of the sea can be achieved if one side has a fleet that is a third larger than that of the enemy. Based on this, he concluded that if Germany would build a fleet that is two thirds the size of the British navy, the latter would not dare to start a war because, even if victorious, the losses of the Royal Navy would mean that British colonies become vulnerable to threats from Russia, France and the USA. Tirpitz saw Great Britain

[1] "Ülevaade Lääne meresõjalisest mõttest", 17–25.

more as an ally than an enemy. However, in order to be an equal ally – Tirpitz used the term *Bündnisfähigkeit*, 'alliance capability' – Germany needed a fleet. Both of these major powers peaked at the start of the 20th century – the Brits launched battleship Dreadnought in 1906 and heavy cruiser Invincible in 1907, forcing Germany to build equivalent ships. Eventually, Germany was defeated in this highly expensive naval race, even though the Brits suffered greater losses in the 1916 Battle of Jutland, the last major naval battle between large fleets. In the world war, Great Britain allied with France and Russia, and the German surface fleet did not play any significant role in the war, unlike their submarines.

Tirpitz's theories on naval warfare were opposed by Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956) who believed that sea power was based on fleet and strategic location, with the first being a tactical and the second a strategic component. In his opinion, a sea battle could only serve strategic purposes. The objective of naval warfare is command of the sea, not a combat against the enemy's fleet. Due to his opposition to Tirpitz, Wegener was disfavoured by the navy higher leadership, but found support among younger navy officers.

Turning his attention to the representatives of the new school – *Jeune École* – of French naval warfare theorists, Commander Urb presents the positions of Vice Admiral Théophile Aube (1826–1890) whose views were popularised by journalist and explorer Gabriel Charmes (1850–1886). The new school believed that it was impossible for France to equal Great Britain in terms of sea power due to the need to be prepared for a land war against Germany. Aube advised using smaller vessels against battleships and attacking enemy freighters with fast armoured cruisers. Aube and Charmes argued that cheaper weapon systems (naval mines, torpedoes and submarines) can increase the threat to large warships in coastal waters, thereby reducing the role of the latter in naval warfare. Later, French military theorist Raoul Castex (1878–1968) emphasised that, unless waged by an island nation, naval war should support joint operations and land force operations. Countries with a weaker fleet need to achieve their strategic objectives in a land war.

The positions of Western European naval warfare theorists influenced their colleagues in Russia whose views are presented by Arto Oll on the example of two Russian officers: Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov (1848–1904) and the Admiralty Major General Nikolai Klado (1862–1919).[2] **Makarov** was productive in several fields: In addition to holding high-ranking positions in the Russian navy, he was an oceanographer and polar explorer, worked on ship construction, and made improvements to the ammunition of naval artillery. In the Russo-Japanese War, he was assigned as the commander of the Pacific Fleet but was soon killed on the board of sea battleship Petropavlovsk, when it struck a mine. Makarov was critical of Mahan's and Colomb's views, arguing that the theorists supporting the open sea doctrine underestimated the impact of technological innovations and scientific discoveries on naval war. He distinguished between three levels in naval warfare – imperial policy, naval strategy, and naval tactics. Policy identifies the tools required to achieve an objective, strategy establishes the art of warfare, and tactics provides guidelines for defeating the enemy in the battle. His own primary focus was on tactics; his series of articles on naval tactics (1897) even attracted attention abroad.[3] Unlike Makarov, Major General **Klado**, who had been in training in the French fleet, supported the open sea doctrine and relied on it in his lectures at the naval corps. Klado believed that Russia needed to build a powerful fleet of battleships and cruisers, whereas naval fortifications had to cooperate with warships. In wartime, the fleet would ensure continuation of maritime transport and connections with allies. In his opinion, Germany was Russia's primary enemy, which is why Russia needed a strong surface fleet on the Baltic Sea.

Russia's naval strategic position was different from that of the other major powers. Its fleet was divided between multiple seas – separate

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[2] "Venemaa meresõjaline mõte", 26–46.

[3] For a more recent English edition, see Stepan Makarov, *Discussion of questions in naval tactics*, Classics of sea power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990). The entire series of articles was published in a separate edition as Stepan Makarov (Степан Макаров), *Rassuždeniâ po voprosam morskoj taktiki* [*Рассуждения по вопросам морской тактики*; Reflections on Questions of Naval Tactics], ch. I–II, Biblioteka "Morskogo sbornika" (Petrograd, 1916). Reprints were also published in the Soviet Union during World War II.

Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets, as well as the Arctic Ocean Flotilla established during World War I. The majority of ports in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean froze over in winter, interfering with navigation for both friendly and enemy fleets. Ultimately, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets did not have access to the oceans, because it would have been easy for a potential enemy to close off the Danish straits and the Dardanelles for Russian ships. Eventually, the views of the open sea doctrine won out. After defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia launched a grand fleet-building programme while also establishing Peter the Great's Naval Fortress – a zone of coastal batteries and land fortifications on both coasts of Gulf of Finland, extending from the mouth of the gulf to St. Petersburg.

Arto Oll continues with a presentation of Soviet thought on naval warfare in the 1920s and 1930s. World War I, revolutions and the civil war resulted in a significant reduction of the military potential of the Baltic Fleet. Initially, Finland and Estonia were seen as potential enemies in a possible naval war, and theories of naval warfare were developed by Boris Zherve (1878–1934) and Mikhail Petrov (1885–1940), former 2nd Rank Captains (Commanders) in the Imperial Navy. **Zherve** had served in the headquarters of Peter the Great's Naval Fortress and then as commander of the coastal defence in the Gulf of Finland. After the Bolsheviks had seized power, he organised evacuation of the Baltic Fleet from Tallinn over Helsinki to Kronstadt and Petrograd in early spring of 1918. He was Commandant of the Naval Academy[4] from 1920 to 1921 and again from 1923 to 1930. He was imprisoned for a time in 1930 for political reasons, but taught later theory and history of naval warfare at the Naval Engineering Academy and the Political Academy of the Red Army. **Petrov's** last

[4] The Russian Naval Academy (i.e. main staff college) was established in 1827 as an Officers' Class at the Naval Cadet Corps. It operated under the name of the Academic Course of Maritime Science since 1862, then as Emperor Nicholas Naval Academy 1877–1917, Maritime Academy 1917–22, Naval Academy of the Workers and Peasants' Navy 1922–31, K. E. Voroshilov Naval Academy of the Workers and Peasants' Red Army 1931–38, and K. E. Voroshilov Naval Academy of the Workers and Peasants' Navy 1938–44. Currently, the institution is named the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy.

position in the imperial Baltic fleet was deputy chief of the operations department at the headquarters. He was commander of the Naval Academy from 1921 to 1923, retired in 1924, but continued as a lecturer, was named professor in 1929 and was promoted to 1st Rank Captain (Captain) after institution of military ranks in the Soviet armed forces in 1935. He was arrested during Stalin's Great Purge and was shot in 1938.[5]

Both belonged to Klado's school, stressing the importance of battleships in a war at sea. They believed that the Soviet Navy had three main functions: attacking the enemy's freight routes while defending their own, attacking the enemy's coastline (artillery fire and landings), and taking part in joint operations to support the strategic objectives of the land forces. Arto Oll writes that the naval warfare doctrine promoted by Zherve and Petrov reflected the means available to the Soviet Union in the 1920s – the aging fleet, in cooperation with naval fortifications, was tasked with defending reinforced coastal positions. They assumed that any fighting in the Gulf of Finland would be against a joint Finnish, Estonian and British squadron. Fighting only against Estonia, the Baltic Fleet would have been able to secure command of the sea with its own ships.

In the 1930s, the younger generation took over the responsibility for developing Soviet thinking on naval warfare: 1st Rank Flag Officers (~vice admirals) Johan Ludri and Konstantin Dushenov, 2nd Rank Captain Aleksandr Yakimychev, and Rear Admiral Aleksandr Aleksandrov. They all had graduated from the Naval Academy in the Soviet period, after having fought in the Russian Civil War in the ranks of the Red Army and advancing quickly in their career. **Ludri** (1895–1937), an Estonian, studied at the Midshipmen School in Kronstadt, served as *komendor* (naval gunner) in the Imperial Baltic Fleet and later as naval artillery non-commissioned officer, while also completing upper secondary education as external student. He made a great contribution to consolidating the Bolshevist

[5] For biographies see *Rossijskij imperatorskij flot* [*Российский императорский флот*; The Russian Imperial Navy], http://infoart.udm.ru/history/navy/biogra15.htm (archived), 10 September 2025.

rule: In early spring of 1918, he participated in the evacuation of the Baltic Fleet from Tallinn to Kronstadt and, from 1918 to 1923, served as a political commissar in the Kronstadt naval base, the Onega Flotilla, the naval forces of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the Caspian Flotilla. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1927, he was commander and chief of staff of the coastal defences of the Black Sea Fleet, was promoted to deputy commander of the Red Navy in 1932, and to the commander and military commissar of the Naval Academy in 1937. In the same year, he was arrested and shot for political reasons.[6] Like Ludri, **Dushenov** (1895–1940) served in the Imperial Baltic Fleet (on cruiser Aurora) and participated in the Bolshevik coup of 1917. During the Russian Civil War, he was commandant of the river ports of Astrakhan and Saratov, then, from 1921 to 1924, commandant of the military port in Sevastopol and later in Baku. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1928, he served as chief of staff in the Battleship Division of the Baltic Fleet and was acting commander of the Naval Academy for a period in 1930. He was chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet from 1930 to 1935, commander of the Arctic Ocean Flotilla from 1935 to 1937 and then commander of the Northern Fleet.[7] He was also arrested in 1938, accused of participation in a 'military-fascist conspiracy', and was shot.[8] After graduating from the Naval Academy, **Yakimychev** (1897–1938) served as assistant to the naval attaché in the United States (the attaché was Paul Oras, an Estonian, 1st Rank Naval Engineer, 1897–1943). He returned to the Soviet Union in 1936, served as assistant to the commander of the Naval Intelligence Department of the Main Intelligence Directorate, and as commander

[6] "Ludri, Ivan Martynovich (*Лудри Иван Мартынович*) (1895–1937)", *Polkovodcy. Velikaâ istoriâ* [*Полководцы. Великая история*; Commanders. The Great History], 16 April 2009, http://www.wargenius.ru/index.php/geroiflota/poslerevolution/2009-02-26-14-56-38, 20 January 2025.

[7] The Arctic Ocean Flotilla was reorganised in 1937 as the Northern Fleet.

[8] *Početnye graždane Severomorska: biobibliografičeskij spravočnik*, 12-e izd. [*Почетные граждане Североморска: биобиблиографический справочник*, 12-е изд.] (Severomorsk, 2024), 8–11; P. Klipp, "Flagman Severnogo flota: k 70-letiû dnâ roždeniâ flagmana 1 ranga K. I. Dušenova" [*Флагман Северного флота: к 70-летию со дня рождения флагмана 1 ранга К. И. Душенова*], *Voenno-istoričeskij žurnal* [*Военно-исторический журнал*], 7 (1965): 56–63.

of naval intelligence from 1937 to 1938, before being arrested, accused of espionage, and shot.[9] **Aleksandrov** (1900–1946) was member of the Red Guard since 1917 and rose to the rank of regiment commissar by 1920. Next, he served as investigator and member in a revolutionary military tribunal and chaired the Black Sea Military Tribunal; in 1921, he was member of the War Chamber of the Crimean Higher Tribunal. He studied at the Naval Academy from 1921 to 1927, before serving on some of the large warships of the Baltic Fleet. In 1929, he completed the higher command courses at the Frunze Military Academy. He was member of the teaching staff at the Naval Academy since 1931, head of the department of strategy and operational management 1932–1934, chief of staff of the Naval Academy 1934–1936, and commander of the Academy 1936–1937. In 1937, he was advisor to a flotilla commander in the Spanish Civil War, returned to the Soviet Union, was forced to retire, was arrested, and was under investigation for suspected treason until 1940, and again from 1941 to 1942.[10] He was chief of staff of the Ladoga Flotilla from 1942 to 1944, and commanded the Leningrad Naval Base in 1944. From 1944, he was assistant to the chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, specialising in navy affairs, and was appointed chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet in April 1945. He died in January 1946 when his aircraft, heading to Berlin, crashed near Tallinn.[11]

While most of the naval officers in the Imperial Russian Navy came from nobility, the new generation that rose to the command positions in the navy in the 1930s compensated their gaps in general

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[9] Vademin, "Âkimyčev Aleksandr Mihailovič – pervyj rukovoditel' voenno-morskoj strategičeskoj agenturnoj razvedki SSSR" [*Якимычев Александр Михайлович – первый руководитель военно-морской стратегической агентурной разведки СССР*], https://huntcatcher.ru/yakimychev-rukovoditel-voenno-morskoj-razvedki-sssr/ , 20 January 2025.

[10] According to his service record, he "performed a special government assignment from April 1936 to June 1940" and was "available to the navy staff department" from October 1941 to January 1942.

[11] Aleksandrov, Aleksandr Petrovič (Barr Aron Pinhusovič) (Александров Александр Петрович (Барр Арон Пинхусович)) 1900–1946, *Internet project commemorating Jewish soldiers*, jewmil.com (n.d.) https://www.jewmil.com/biografii/item/272-aleksandrov-aleksandr-petrovich , 20 January 2025.

education with merits earned in revolutionary engagements and political management of Red Army units. The author writes that Ludri, Dushenov, Yakimychev and Aleksandrov criticised the vision of their predecessors – Zherve and Petrov – that relied on large warships, arguing instead that the development of submarines and naval aviation had made the concept of sea power obsolete. The naval officers of the new Soviet school believed that focus should be shifted to destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats and naval air forces. Relying on a study by Robert W. Herrick, Oll summarises Aleksandrov's arguments as follows: technological development will preclude the possibility of establishing command of the sea in the future; Great Britain, Germany and France were unable to establish command of the sea even in World War I; Zherve and Petrov are mistaken, because they represent an "imperialist bourgeois ideology"; following the concept of the old school would mean a defeat for the Soviet navy, because they would be unable to wage such a war at sea. By the 1930s, the Soviet military industry had attained the capacity for producing submarines, torpedo boats and destroyers; design plans for Kirov class cruisers were ordered from Italy, and some were launched even before World War II. The actions of the Soviet Navy in World War II were based on the doctrine of the new school. Arto Oll writes that strengthening economic power of the Soviet Union enabled Stalin to plan the building of a powerful fleet and a return to the naval warfare ideas of the open sea school. In 1937, the navy was separated from the Red Army structure and converted into a separate branch. The construction of battleships was started but none of them were completed; the projects were terminated after Stalin's death in 1953.

The chapter on naval warfare theory in the Estonian Navy during the interwar period was also written by Arto Oll.[12] In the War of Independence (1918–1920), Estonia was able to use ships that had been left behind by Russia's Baltic Fleet or by the withdrawing German occupation forces. Early on, Estonia was given two new Russian destroyers, Avtroil and Spartak (renamed in the Estonian

[12] "Meresõjaline mõte ja Eesti merejõud", 47–61.

navy as Lennuk and Wambola), that had been seized by a British naval squadron from the Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland in December 1918. The author writes that Rear Admiral Johan Pitka, commander of the Estonian navy, while being an experienced ship captain and trained as a reserve officer of the Russian navy, was probably not very knowledgeable about the theory of naval warfare. Nevertheless, Estonian naval forces carried out landings and transport operations, supported the land forces with artillery fire, deployed and trawled mines, etc. This was all made possible by the British naval squadron that restrained the Soviet Baltic Fleet. A fleet is a very expensive service branch and there were even proposals to do away with the navy completely in the Estonian cabinet sessions in early 1920s. However, this path was not chosen. Furthermore, Estonia also inherited from imperial Russia the powerful coastal defence batteries of Peter the Great's Naval Fortress, parts of which around Tallinn were made operational in the 1920s and were included in the naval forces as naval fortifications.

The situation with trained naval officers was not much better in the Estonian Navy than the situation with ships. As the majority of Estonians had belonged to the class of peasants or townsfolk, they had no access to the elite Russian Naval Cadet Corps. While there were numerous Baltic German officers and even admirals from Estonia in the Russian navy, most of them did not join the navy of the young Republic of Estonia, with a few exceptions. In the 1920s, naval warfare theory was taught at the naval officers' advanced courses, the Navy Specialists' School, the Naval Cadet School, and the Military College by former officers of the imperial navy who had been educated before World War I under Nikolai Klado at the Naval Academy. None of them was an ethnic Estonian. Promoted to rear admiral in 1928, **Hermann Salza** (1885–1946)[13] had studied at

[13] In fact, Baron Hermann (von) Salza, but nobility titles were not included in names in the Republic of Estonia. His family came from Thuringia and lived in Estonia since the 17th century. Similarly, the commander of the Latvian navy from 1920 to 1931 was a Baltic German, namely Count Archibald Keyserling (1882–1951).

Navy Captain (Rear-admiral from 1928) Hermann Salza, Commander of the Estonian Navy from 1925 to 1932. Photo before 1928 by August Vannas. Source: National Archives of Estonia, RA, EFA.8.4.2108

the Emperor Nicholas Naval Academy from 1911 to 1914, served in the General Staff of the Imperial Russian Navy at the onset of World War I, was senior officer and commander of battleship Petropavlovsk from 1917 to 1918, and chief of the operational headquarters of the Baltic Fleet from July to October 1918, i.e., during the Bolshevik regime. He joined the Estonian Navy in January 1919 as 2nd Rank Captain, and served as chief of the navy staff from 29 January to 18 June 1919 and then from 20 January 1920 onwards. Salza was acting commander of the navy from 1924 to 1925, and commander from 1925 to 1932. At the same time, and after resigning command of the navy, he taught at various naval schools and the Military College.[14] In October 1939, he resettled to Germany, was imprisoned in 1945 under Soviet occupation in Germany, was deported to

[14] Service file of Hermann Salza, RA, ERA.495.7.5132.

Russia and died in 1946 in a Moscow prison. **Georg Weigelin** (Veigelin, 1886–1945) had studied submarine warfare at the Emperor Nicholas Naval Academy. In World War I, he had served as navigation officer of the 7th destroyer (mine cruiser) division of the Baltic Fleet, senior officer on minelayer Volga, and commander of submarine Tur. He came to Estonia as Lieutenant Senior Grade,[15] commanded destroyer Lennuk from 1918 to 1919, and then served in the Northern Corps of the Russian White Army. He acquired Estonian citizenship in 1921 and was assigned to the reserve. Later, as a civilian, he taught history and tactics of naval warfare at military schools. In 1939, he moved to Germany as a late resettler[16] and disappeared as member of the Volkssturm in early 1945 near Danzig (Gdańsk). Born in Kaunas, **Aleksander Malevitsch** (1887–1950) joined the Estonian Navy in January 1919 and served mainly as officer in mining, torpedo and naval artillery units until his retirement as Commander in 1930. He taught electrical engineering and mining at naval schools and signal operations at the Military College. He died in Türi, Estonia. Whereas Salza and Malevitsch started to teach in Estonian after a few years, Weigelin never learned to speak Estonian.

Salza's lecture notes on "Naval Warfare" at the Military College were published in several editions. He also wrote learning materials on "History of Naval Warfare: Beginning to 1914" and "Naval Tactics", as well as a description of "The Dardanelles Operation". Notes of his lectures "Военно-морское дело" (~Naval studies) for the General Staff Courses (predecessor of the Military College) were published in 1922. Similarly, Veigelin's notes "Программа по стратегии" (Programme on strategy) and "Программа по истории военно-морского искусства" (Programme on history of the art of naval war) were published.

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[15] In this article generally the designations of British navy ranks are used. Exception are the junior officers, because there are and were four ranks for them in Estonian navy: lipnik (Ensign), nooremleitnant (2nd Lieutenant), leitnant (Lieutenant) and vanemleitnant (Lieutenant Senior Grade).

[16] Service file of Georg Veigelin, RA, ERA.495.7.6572.

Both Salza and Veigelin had received their education at the Naval Academy based on the strategic open sea doctrine, writes Arto Oll. According to Salza, in a situation where the enemy had large battleships, Estonia's only hope would be aid from a major power because command of the sea would not be possible in any other way. Arto Oll writes, "Estonia's options included relying on the strategy of the open sea doctrine (taught by Salza and Weigelin), developing a new naval warfare theory to suit its particular situation, or borrowing certain aspects from existing theories and adapting them in a symbiotic manner to be suitable for a small nation."[17]

In a separate chapter, Arto Oll analyses the views of Estonian higher military commanders on the role of the navy in Estonian national defence.[18] Lieutenant General Laidoner, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces during the War of Independence, retired in 1920. His former chief of staff, Major General Jaan Soots, was the minister of war from 1921 to 1923 and from 1924 to 1927. Soots supported modernisation of the navy because he acknowledged Estonia's dependence on support from the allies, which required a maritime connection with the rest of the world. Despite the decreasing strength of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, it had still enough resources to attack Tallinn or to dispatch strong landing parties. Soots believed that Estonia needed submarines and capacity for laying minefields. Similarly, Major General Juhan Tõrvand, chief of staff of the Estonian Armed Forces from 1925 to 1934, supported strengthening of the navy. He also believed submarines to be essential, as they would be able to threaten the enemy's large battleships, thereby interfering with the efforts to achieve command of the sea. Arto Oll writes that Tõrvand was one of the main figures who helped the Estonian government reach an agreement on the need to modernise the navy in early 1930s. The two Russian destroyers that had been received from the Brits during the War of Independence were sold to Peru and an order was placed for two modern submarines. It was also

[17] "Meresõjaline mõte ja Eesti merejõud", 61.
[18] "Suhted kõrgema sõjalise juhtkonnaga", 62–69.

envisaged that the submarines would play a role in Finnish-Estonian military cooperation, which aimed at having capacity to close off the Gulf of Finland to the enemy's ships between Tallinn and Helsinki, using artillery fire from the coastal defence batteries of the Naissaar and Mäkiluoto islands. In an ironic twist, the navy fleet spelled an end to Tõrvand's career, as he and the minister of defence, August Kerem, were accused of taking a bribe when selling the destroyers to Peru. Even though both men were acquitted later – it turned out that the Peruvian attaché in Berlin had profiteered from the deal, in addition to arms traders – Tõrvand was removed from the position of the chief of staff.

General Nikolai Reek, who was chief of staff of the Armed Forces from 1934 to 1939, was less interested in the needs of the navy. Arto Oll writes that Reek believed the naval fortification batteries around Tallinn to be sufficient and did not see the enemy's capacity to operate across the entire length of Estonian coastline as a major threat. At that time, the higher military command considered the navy to be important "mainly for the defence of Tallinn, which had to be achieved with stationary coastal defence batteries near the coast, not with military units on the sea," the author writes. According to him, alliance value for Finland was the main consideration in the context of naval defence, with the submarines also serving the same purpose. Less attention was paid to the development of the navy and general naval defences. Captain Valev Mere, who commanded the navy from 1938 to 1939 and had been commander on both Estonian destroyers, as well as commander of the naval fortifications and chief of staff of the navy, and the last commander of the naval forces, Lieutenant Commander Johannes Santpank, both believed that the enemy would not be able to block Estonia's entire coastline but might still have enough potential for that if Estonia had no fleet whatsoever. In conclusion, Arto Oll argues that procuring a fleet that would be capable of performing all the necessary functions was too expensive for Estonia in the opinion of the higher military commanders. Partially, this belief was supported by hope that a British fleet would come to the Gulf of Finland in case of a war threat. That hope proved

to be baseless after the British-German naval agreement of 1935, which demonstrated that the Royal Navy would no longer consider the Baltic Sea as part of its sphere of interest.

In his article[19] on **Hermann Salza**, Taavi Urb writes that Salza's writings reveal clear influences of the maritime power and command of the sea doctrine of Mahan, Colomb and Klado but the concept of 'alliance value', which he uses as well, comes from Tirpitz. While Salza's assessment of the Battle of Jutland is similar to Wegener's, Salza has included no references to his ideas and the author conjectures that Salza reached the same conclusions on his own. The three elements of naval strategic operations that were taught at the Russian Naval Academy were also included, in a simplified form, in Salza's learning materials: preparatory element (fleet organisation, management of bases, fleet concentration and deployment), main element (operational plan, marching manoeuvre, battle and monitoring) and supplementary element (rear of the fleet, provision of support bases and communication lines). In his lecture notes, Salza analysed mostly tactics, i.e., battles, the author writes. Salza's idea of a sea battle in a prepared position is closer to the notion of coastal defence, rather than the maritime power and command of the sea doctrine. In World War I, the German plan to engage in a decisive battle at the reinforced position of Heligoland and the Baltic Fleet's plan to establish a secure position in the eastern corner of the Gulf of Finland and fight a decisive battle on the Gulf both failed, because the Royal Navy did not enter the German Bight and the bases of the Baltic Fleet, with the exception of Kronstadt and Petrograd/Leningrad, were captured from land in both world wars alike. In his "History of Naval Warfare" he emphasises concentration of forces to achieve superiority, mutual support, surprise and taking advantage of a victory achieved as the principles of war. Salza stressed the importance of military history – older history is important to understand strategy while more recent military history needs to be studied to understand tactics.

[19] "Hermann Salza meresõjateoreetikuna", 70–97.

Salza described and analysed military history mostly from a general perspective. In the context of the Baltic Sea, he concluded that Western major powers have, for centuries, tried to prevent emergence of a single dominant power in the Baltic Sea. Even though Salza does not write much about the War of Independence, the above claim is linked to his generalisation about the naval battles of that war – "Our successful operations in 1918 and 1919 were facilitated by the mighty English fleet". Salza believed that the functions of the navy included securing free use of the sea in wartime, preventing the enemy's use of the seaways, protecting one's own coast and providing opportunities for engagements against the enemy coast. A strong fleet needs to lure the enemy to the sea and then destroy it in a decisive battle. A weaker fleet must strike at the enemy in sections. If Estonia's small fleet is unable to achieve command of the sea without allied aid, it must prevent the enemy from establishing a blockade.

Salza envisaged that artillery, with its increased range and more accurate targeting systems, as well as large battleships would play an important role in future naval warfare. This coincided with the vision of the major naval powers in the interwar period. He believed that submarines were important in naval warfare to pose a constant threat to surface vessels and that Estonian submarines would provide effective deterrence even against the large ships of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Salza also predicted increased role for aircraft in long-range reconnaissance and bombing of moving ships. In Salza's opinion, coastal defence batteries – naval fortifications – were a difficult target for the navy because, even though they are stationary, it is difficult to monitor the hits of fired shells. Salza believed that establishing too many coastal defence batteries would be imprudent, because they need a lot of manpower for their crews but may never be involved in any battles. Taavi Urb observes that this point tends to be overlooked even today. However, naval fortifications and minefields alone cannot ensure security of a nation's freighters.

Salza approaches the issue of navy development and naval defence "from the outside in," Taavi Urb writes. Salza did not agree with

the authors who emphasised coastal defence as the main priority of the navy, and pointed out that Estonia's aquatic border, including Lake Peipsi, is much longer than the land border. In a 1924 memo to the minister of war, he listed defence of the capital from sea bombardment, defence of the coast against landings and maintaining maritime connections with the rest of the world as the primary functions of the navy. According to Salza's vision from 1924, the Estonian Navy would have required two additional guard ships and three submarines, whereas the naval fortifications would have needed two mobile batteries.[20] In a memo written in 1926, Salza added blocking seaways for the enemy's freight ships as the fourth function of the navy. Deterrence was also important for him. Taavi Urb quotes his argument: "Even though we would not be able to resist a serious offensive for long, we can reasonably hope to prevent such an assault by having our military preparation at a level where the sacrifice needed to occupy our state outweighs any potential benefits."

In the next chapter[21] Commander Urb writes about the use of the term 'coastal defence' in Estonian military literature from 1924 to 1940. His research is based on Estonian military periodicals: the journal *Sõdur* (Soldier; published 1919–1940), the Defence League journal *Kaitse Kodu!* (Defend your Home!; 1925–1940) and the publication *Merendus* (Maritime Affairs; 1933–1940) of the Naval Officers' Association. "A study of military thought requires an understanding of the terms used for its expression," the author comments. At the time when Estonian military terminology was still developing, it often happened that the same term was given multiple meanings by different authors or even by the same author, as illustrated by the examples that Taavi Urb provides. The adopted terminology could sometimes also indicate whether the respective author preferred the command of the sea doctrine or the coastal defence theory.

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[20] The Baltic Fleet used heavy rail batteries in Estonia in 1940 and 1941, whereas the German Army used towable motorised coastal defence batteries in 1941 and 1944.

[21] "Rannakaitse mõiste Eesti sõjandusajakirjades aastatel 1924–1940", 98–119 and 166–172.

Further differences emerged due to the specifics of different service branches – land, naval and air forces interpreted coastal defence from the perspective of the weapons, functions and needs of their respective branch. In articles, written by numerous authors over a period of 16 years, the terms 'shore defence', 'coastal defence' and 'naval defence' could be used as synonyms or alternatively as descriptions of specific sub-categories. The term 'coastal defence' itself has two subordinate meanings – a type of military actions and an organisation that executes them – which were not differentiated by some authors in their articles.

In 1932, captain **Harald Roots** (1905–1986) graduated from the Military College with a thesis on "The importance, functions, organisation and complement of the navy, especially in our situation" in which he defined coastal defence as "combined efforts that are concentrated in a particular coastal area and in the nearby coastal waters with the specific purpose of direct defence against an assault from the sea as the main direction, as well as from air and sometimes from land". As subcategories of coastal defence, he identified defending the coast against bombing, fending off landings, protecting naval bases, and other operations on the coast and in coastal waters. Taavi Urb notes that the breadth of territorial waters at the time was only three miles from the coast and, in principle, the coastal defence units were able to protect the entire maritime area of the territorial waters. According to Harald Roots, coastal defence was both a function and an organisation at the same time. He emphasised the need for a separate coastal defence organisation that should include, in addition to the coastal defence artillery as the main force, also a fleet of ships, an air force, and land units to enable other service branches to focus on their main functions.

In the last chapter[22] of the collection, Arto Oll presents reflections on the future of naval warfare and the Estonian navy, written in the 1930s by navy officers Johannes Santpank, Bruno Linneberg

[22] "Meresõjalised mõtlejad Eesti merejõududes 1930. aastatel", 120–156.

and Johannes Ivalo. Lieutenant Commander **Santpank**[23] had published his first writings, gun manuals for *komendors*, as early as the 1920s: "6-inch Canet Gun" and "75 mm Möller Gun" (both in 1925) and "4-inch/60 Cal. Semi-Automatic Gun" (1929). In the 1930s, his articles on naval strategy and tactics were published in the journals *Sõdur* and *Merendus*, and in 1939 he prepared a learning material on "Naval Tactics". In his graduation paper (1937) at the Finnish War College, he discussed the naval strategic importance of Estonian islands from the perspective of Estonia, the Soviet Union, Germany and other states.[24] Santpank believed that naval warfare consisted of theoretical naval strategy (operations) and naval tactics (use of weapons in battle), but the boundary between strategy and tactics had become less clear due to the development of military technology. Advancements in weaponry have made battles in smaller seas more precarious for larger ships and have given an advantage to smaller and faster vessels. However, Santpank did not underestimate the military potential of battleships. He believed that modern submarines, torpedo boats and mine layers were the most suitable types of vessels for the Estonian naval forces. According to him, only torpedoes could be used by a small country as viable weapons in a fight against the fleet of a major power. Notably, he proposed a new type of ship that

[23] Johannes Santpank (1901–54) fought in the War of Independence (awarded Cross of Liberty II/3), graduated from the Naval Cadet School in 1921, 2nd Lieutenant, course officer and adjutant at the school from 1921 to 1922. He studied in navigation, artillery and electrical engineering courses in England from 1922 to 1923, served as artillery officer on gun boat Lembit and destroyer Lennuk from 1922 to 1928, assistant commander on Lennuk from 1926. Promoted Lieutenant in 1925. Studied in higher artillery courses in England from 1928 to 1929, served as artillery officer of the Navy Base in 1929–37, Lieutenant Senior Grade in 1930. Studied at the Finnish War College from 1935 to 1937, navigation officer at the navy headquarters in 1937–38, Lieutenant Commander in 1938. Commander of torpedo boat Sulev from 1938 to 1939. Was editor-in-chief of the journal *Merendus*. In November 1939, after commander of the navy Valev Mere retired due to the escape of Polish submarine Orzeł that had been interned in the port of Tallinn, Santpank was appointed as his replacement. Soviet State Security (NKVD) arrested Santpank in 1941 and he died in a GULAG camp in Karagandy Oblast. (Officers' cardfile, RA, ERA.495.13.57; *Eesti Vabaduse Risti kavalerid*, toim. Jaak Pihlak (Viljandi: Eesti Vabadussoja Ajaloo Selts, 2016), 417).

[24] Kapteeniluutnantti J. Sandbank, „Viron Itämeren saariston merisotilaallinen merkitys". (Sotakorkeakoulu, diplomityö, 1937), National Archives of Finland, SKK-1:280.

would be suitable for the Estonian situation – a destroyer adapted to serve as a small minelayer/cruiser. From a strategic perspective, Santpank assumed that a new war would break out sooner or later in the Baltic Sea region, with the major powers being particularly interested in the North Estonian coast and West Estonian islands.[25] In many respects, Santpank's views were similar to those of Salza: he also believed that the functions of the Estonian navy included securing maritime transport and connections in wartime, protecting the coast and Tallinn in particular against attacks from the sea, and ensuring safe navigation of freight vessels.

Lieutenant Commander **Linneberg**[26] was about the same age as Santpank and they also had similar careers in the navy. They studied

[25] His prediction was accurate. In the autumn of 1939, the Soviet Union forced the Baltic states to accept establishment of Soviet military bases on their territory. For Estonia and Latvia, it also meant establishment of footholds for the Baltic Fleet, in addition to those of the Red Army. After the Baltic states were finally occupied in the summer of 1940, the Baltic Fleet rushed to build coastal defence batteries, airfields and defensive positions on the West Estonian islands to control navigation on the Baltic Sea and in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and to close the Gulf of Riga, thereby controlling access to the port of Riga. In the summer of 1941, capturing the North Estonian coast and the West Estonian islands was also one of Wehrmacht's main objectives in order to force the Baltic Fleet to retreat to the eastern corner of the Gulf of Finland and to open safe seaways for supplying the Army Group North that was besieging Leningrad, while also ensuring secure transport of ore from Sweden across the Baltic Sea.

[26] Bruno Linneberg (1899–1964) fought in the War of Independence (Cross of Liberty II/3), after which he graduated from the Naval Cadet School and was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1921. He studied navigation, torpedo and electrical engineering in England from 1922 to 1923. In 1923–24, he served in naval fortification, and then on both Estonian destroyers, and was acting commander of gunship Mardus and guard ship Laine. Promoted to Lieutenant in 1925. Studied again in England in 1928 and 1929, completing a course on signalling. Assistant commander of destroyer Lennuk from 1929 to 1931, Lieutenant Senior Grade in 1930, senior warrant officer of the commander of the naval forces from 1931. Studied at the Finnish War College from 1935 to 1937, commander of the Tallinn naval communications region of the navy headquarters from 1936 to 1938, acting commander of the navy class at the Military School in 1938, Lieutenant Commander. Served as commander of precinct A of the 2nd department of the headquarters of the Armed Forces in 1939, commander of the navy headquarters in 1939–1940. Escaped to Germany as a late resettler in 1941, served in German military intelligence and navy in World War II, was promoted to Frigate Captain. Was captured in Oslo in 1945 and was a prisoner of war in Germany. Lived in Sweden from 1949 and worked as head of the archive department of the German embassy. (Cardfile of officers and military clerks L–P, RA, ERA.495.1.731; *Eesti Vabaduse Risti kavalerid*, 417).

together at the Finnish War College. Arto Oll remarks that the notes of research projects submitted in Linneberg's courses for naval officers have not been preserved. His diploma paper at the Finnish War College, "Estonia's dependence on maritime connections in wartime,"[27] discusses Estonia's strategic position and military defence; he relies, among others, on Wolfgang Wegener's views concerning the strategy of naval warfare. Linneberg concluded that Estonian economy is not independent in peacetime, and thus even less so during war, and maritime connections with Great Britain, Sweden and Finland play a decisive role in Estonia's defence. Estonia's security was completely dependent on the Baltic Sea and the Soviet Union was the most dangerous enemy for Estonia. He argued, following Wegener, that the strategic position of any country depends primarily on geography, which in turn will affect national military defence strategy. Therefore, Estonia's strategic objective was maintaining its current geographic position, including the West Estonian islands. Weaknesses of Estonia's position included a geographically narrow coast and few ports of strategic importance; it was relatively easy to disrupt Estonia's maritime connections with Great Britain, its main trade partner; access to the ocean was difficult and Estonian maritime connections passed through multiple hazardous seaways. Linneberg emphasised the importance of fortifying the ports of Tallinn and Pärnu, as well as that of Paldiski, to a lesser extent, and achieving at least temporary command of the sea in the Naissaar-Porkkala area to prevent the Baltic Fleet from accessing these ports. He concluded that Estonia must be capable of retaining its maritime connections in wartime. Considering Estonia's geographic position, preservation of maritime connections cannot be secured without modernisation of naval weaponry, and Estonian economic policy should move towards greater autonomy of supply. According to him, maintaining Estonia's strategic position would require joint exercises of the freight fleet, navy and air forces to train cooperation in the defence of strategic

[27] Kapteeniluutnantti B. Linneberg, „Viron riippuvaisuus meriyhteyksistään sodan aikana". (Sotakorkeakoulu, diplomityö, 1937), National Archives of Finland, SKK-1:281.

positions. Linneberg wrote that, in case of a war, Estonia's forefronts would be located mostly at sea, because a warring army and nation require food and supplies.

Johannes **Ivalo**[28] was one of the executive editors and author of numerous articles for the journal *Merendus*. Arto Oll highlights his notable series of articles on doctrinal principles of maritime warfare of a small country (small war), published in *Merendus* from 1935 to 1936. Ivalo saw the potential of a small navy in small ships that are faster than the enemy's vessels, a modern naval reconnaissance network, selection of ship types that are suitable for local coastal waters, a large fleet of small ships (submarines and motor/torpedo boats), at least two well-organised naval bases, a defined command structure, and well thought-out military objectives. He believed that a small nation should not use the doctrines of major powers as a model and should instead specialise on particular areas based on its needs. His suggested areas of specialisation for Estonia included torpedoes, mines and fogging. According to Ivalo, the concept of a small war at sea is "[---] a mode of warfare characterised, firstly, by the composition of the participating forces and, secondly, by the nature of operations carried out by these forces." Torpedoes and mines were the primary weapons in a small war, and the navy had to be supported by the air force. A skilful and consistent

[28] Johannes Ivalo (1902–2001) was born in Kihelkonna, Saaremaa, as a son to non-commissioned border guard officer Dmitri Ivashchenko, originally from Kiev Governorate, and a local lady. Before Estonianisation in 1934, his family name was Ivasčenko or Redlik-Ivasčenko. After completing the Saaremaa Upper Secondary School, he studied law at the University of Tartu in 1922–1925. Following conscript service, he completed the naval course at the Military School, 2nd Lieutenant in 1928. Commander of the training company of the Navy Equipage in 1928–1929, company commander and assistant mine/torpedo specialist on destroyer Lennuk in 1929–1931, assistant commander of guard ship Laine in 1931–1939, Lieutenant in 1932. Mine/torpedo specialist on torpedo boat Sulev in 1939–1940, Lieutenant Senior Grade in 1940, appointed commander of gun ship Mardus in April. At the same time, 1935–1940, worked as one of the executive editors of the journal *Merendus*. During the German occupation, commander of the Port of Tallinn platoon of the Harjumaa Home Guard, fled to Sweden in 1944. (Cadfile of officers and military clerks A–K, RA, ERA.495.1.730; Ivastschenko, Dimitri Ivani p. ja Johannes Dimitri p., RA, ERA.14.13.1261; Album Academicum Universitatis Tartuensis, https://www.ra.ee/apps/andmed/index.php/matrikkel/view?id=3857, 15 January 2025).

application of this concept would, Ivalo believed, force the enemy to forego the operational engagements that it had considered advantageous.

In a separate section, Arto Oll discusses the Estonian naval officers' ideas about the use of aircraft in a future war. Estonia had very few airplanes in the War of Independence, and they were rarely used in battles. During World War I, the Russian Baltic Fleet had established a modern – in contemporary terms – seaplane harbour at the Tallinn military port, and cooperation between aircraft and navy was not unprecedented in the Baltic Sea. However, development of naval aviation was held back by the limited number of aircraft in Estonia and by the ideas of the higher military command on the role of the air force in national defence. The important role of aircraft in naval reconnaissance had become clear by the 1920s. Lieutenant Commander Eustaatius **Miido**[29] compared the role of submarines and aircraft in coastal defence and argued that procuring 15 bombers would be preferable to buying a single submarine, as the former could be used for naval reconnaissance and for bombing the enemy's ships and naval bases if necessary. However, these aircraft would not be capable of attacking a larger squadron equipped with air defence guns. His paper was motivated by the debate, started in the United States in mid-1920s, on the increasing role of naval air forces in coastal defence. Lieutenant Senior Grade Santpank countered that airplanes cannot sink large, modern warships. The future vision for Estonian naval forces in early 1930s included military aircraft. When an order for submarines

[29] Eustaatius Miido (1893–1978). Studied at Liepāja Maritime School, reserve ensign of the Russian Fleet in 1916, midshipman in 1917; senior officer and commander on a mine trawler. Fought in the War of Independence on gun ship Lembit, Lieutenant in 1919 (Cross of Liberty II/3); acting senior navigation officer on Lembit in 1921–1922, Lieutenant Senior Grade in 1922. Assistant commander of the Naval Cadet School in 1922–1923, commander of torpedo boat Sulev in 1924–1937, commander of destroyer Lennuk in 1932–1933. Lieutenant Commander in 1925, Commander in 1933. Retired in 1937 and managed a farm. Was arrested by NKVD in 1941, deported and imprisoned in a GULAG camp until 1956. After that was employed in a collective farm in Estonia. (Cadfile of officers and military clerks, L–P, RA, ERA.495.1.731; *Eesti Vabaduse Risti kavalerid*, 467).

Senior Lieutenant Eustaatius (Evstafi) Miido, commander of the torpedo boat Sulev, 1924. Source: National Archives of Estonia, RA, EFA.272.0.167125

was placed in England in mid-1930s, the air force also hoped to modernise its air fleet. The Estonian air force believed that it had a role to play in naval defence, whereas naval officers saw the main use of airplanes in naval reconnaissance. Navy commander Captain Valentin **Grenz**[30] joined the debate in 1933, arguing that air force cannot replace the navy, especially in countries like Estonia that depend on maritime trade. In contrast, air force commander,

[30] Valentin Grenz (1888–1944) graduated from the Paldiski Maritime School as high seas helmsman. Served in the Russian Baltic Fleet from 1913 to 1918, naval ensign in 1914, commander of transport vessel Snarjad in 1915–1918, midshipman in 1917. Fought in the War of Independence on gun ship Lembit in 1918, on destroyers Vambola and Lennuk in 1918–1919, commander of Vambola from 1919 to 19 22, Lieutenant in 1919, Lieutenant Senior Grade in 1920 (Cross of Liberty II/3). Senior navigation officer at the navy headquarters in 1922–1925, Lieutenant Commander in 1924. Commander of the navy headquarters in 1925–1932, Commander in 1926, Navy Captain in 1930. Acting commander of the naval forces in 1932–1934, commander from 1934 to 19 38, then retired. Arrested by NKVD in 1941, died in a GULAG prison camp. (*Eesti Vabaduse Risti kavalerid*, 186).

Air Defence Commander Colonel Richard Tomberg. A Portrait.
Source: Estonian War Museum, KLM FT 1060:1 F

Colonel Richard **Tomberg** (1897–1982) believed that it would be better for Estonia to buy 90 bombers or 60 torpedo planes instead of two submarines and three torpedo boats. This debate between the air force and the navy on the use of aircraft in naval defence resurfaced later as well. The navy officers did not deny the importance of the air force, but believed that airplanes cannot replace ships, especially submarines. According to Johannes Santpank, this belief was supported by weapons procurements of other countries that still invested in modernisation of their naval defence fleets. In late 1930s, Navy Captain Valev **Mere**[31] held lectures on naval warfare at

[31] Valev Mere (1893–1949) served in the Russian Navy since 1914, naval ensign in 1916. Served on mine trawlers in 1916–1918. Fought in the War of Independence from 1918 to 1920 as senior mine officer and senior officer on gun ship Lembit, Lieutenant in 1919 (Cross of Liberty II/3). Senior officer on destroyer Vambola in 1921–1922, Lieutenant Senior Grade. Commander of gun ship Meeme from 1922 to 1923, acting commander of destroyer Vambola from 1923 to 1924,

the Military College. He wrote in his lecture notes that the naval air force should be part of the navy and operate in close cooperation with the fleet, performing reconnaissance and attacking the enemy's warships and coastal structures, as well as opposing the enemy's aircraft. However, modernisation of the navy was a slow process – the country did not have enough money for everything – and Estonia has never been able to establish a dedicated naval air force.

Arto Oll concludes that the Soviet technical service branches in World War II were unable to defeat an inferior opponent, drive the Finnish air force to surrender, and disrupt Finnish economy and port operations.[32]

The chapters by Dr Arto Oll and Commander Taavi Urb provide a framework for the history of naval warfare theory in interwar Estonia, starting with an introduction to the history of naval warfare theory in Europe, the USA, the Russian Empire, and Germany. It is notable that, even though Estonia had almost no officers with higher naval education and the relatively randomly assembled navy was commanded in the War of Independence by men who had mostly trained in wartime ensign courses, they were able to establish a functional fleet with support from the British squadron. As early as January 1921, the government decided to allow the minister of war to send five officers from the general staff, two from engineering units,

Lieutenant Commander in 1924. Completed regular army officers' courses in 1925. Commander of destroyer Vambola from 1924 to 1927, acting commander of naval fortifications from 1927 to 1929, Commander in 1928. Commander of destroyer Lennuk from 1929–32. Acting chief of staff of the naval forces from 1932 to 1936, studied at the Military College from 1934 to 1936. Navy Captain in 1936, commander of naval fortifications in 1936–1937, chief of staff of the naval forces in 1937–1938, commander of the Naval Forces in 1938–1939. Forced to resign due to the escape of Polish submarine Orzeł that had been interned at the port of Tallinn, master of a freight ship in 1939–1941. During the German occupation, master of tug Steinort, fled to Germany in 1944. (Cardfile of officers and military clerks L–P, RA, ERA.495.1.731; *Eesti Vabaduse Risti kavalerid*, 464).

[32] However, the air force of the Baltic Fleet played an important role in slowing the advance of Wehrmacht's infantry divisions in Estonia in the summer of 1941. The air force of the Baltic Fleet caused significant losses to the German forces in continental Estonia and on West Estonian islands. In August and September 1941, bombers of the Baltic Fleet carried out air attacks against Berlin from Saaremaa, even though they mostly had only propagandistic significance.

five from the artillery and three from the navy to higher military schools abroad to upgrade their knowledge and experience.[33] Before rising to the command of the Estonian naval forces in the second half of the 1930s, Johannes Santpank and Bruno Linneberg were among the first to study abroad. Later, they also graduated from the Finnish War College. Unfortunately, they were able to apply their knowledge as commanders of Estonian naval forces for less than a year. Estonia was occupied, Santpank disappeared in a GULAG prison camp, and Linneberg served in the Kriegsmarine during World War II. Their visions of the future of Estonia's naval forces were restrained by Estonia's limited financial resources for weapons purchases, as well as by the onset of the world war.

In addition to some minor errors, there are some regrettable inconsistencies in terminology. Arto Oll sometimes uses the term 'blue-water doctrine' instead of the 'open sea doctrine'; a better presentation of the connections between the terms 'maritime supremacy', 'supremacy on the sea', 'maritime power', 'maritime power in open sea', and 'command of the sea' would have been useful, even though the meaning of specific passages is usually understandable upon careful reading. There is also some duplication – both authors present a summary of Harald Roots' graduation paper at the Swedish Military College.

Professor Aleksei Baiov and his legacy in military sciences

Igor Kopõtin's book on Aleksei Baiov presents his biography and work in military sciences, while also providing an overview of the organisation of studies at the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg before World War I, the debates held there between different doctrines and schools, and finally his work as professor at the Estonian Military College. Dr Kopõtin raises two

[33] Decision of the Government, 14 January 1921, RA, ERA.31.2.1030.

research questions: What were Baiov's views on the theory of warfare and the factors that influenced them? How well did these views meet the needs of Estonian national defence and what was their impact on the development of Estonian military theory and research. While Nikolai Reek – proponent of development of Estonian military education and Baiov's student at the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy, also the first commander, from 1921 to 1923, of the Estonian general staff courses, which eventually became the Military College – later studied at a higher military school (École de guerre) in France and tried to cultivate Western European military thought in Estonia, Kopõtin demonstrates that even Reek was not free of influences of Russian military thought and of Baiov.

Lieutenant General Aleksei Baiov (1871–1935) was born to a military family. His father and older brother were also lieutenant generals and his younger brother was colonel. Baiov was born in Uman, Kiev Governorate, and his father was member of nobility in Poltava Governorate. The roots of the family go back to France and Sweden. The ancestor of the Baiovs, Swedish count Oskar Boev (in Russian at first Бёв, later Боэв or Боев) was invited in 1613 to serve in the Russian army by Tsar Mikhail I who gave him a manor in Voronezh Governorate. The family of Oskar Boev's father, Sigismund Boev, Count of Hauteville, had relocated to Sweden during the Hundred Years' War.

Baiov studied at Kiev Cadet Corps, 2nd Konstantin Military School, and graduated from the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy in 1896 with a 1st rank diploma, before being promoted to Captain of the General Staff. Then he served in the staff of the Vilno (Vilnius) military district (in the meantime completing practical training as company commander at the 105th Orenburg Infantry Regiment), was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1900 and was then chief of the staff formation department in the Brest-Litovsk Fortress. Served in the General Staff from 1901 to 1904. Was administrator of the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy from 1904 to 1914 and also associate professor of the history of Russian warfare in 1906 and ordinary professor from 1906 to 1914. Promoted to Colonel in

1905, was in training as battalion commander in the Life Guard Jäger Regiment from May to September 1908, and was promoted to Major General in 1911. Kopõtin writes that wartime duties of the teaching staff at the General Staff Academy had not been planned in advance by the Russian army, which is why all professors below the rank of general were appointed to serve as chiefs of staff at second-rate divisions. Generals had the right to choose their own service location. However, in the summer of 1914, Baiov was appointed as warrant general for Cavalry General Aleksei Brusilov, commander of the 8th Army, who then named him chief of staff of the 24th Army Corps. After that Baiov served for a while as quartermaster general for the 3rd Army staff and as chief of staff from 1915 to 1917. Allegedly, Baiov managed to make the army staff work at such a high level that it operated flawlessly for two years. He was promoted to Lieutenant General in 1915 and served as commander of the 42nd Infantry Division for two months in the spring of 1917. In the summer of 1917, Baiov returned as professor of the General Staff Academy and served then as commander of the 10th Army Corps and as commander of the 2nd Army at the end of the year.

Since January 1918, Baiov served in the Red Army and taught at the Military Academy. In 1919, he lived in Pavlovsk near Petrograd that was captured by the forces of General Nikolai Yudenich in October. Baiov had remained true to his monarchist views. For him, the capturing of Pavlovsk came as liberation. However, the position he was given in Yudenich's army – chairman of the army audit committee – did not correspond to Baiov's education and experience, Kopõtin writes. The Russian Whites only valued service experience gained in their army.

From 1920 to 1926, Baiov served as lecturer at the Estonian Military School and general staff courses, the predecessor of the Military College. More on this below. His resignation from the Military College was caused by conflicts with Nikolai Reek and a desire to focus on the politics of Russian emigrants. In 1926, he attended the Paris Congress of Russian Emigrants, representing Russian emigrants in Estonia. In Estonia, he chaired the veteran associations of the Life Guard Jäger

Regiment and Chevaliers of the Order of St. George. He was also the actual publisher of Russian emigrants' newspapers *Ревельское время* (Tallinn Times) and *Ревельское слово* (Tallinn Word). Baiov's activity as a leader of Russian emigrants was of great interest for Soviet intelligence agencies. When the Red Army occupied Estonia in the summer of 1940, five years after Baiov's death, the NKVD arrested Baiov's adopted son Sergei Zharkevich in Tallinn already in June. The NKVD investigators were mainly interested in his relation to Baiov, Baiov's contacts with Russian emigrants in other countries and the location of Baiov's archive. Indeed, Zharkevich did testify that the archive was located in bookshop Vene Raamat (Russian Book) in Tallinn, which the NKVD believed to be an emigrant espionage centre. Whether the NKVD actually found the archive is unknown.[34]

At the **Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy**, Baiov was professor of the history of Russian warfare. The department of the history of Russian warfare was established only in 1890 and its first professor was Dmitri Maslovski who emphasised the importance of Russian national warfare. He was among the people who shaped Baiov's worldview. In 1906, Baiov took over this professorship from general Aleksandr Myshlaevskij who had also argued that warfare always has a clear national character and that Russian warfare was not inferior to that of the West and could sometimes even surpass it. Similarly, at the start of his professorship, Baiov promised to fight against "cosmopolitanism of the army"; according to him, the time when Russian warfare was based on war experiences of Western nations was now over.

There were several competing schools in Russian military sciences at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Infantry general Genrikh Leer (1829–1904), commander of the Emperor

[34] On this, see *Estonia 1940–1945, reports of the Estonian International Commission for Investigation of the Crimes against Humanity*, edited by Toomas Hiio, Meelis Maripuu, Indrek Paavle (Tallinn: Inimsusvastaste Kuritegude Uurimise Eesti Sihtasutus, 2006), 312. Investigation file of Sergei Zarkevich, RA, ERAF.129SM.1.28198.

Nicholas General Staff Academy from 1889 to 1898, was a very productive military theorist who claimed in his works on strategy that the laws (principles) of warfare are timeless. His contemporary, Infantry General Mikhail Dragomirov (1830–1905), who had commanded the Academy from 1878 to 1889, was an expert in tactics and effectively denied the existence of military theory, considering war to be more like art. Kopõtin writes that Dragomirov prioritised the training and education principles attributed to Generalissimo Aleksandr Suvorov, while ignoring the realities of modern warfare (such as ever increasing firepower and the use of telephony and telegraphy). Kopõtin argues that Baiov tended to support Dragomirov's ideas – he was a nationalist and a traditionalist Slavophile, but in his worldview he was able to combine the assault tactics of Suvorov and Dragomirov with Leer's beliefs on academic military sciences and warfare, based on the experience of the Western civilisation.

After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the school of 'Young Turks' gained traction at the General Staff Academy – they looked to Western military sciences and blamed the defeat on the lack of knowledge about modern warfare in the Russian army. Kopõtin cites US historian John W. Steinberg who argues that Nikolai Mikhnevich (1849–1927), commander of the Academy from 1904 to 1907, appointed Baiov as administrator of the Academy specifically because he wanted to reinvigorate the nationalist school and retain their position of power at the Academy.

The Russo-Japanese War was followed by a reform of the Russian armed forces, spearheaded by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (1856–1929) who was popular among officers and became commander of the Russian armed forces at the start of World War I. His plans included reorganisation of teaching at the General Staff Academy. However, the reform soon petered out, partially because of opposition from general Vladimir Sukhomlinov, the reactionary minister of war. Nevertheless, neither party completely discarded the opponents' claims. Nikolai Golovin (1875–1944), professor of the general staff service at the General Staff Academy, believed to be the representative of the 'Young Turks', acknowledged the integral effect

of using moral factors and firepower ("fire and movement"). Kopõtin writes that, according to Baiov, moral factors surpassed firepower because fire was only supposed to create conditions for a decisive infantry attack, whereas Golovin believed that it would be wrong to see moral factors and firepower as opposites because integration of both is required for victory in a modern battle.

As professor, Baiov preferred traditional lectures, or the lecturer's monologue, to active learning methods because the content of teaching was more important than the form. Many graduates of the General Staff Academy have rated the teaching in that period as tedious. Kopõtin writes that in their memories, Baiov was a bland and monotonous teacher who showed no interest in modern warfare and focused only on the 18th century, which was his own research interest. He presented his subject, the history of Russian warfare, by reciting the text of his notes, with only a few additional explanations. And his notes were mostly copied from the works of other authors. Professor Boris Gerua, a supporter of Golovin, wrote that Baiov sincerely believed that applied teaching methods would transform military higher education into a regimental training commando.

Kopõtin summarises: Before World War I, the debate on Russian military doctrine returned to the classical issue of war theory, i.e., whether warfare is science or art, or Clausewitz versus Jomini, and it was associated with a clash between the nationalist and academic schools. Being a leader of the young nationalist generation, Baiov not only adopted Leer's beliefs on timeless principles of warfare and military science but also his position that a scientifically justified unitary doctrine of war was necessary. Baiov seems to have agreed with the idea of two doctrinal models: defensive (France) and offensive (Germany) that had to be adapted to the Russian situation. However, Baiov rejected the thesis that modern principles of war are identical for all nations.

Aleksei Baiov as teacher at the Estonian General Staff Courses and the Military College. During the War of Independence and in the early 1920s, there were fewer than a dozen Estonian officers with higher military education. They were also rather young, having graduated from the General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg shortly

before World War I like general Johan Laidoner (1912) or during the war, or whose studies had been interrupted by the war. The General Staff Courses were established in 1921 to train Estonia's own staff officers. From 1920 to 1926, Baiov was lecturer at the Estonian Military School and General Staff Courses, the predecessor of the Military College. He was invited to serve as professor for the General Staff Courses by Major General Jaan Soots, who was minister of war at the time. Baiov wrote the statute and the first curriculum of the courses and recruited the teaching staff. As he was one of the more prominent members of the local Russian expatriate community, it was easy for him to find suitable people. As a temporary solution, several Russian staff officers and generals were invited to teach, including some former members of the teaching staff at the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy. While a quick transition to Estonian language in military (higher) education was considered important, this generation of Estonian officers had no problems understanding Russian – they had been raised in the period of Russification when Russian was the language of teaching in city schools and upper secondary schools, not to mention the military schools of the Imperial Army.[35]

Teachers in the general staff courses included, in addition to Baiov, Major Generals Gleb Vannovski[36] (cavalry tactics and staff services) and Vladimir Drake[37] (artillery and artillery tactics). The author does not mention acting professor of tactics, Major General Dmitri

[35] Systematic efforts to develop Estonian military terminology started during World War I and increased after Estonian national units of the Russian Army (founded in 1917) switched to Estonian language overnight after declaration of Estonia's independence in February 1918. See, e.g., *Eesti Kamandu sõnad jalawäele, koostanud I jalaväe polgu oskussõnade komisjon* (Orders for Infantry in Estonian Language, Compiled by the Terminology Committee of the 1st Infantry Regiment), toimetanud Karl Tulmin (Tallinn: s.n., 1918).

[36] Before the Russo-Japanese War, Gleb Vannovski (1862–1943) was Russia's military attaché in Japan. In World War I, he served as commander of the 5th Don Cossacks Regiment, then commanded two army corps one after other in 1917, was appointed commandeering officer of the 1st Army in July, was dismissed in September for supporting Lavr Kornilov's attempted coup, and was in prison for a while. Served in the Russian Volunteer Army in 1917–1918. Left Estonia at the end of the 1920s and died in Cannes, France.

[37] Vladimir Drake's (1874–1932) last position in the Imperial Army was artillery inspector of the 49th Army Corps. After retirement, he was a shareholder of the Kohila Paper Factory in Estonia.

Lebedev,[38] who arrived in Estonia a little later. Other Russian emigrants who taught the courses[39] included Lieutenant Senior Grade Ivan Golenishchev-Kutuzov[40] (airplanes and armoured equipment), Commander Aleksandr Malevitsch[41] (signalling), Professor Nikolai Erassi (1871–1930, taught geodesy and landscape photography), Pjotr Marisev who taught military engineering, and finally General Staff Colonel Arthur Salf, an Estonian.[42]

Baiov and Major General Drake relied on the experience of World War I and thought of the Russian Civil War and the Estonian War of Independence as exceptions rather than a rule. Kopõtin writes that, in opposing them, officers of the younger generation, incl. Nikolai Reek, tended to put too much importance on the experience of the War of Independence. Kopõtin assumes that, in addition to Baiov's traditionalism, Nikolai Reek also disliked his Russian nationalism and his thesis about distinctly Russian warfare. Baiov's notes on the evolution of warfare included many topics dedicated to Russian warfare. Reek who commanded the General Staff Courses from 1921 to 1923, studied at a French higher military school since 1923. After he returned to Estonia in November 1925 and was appointed Chief of the General Staff, he proposed

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[38] Dimitri Lebedev (1872–1935) was born in Estonia as a son of an Orthodox priest. He taught at the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy from 1911 to 1914 and in 1917, and at the Red Army Military Academy since 1918. In 1917, he was briefly editor of the Russian military journal *Voyennyi sbornik* and the newspaper *Russki Invalid*. He came to Estonia in 1922 and was later active as arms trader.

[39] According to the book *Kõrgem sõjakool 1921–1931* (Tallinn, 1931), 54–65. Biographic details: *Russkaia Estoniâ* [Russian Estonia], http://russianestonia.eu; Database of Estonian officers 1918–1940, http://prosopos.esm.ee/; *Russkaia armiâ v Pervoj mirovoj vojne* [Russian Army in the First World War], Kartoteka proekta [Project Card Index], http://www.grwar.ru/persons/list, 10 January 2025.

[40] Ivan Golenishchev-Kutuzov (1885–1948) served in the Imperial Navy where he tested the use of hydroplanes as torpedo carriers. Emigrated to Brazil in 1927.

[41] Aleksandr Malevitsch's (1887–1950) last position in the Russian Baltic Fleet was senior mine officer of Peter the Great's Naval Fortress. He continued his service in the Estonian army and died in Türi (see p. 185).

[42] The last position of Arthur Salf (1873–1937) in the Imperial Army was acting chief of staff of the 19th Army Corps; he worked at the Estonian Military College until retirement.

Lieutenant General of the Russian Tsarist Army and former lecturer at the Estonian General Staff courses, Aleksei Baiov, August 1931. Photo by Parikas. Source: National Archives of Estonia, RA, EFA.272.0.49113

a reorganisation of teaching at the Military College following the French model, which would entail a reform of the curriculum and methodology. The Estonian military command had set the objective of disengaging from the heritage of Russian warfare and setting a course towards the West. However, the conflict between Baiov and Reek was not absolute. Kopõtin writes that Reek borrowed from Russian traditionalists, possibly through Baiov himself, the Leerian notion of timeless principles of war and analysed characteristics of Estonian soldiers from a national perspective, like Russian nationalists.

Baiov did not leave the Military College because of his outdated methods but because of his political activity as a Russian monarchist. The Estonian military command did not want to dismiss him and offered a choice: remain a member of the teaching staff at the Military College or focus on the politics of Russian emigrants. Baiov opted for political engagement.

There were debates in the General Staff Courses and in the Military College on the desirable share of military history and history of warfare in military education. Baiov saw military history as the most important part of military education, but its relative share decreased after Reek's reforms. In addition, Reek suggested focusing primarily on recent military history – World War I, the War of Independence, and the Russian Civil War. A broader question concerned the nature of Estonian military education as such: should it be offered by a military university or by a vocational school for professionals? According to Kopõtin, Baiov preferred the university model whereas Reek was more inclined towards professional and practical education. This dilemma in Estonian military education was never completely resolved – it was attempted to apply vocational training principles to the development of the Military School and university education principles to the Military College.

Aleksei Baiov's work. His principal works are thought to be the book *Russian Army in the Age of Empress Anna. War against Turkey 1736–1739*[43] in two volumes that won the General Leer Award of the Emperor Nicholas General Staff Academy, and *The Course in the History of Russian Warfare*[44] in seven volumes that received the Akhmatov Award of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. The first book was based on Baiov's dissertation that examined the work of marshal Burkhard Christoph von Münnich. Baiov's novel approach to the history of Russian warfare was evident in the fact that he did not start with Peter the Great nor with the 1380 Battle of Kulikovo, but went back to the 9th century wars of Kievan Rus. Baiov wrote that his work is based on studies by previous heads of the department of Russian warfare. In addition, Baiov's views can be gleamed from his shorter treatises, *Notes on the History of Warfare in Russia*,[45]

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[43] Aleksej Baiov, *Russkaâ armiâ v carstvovanie imp. Anny Ioannovny. Vojna Rossii s Turciej v 1736–1739* [*Русская армия в царствование имп. Анны Иоанновны. Война России с Турцией в 1736–1739*], 2 vols (St. Petersburg, 1906).

[44] Aleksej Baiov, *Kurs istorii russkogo voennogo iskusstva* [*Курс истории русского военного искусства*], 7 vols (St. Petersburg: Printing House of Gr. Skačkov, 1909–1913).

[45] Aleksej Baiov, *Zapiski po istorii voennogo iskusstva v Rossii* [*Записки по истории военного искусства в России*] (St. Petersburg: I. Trofimov's Printing House, 1908).

History of Warfare as Science[46] and *Significance of Klyuchevsky for Russian War History*[47]. In his lecture notes for the audience in the Estonian General Staff Courses, Baiov defined war as an armed clash of nations over matters that affect vital interests of the parties and in which parties attempt to achieve victory with weapons in order to force the adversary to recognise the priority of their interests. Kopõtin assumes that Baiov's definition of the art of war was inspired by Clausewitz. Baiov wrote that both material and mental powers and resources need to be applied skilfully to achieve victory, and the art of war means the ability to combine these resources in practice. According to Baiov, warfare is subordinated to the laws and principles of war, which stem from its nature and form together the theory of warfare. A systematic collection of the laws of war and the modes of their application in different situations amount to a science that is called strategy. Kopõtin writes that here Baiov reiterates Genrikh Leer's idea of strategy as being not primarily a level of warfare but rather in itself a science about war.

Baiov concluded that the laws of warfare can be expressed in formulas determined by warfare theorists and practicians (military commanders) from Xenophon, Aleksandr Suvorov and Napoleon (as interpreted by Clausewitz) to Leer and Mikhnevich (neither of whom had won a single war or campaign) and finally also Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Among them, Suvorov was the most important figure, he believed. However, by appraising Napoleon and Foch, he synthesised the Suvorov-Napoleon-Foch formula. According to him, a war consists of campaigns, strategic operations and battle engagements, which are related to the overarching objective of the war. As the strategic objective of a war can be difficult to achieve, intermediate objectives should be established and the collection of military efforts to realise such an objective was called a 'military

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[46] Aleksej Baiov, *Istoriâ voennogo iskusstva, kak nauka* [*История военного искусства, как наука*] (St. Petersburg: A.S. Suvorin's Printing House, 1912).

[47] Aleksej Baiov, *Značenie Vasiliâ Osipoviča Klûčhevskogo dlâ russkoj voenno-istoričeskoj nauki* [*Значение Василия Осиповича Ключевского для русской военно-исторической науки*] (St. Petersburg: A.S. Suvorin's Printing House, 1911).

campaign'. Baiov viewed the positional warfare of World War I as an unnatural way of waging a war, but did not offer a description of how it could be avoided. He believed that manoeuvre warfare reflected the true nature of war. According to Baiov, the future of warfare required professional armies. The reserve army – "armed people" – had to be replaced by a small and high-quality regular army, perfectly trained, highly manoeuvrable, capable of being in the right place at the right time in any war theatre or battle. A mass army, conversely, is unwieldy, poorly trained and with weak moral preparation, struggles with manoeuvrability, is difficult to motivate and can be unreliable in battle.

Suvorov's role as a great military theorist was truly highlighted by count Dmitri Milyutin, war historian and Russia's minister of war from 1861 to 1881, at a time when Russia had been soundly defeated in the Crimean War and started to look for positive examples from its military history. Suvorov's only theoretical treatise, *The Art of Victory*, was conceived as a textbook on tactics for non-commissioned officers, writes Kopõtin. Suvorov's victorious campaigns and his manual for non-commissioned officers inspired the nationalistic school of Russian war historians to emphasise supremacy of moral power over the material. Kopõtin observes that Baiov went further than his teacher at the department of Russian warfare by discovering Russian art of war even in early medieval Russia. He argued that its timeless principles were encapsulated in the following theses by Suvorov: always acting on the offensive, quick manoeuvres and decisive bayonet attacks, less methodology and more situational appraisal, absolute authority of the commander-in-chief, attacking and striking the enemy in an open field, avoiding sieges and passing fortifications, not splitting forces to hold territory, and concentrating them for manoeuvres.

Kopõtin notes in summary that Baiov's Suvorovian Russo-centric approach to warfare was based on the idea of ethnic uniqueness of the Russian nation. The Estonian military command wanted to shake off the Russian influences and turn to European, particularly French war experience and theory. But even Nikolai Reek thought of Suvorov as

a great commander and emphasised the advantages of his offensive action over defence, gaining initiative, surprise, decisiveness and ultimately also direct command in the midst of the battle. Kopõtin concludes: "Can a small nation have its own unique military thought, or art of war, or is it something that belongs to a civilisation? [---]. [W]hat kind of military thought can be cultivated by small nations such as Estonia that have always found themselves at the boundary between civilisations? Similar questions may have risen in Estonian officers listening to Baiov's lectures in the 1920s."