EAST-WEST STUDIES

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FOREWORD

Is the era of globalisation at its end? The decline of the Washington Consensus has been in the zeitgeist for years now – but what is next in line? A multi-polar liberal world? A withering of the institutions of post-World War II stability? A retrenchment of regional spheres of influence – a central power for each jealously enforcing its will?

The past few years have seen many challenges to the age we had come to know – the globalised world. A pandemic closing borders and wreaking havoc on long-taken-for-granted global supply chains. A trade war and tensions over Taiwan laying bare the myth of 'Chimerica'. Nationalists challenging democracies from within – from 'illiberal democracy' using the power of the state to benefit the regime in Hungary, to a violent attempt to annul an election in the USA. A revanchist Chinese leadership asserting its will over Hong Kong and cracking down on its own global commercial brands lest they challenge the domestic central government. The QUAD, AUKUS, and IPEF drawing new lines in strategic defense and trade. A fracturing internet – a once-aspired global commons of ideas being broken down into nationalist islands controlled by authoritarians. Most dramatically, an upending of international stability, law, and peace in the Russian invasion of Ukraine – leading to a reinvigorated NATO, a stalemated and sidelined UN Security Council, and the beginnings of a newly defined Europe in the European Political Community.

What are we to make of all of this? What does it tell us about the future of the global order we had come to know? How can social sciences make sense of this transformation?

As this journal enters a new era itself, we aim to thrust ourselves into this conversation. Using our bases in international law and international relations, we seek to understand this new era – and to contribute to finding solutions to the problems that come with it. In this issue, we range from a discussion of the possible future paths for globalisation and global institutions in a changing world order ('Globalisation by Other Means? Hegemonic Continuance and Rising Powers – A Framework of Analysis'), we analyse the rise of India and imagine a post-colonial world order ('India and Decolonising the World Order'), we talk about the changing definition of sovereignty in the transnational age ('Governing Transnationalisation and the Transformation of Sovereignty'), we discuss the relationship between autocracy and development ('Exploring Overdeveloped Post-Communist Autocracies'), and examine the complicated role of social media in localised response to a global pandemic ('Co-Creating Community-Based Solutions Through Social Media in Estonia During the COVID-19 Pandemic'). In so doing, we hope to shed light on some of the many research challenges that lie ahead in this sudden age of uncertainty.

The old certainties of the post-Cold War age have faded – and one might argue they only existed for a privileged few even in that time. The future that will be built upon their ruins is still to be decided – and we appreciate you joining us at East-West Studies in undertaking that construction.

Mart Susi – Editor-in-Chief
Terry McDonald – Managing Editor
Benjamin Klasche – Submissions Editor

GLOBALISATION BY OTHER MEANS? HEGEMONIC CONTINUANCE AND RISING POWERS – A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This paper engages in conceptual and theoretical debates about the dynamics of continuance and conflict in contemporary globalisation. Its particular focus – shaped by an invitation to write on these themes by the editors of the *East-West Studies* Journal – is on the question of hegemonic continuance and the role of rising powers in laying down the settings of future globalisation. These questions are operationalised through a discussion of five different but overlapping perspectives. The first two perspectives focus on evidence about systemic continuance or resilience: (1) that liberal economic order remains largely unchallenged and that thus, the liberal economic order is likely to remain even if the political norms that underpin the liberal order are heavily constrained, (2) that economic globalisation continues to be driven by market rationality, and so far new institutions have been more supplementary than direct challenges. The two following perspectives, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the elements of conflict. The third (3) perspective points out the rising discontent with global governance not only from rising powers but also and particularly from the US, emphasising that the question of how the US will relate to the changing power relations in the world is of crucial importance to the resilience of the current system. The fourth (4) perspective brings in the concept of geo-economics, arguing that one key factor in the systemic continuance of the liberal order has been that of realism and that China has more recently taken up the leading role. Finally, the fifth (5) section seeks to go beyond these perspectives and asks the relevant question about whether we should not seek alternative ways to examine international relations (IR), especially the need to include voices from outside the traditional centres of power. In sum, the article sets out the possible frames through which IR as a discipline will present the coming changes in the arc of globalisation, and what they will mean for the field as a whole.

Keywords: globalisation, China, USA, geo-economics, international relations.

INTRODUCTION

In this era of 'wicked problems' – pandemics, climate change, resource competition, and war –, the challenges and problems brought about by the growth of new global actors have made ongoing power shifts regarding international co-operation a theme of high political relevance (Klasche, 2021). One consequence of the 2008 financial crisis and its effects was bringing together interests surrounding hegemonic power. Emergent countries, also called Rising Powers, began to organise meetings and agreements to review their position in the international order, looking to protect their economies and minimise losses

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from a potential collapse of the financial system. Yet, research on international political economy has demonstrated that the rising powers have benefitted from US-led globalisation and, although they are increasingly trying to insert their agenda in multilateral forums, have shown little indications of seeking systemic change (Chin & Thakur, 2010; Gray & Gills, 2016; Ikenberry, 2018; Juutinen, 2019; Nölke et al., 2015). Thus, following Richard Saull's (2012) interpretation of hegemony, it is possible to argue for favouring a certain kind of continuity in the international system despite radical power shifts.

Indeed, one crucial element in contemporary global political economy is the deep integration of China into the US-led international liberal order. From this perspective, the rhetoric of political rivalry emphasised in US National Security Strategy – as much as the small-scale trade wars caused by the US can be seen as an indication of assimilation problems on the part of the Hegemon instead of what has been feared, the onset of Age of Empires, Global Game of Thrones, or the return of the state of nature (Barbieri, 2020; Hopewell, 2021; Juutinen & Käkönen, 2016). However, the continuity of sui generis liberal world order would involve tremendous regional changes. This is related to the American foreign policy agenda discussion towards the "deep engagement" strategy to balance or counter the Rising Powers' initiative.

China's rise can be seen to threaten the political and economic independence of small and medium powers in their aspirational sphere of influence. The lack of an inclusive, transnational, and global élites network and strong political authority on the international level imply that the dissonance or gulf between markets and politics, as Strange (2015) pointed out in 1988, still exists. This implies that rivalries and conflict, instead of hegemonic stability in a certain sense, might still prevail and bring to an attenuation of the current hegemon authoritative power within the current system.

In this sense, the question is: what is known about the effects the Rising Powers are having on globalisation at this point? The two dimensions of this dilemma that we wish to mention are uneven development (Saull, 2012) and fear of a possible dilution of the current liberal order with illiberal political characteristics. Without stronger multilateral efforts to regulate both global markets and financial flows, wicked problems like global warming and unequal development are unlikely to be remedied. This study seeks to understand hegemonic continuance and the future of globalisation through a discussion of five perspectives. These perspectives boil down to the idea of a systemic continuance with non-liberal characteristics, as they are embodied by some of the new emerging global actors like China and, to a lesser extent, BRICS and Global South agenda. The assimilation of non-liberal features would result in the endurance of the current hegemonic order and in the growth of shared responsibilities in the maintenance of the existing system. The two perspectives within this category can perhaps be classified as Ikenberrian (2018).

On the other hand, plenty of evidence supports increasing rivalry within the international system. Indeed, as the Russo-Ukrainian War is ongoing, fear of a third world war has gone mainstream. The Western world finds itself handcuffed by its economic integration with non-liberal actors. The initial reluctance of Germany to spell out an embargo on Russian oil and gas shows effectively that economic integration has clear negative effects on the EU's ability to stand up for its perceived liberal values. Following the capitalist peace theory (e.g. Angell, 1913), it started with the belief that incorporating world economies would lead to a more peaceful world (Snyder, 2013). However, we can see that it is exactly this economic interdependence which allows states to act in contradiction with liberal values without facing the harshest repercussions. The war in Ukraine is just the latest example of muted Western reactions to the Chinese treatment of the Uyghur minority or its illiberal exertions in Hong Kong. Similarly, the Western leaders that launched a thirteen-year war on Iraq – culminating in the death of hundreds of thousands of people, not to mention the executions and torture of civilians (e.g. Hicks et al., 2009), or the torturing and rapes of detainees at the US prison in Abu Ghraib – have been left unpunished.

Indeed, from a non-Western perspective, it is possible to shift the focus to an analysis on how the Western powers have reacted to the rise of the Emerging Powers. Has the West met the development concerns posed by the developed and emerging countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? The answer to this would be no. Some non-Western powers accuse the West of double standards in terms of values and standards. In terms of globalisation, some non-Western perspectives do not see any intrinsic problem in international anarchy – particularly the South Asian perspective (Saran, 2017). While the Western powers tend to ask questions like how to contain China, how to maximise our influence in the Indo-Pacific, and how

to stop on the advancing hoards of authoritarian states, some non-Western powers may be posing quite contrary questions: how to circumvent Western attempts to keep second class members of international society, or how to stop the advance of US proxy armies. (Juutinen & Käkönen, 2016; Shahi, 2019.) Perhaps this ideational cleavage can become the source of many conflicts and degrade global co-operation.

Consequently, it appears as if we found ourselves at the crossroads of a large political change. It is impossible to tell what the global order will look like in a few years. However, ample conceptual work has been produced in light of global power shifts. It is the focus of this discussion paper to sketch out five scenarios that accommodate some key features of these shifts. Each scenario draws from a different conceptual premise to further the discussion. The first two perspectives contemplate the continuation of the current system. The next two consider room for growing rivalries and their impact, and the fifth perspective tries to go beyond what we know, attempting to re-imagine the system. In light of these developments, we have chosen to keep the focus of this discussion paper on the theme of global political economy and the long-term strategic developments therein. While this is instrumental in providing a framework for understanding the implications of contemporary conflicts, this focus also excludes current conflicts from the scope of our analysis. Thus, when discussing conflicts, we examine long-term international political economy (IPE) trends.

The paper is divided into four main sections. The first introduces the structure of the argument in more detail. This is followed by perspectives about systemic resilience that relate to the idea of hegemonic continuity. The third section is about rivalry and challenges to the current system, and the fourth section discusses the argument presented by global international relations – that there is a need for alternative or supplementary perspectives for the study of continuity and change (Acharya & Buzan, 2009). In examining these three ideas, we seek to provide grounds for further discussions in this moment of many transitions – transitions of the liberal world order, of rising regions, powers, and institutions, and of the field which hopes to understand them all.

ARGUMENT STRUCTURE

We write this article by invitation, as this journal seeks to engage with the new challenges that will shape the East-West relationship in the fields of IR and Global Governance. We, a group of scholars each studying this relationship, engage in a discourse in which we each take a turn at mapping out the broad strokes of the possible challenges and changes to the world order we face at this moment in history. While admittedly, this process lends itself to speculation, there is value in confronting the known unknowns of a particular age. In terms of East-West engagement, the past ten years looked quite different from those that came before – it is our task to imagine where that leads us from here.

This explorative paper aims to establish five conceptual-based hypotheses on the nature of the changing world order. Ideally, we would have time and space to test the hypotheses but based on the contingency of today's global politics, we considered it necessary to first theorise different possible scenarios and gather them here. The first two perspectives focus on evidence about systemic continuance or resilience: (1) that liberal economic order remains largely unchallenged and that thus, the liberal economic order is likely to remain even if the political norms which underpin the liberal order are heavily constrained, (2) that economic globalisation continues to be driven by market rationality, and so far new institutions have been more supplementary than direct challenges. The two following perspectives, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the elements of conflict. The third (3) perspective points out the rising discontent with global governance not only from rising powers but also and particularly from the US, emphasising that the question of how the US will relate to the changing power relations in the world is of crucial importance to the resilience of the current system. The fourth (4) perspective brings in the concept of geo-economics, arguing that one key factor in the systemic continuance of the liberal order has been that of realism and that China has more recently taken up the leading role. Finally, the fifth (5) section seeks to go beyond these perspectives and asks the relevant question about whether we should not seek alternative ways to examine international relations, especially the need to include voices from outside of the traditional centres of power.

SYSTEMIC RESILIENCE: TWO HYPOTHESES ON HOW THE SYSTEM WILL SURVIVE

Hypothesis of Non-Liberal Globalisation

While this is a subject of some debate, suppose we agree for the purposes of this article that globalisation and the first global hegemonic cycle started at the end of the 15th century with Portugal's domination (Modelski, 1978). From there, we can see that the exploitation of a global economic system can clearly function without attaching liberal values – which really only became important ideological drivers after WWII – to it. Liberal values wish to combine a liberal market strategy with liberal political ambitions. In the form of the market, it advocates for the opportunity of free, borderless, and unrestricted commerce that leads to a growing amount of wealth for the society and the individuals involved. In connection with that, it promotes a political ideology that nothing matters more than the individual and their freedoms and rights expressed in a democratic system.

These aspects are described in Western-style liberal democracy, which, at least formally, has been installed in many wealthy Western countries which are still busy exporting it to the rest of the world. Fukuyama believed that the ascendency of liberal democracy was inevitable, and we would soon reach the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). By now, Fukuyama has understood that the end of history must be postponed, seeing that liberal democracy will indeed not become the all-encompassing ideology he envisioned any time soon (Fukuyama, 2012, 2018). For one, this is owed to rising powers (e.g. China but also Singapore) outside of the Western hemisphere which openly disregard (parts of) the political aspect of liberalism but thrive nonetheless in their economic realm and show that you can achieve success in one without the other. This is also challenged by the renewed fight between democrats and authoritarians, which plays out, for example, on the battlefields of Ukraine and in the alliances that came together to support Ukraine or Russia.

However, maybe even more importantly, we see the decline of liberal political values in the 'old' democracies of the West, which are, for the most part, facing a political crisis led by populist and extremist political groups that want to set aside aspects of the liberalist ideology. Therefore, we must consider Strange's (2015) thoughts on the dissonance of the market and politics mentioned at the start of the paper. Even though free markets have brought great wealth to states who have embraced them, the wealth has often benefited only a small group of individuals. This inequality gap has been rising even more in the last decades, creating hurdles for large parts of the population to make use of their assigned liberal values.

Finally, the global economy and the globalisation processes which followed are not driven by (political) liberal values whatsoever. In the past 500 years, it has been the quest for profit and the development of new markets that have been in the driver's seat. Perhaps the West has simply 'embedded' liberalism into a global economic order which gives primacy to market rationality (Ruggie, 1982, p. 381). A cynic could argue that its most important function is to hide the role of the market in an umbrella ideology which could be easily substituted with another one, like a Confucianist vintage.

Today, the Western world is grappling with this crisis of liberalism. We are still trying to combine liberal political and liberal market mechanisms in harmony, whereas the non-Western world is casting aside these problems and can fully focus on maximising the benefits of the liberal economic system without the need to slow down due to liberal political values. In other words, they can embrace market rationality to the fullest. Rationality, in that case, can look different from what we know from a neoliberal perspective which favours democratisation and promotion of individual liberties but also focuses on alliance-building and co-operation via supranational or intergovernmental organisations[6] (Stein, 2010). These more general assumptions on rationality are expanded on by approaches such as Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice (MIRC), which solely assumes that rational actors are to be intelligent and strive for trade efficiency, maximisation of wealth, and making use of globalisation processes (Kydd, 2010, p. 431). MIRC only views the promotion of liberal values as something rational if it supports the aforementioned objectives (Kydd, 2010, pp. 431, 432).

[6] Naturally, joining existing organisations or creating their own to enhance co-operation is something in which China is actively involved.

The existing economic world order has been shown to maximise trade, wealth, and globalisation processes. All things that are potentially deemed to be rational choices of an actor that only follows the economic aspects of liberal ideology. Why would a rising power containing non-liberal features seek to abolish that system and install a new one, if it maximises its goals and has helped this power reach the point in history where such a question can be posed?

Hypothesis of Liberal Economic Globalisation

Amid the changes and challenges to the existing world economic order mentioned above, one of the most significant has been the rise of new institution creation, especially by emerging powers. China has been the leading force engaged in building up new structures in the world economy. These, namely BRICS and BRICS Bank, the AIIB, and the nascent forms of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), could be seen to serve to buttress the existing liberal order or threaten to replace older pillars thereof that did not adapt to new geo-economic realities sufficiently. The question observers must ask is, does China seek to supplant the existing liberal economic order or merely augment it?

China (and other rising powers) have long complained that the structures of the Bretton Woods era have failed to adapt to the rise of non-Western powers. There is merit to this claim. For instance, upon formation, BRICS countries had 23% of Gross World Product, but 10% of the vote share in the IMF (Bershidsky, 2015). Western powers have been reluctant to reduce their share of influence. Still, in this reluctance, they have inadvertently cultivated a potential to undermine these very institutions by having them supplanted by organisations led by other powers.

In this context, perhaps, we can understand the rise of the BRICs/BRICS in the first place. Many are familiar with the concept's origins in a Goldman Sachs investment forecast, but the political impetus comes from the perceived neglect of rising powers in traditional liberal institutions. The creation of the BRICS bank (later New Development Bank) is an offshoot of this – a source of development capital for these states (and potentially others) which is not controlled by traditional Western powers and their allies such as the IMF and World Bank. Moreover, the equal share capitalisation of the member states gives a veil of equality to the states therein.

The AIIB, then, represented the next big jump in Chinese new institution creation. Here, China could flex its economic muscle in a more unrestrained manner. China would put up half of the capital and retain half of the voting shares. Additionally, here China showed its ability to attract traditional powers into its institutions, as the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, and others have joined despite US misgivings. China showed the world that it could create a financially liberal institution, and the world would largely play along.

The BRI represents a different sort of liberal creation from China – it is seeking economic co-operation and trade, but generally on a bilateral basis, as opposed to under the auspices of a larger 'board of directors' style arrangement. The BRI is taking shape as a series of deals between China and smaller economies through investment, aid, and infrastructure building. The scale of this project is still expanding, but for this article, it is enough to note that to date, it represents China's largest inroad into the world economic structure and capability to insert its narratives into policy adoption abroad (Van Noort & Colley, 2021). How it will mesh with a liberal world economic order will be discussed below.

So, with these new institutions, is China seeking to upend the liberal world economic order? At this stage, it would be hard to argue a yes.

In the founding document of the BRICs – perhaps the most overtly political of these institutions – they advocate for developing states but make sure to emphasise a desire for co-operation on a worldwide level – stating that the goals of BRIC are:

> *to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way. The dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries are conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.* (Official statement, 2009)

While Stiglitz, Stern, and Romani (2012) and others have suggested the NDB can act as a challenge to Western Institutions, as we note below, the resources at its disposal would limit any structural impact it could have on world economy. Moreover, it has been argued that NDB in fact does not seek to challenge but complement and expand the existing scope of development lending. Yet, an even stronger case against the thesis of BRICS challenge would appear to be the institutional linkage of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to the IMF – which in practice subjects BRICS members to the structural adjustment loans from the IMF before they can receive support from the CRA (Juutinen, 2019, pp. 313, 314).

The AIIB, while notably showing China's ability to court Western interest in a politically illiberal institution with its investment capital, does not seem to be seeking an upheaval of the liberal economic order so much as it seems to be a vehicle for putting Chinese investment capital to work. By including traditional liberal partners in its creation, the AIIB seems to commit itself to work within the strictures of a liberal world economy.

The BRI, however, has indeed ruffled some feathers as it has spread. Green (2018), the Economist (2018), and others reported grievances from both Asian and African partners about the debt loads and feasibility entailed in the project early on, and those murmurs of suboptimal results from BRI investment have only grown over time (Voon, Chien-peng, & Nam, 2021). Also, the EU is justified in being careful about how funds from the project are influencing the voting behaviour of member governments – especially as Greece becomes more intertwined with the project and more hesitant to criticise China in unanimity with other EU states (Alderman & Horowitz, 2017; McDonald, 2020). Nonetheless, it would be hard to take seriously any Western argument that a liberal economic system and geo-economic power plays could not co-exist, given their prevalence through most of its history thus far, from the British and Dutch East India Companies onward. It is too early to assert that the BRI is incompatible with a liberal economic global system – but it does merit observation as the power dynamics of the relationships within it play out over the coming years. For now, though, it functions as an addition to the pre-existing system.

Chinese new institution creation has spurred movement from the status quo. Capital-hungry partners from Africa to the Arctic have eagerly signed on (McDonald & Klasche, 2019), and even in the IMF, Japan and the USA have reduced their voting shares to give more voice to rising powers at the table in response to the imbalance noted above. Nonetheless, as Ikenberry (2018) has argued, none of these institutions – built on reducing trade barriers, fostering economic co-operation, and creating new shipping infrastructure – are necessarily designed to be incompatible with a liberal international economic system. They may simply reflect China and other growing powers' increased role therein, although the leverage granted by the bilateral agreements with smaller states in the project does stand to enhance Chinese geoeconomic power overall and thus should be part of the discourse in IPE, as discussed below in section 3.2. There are many questions that remain about China's ambitions that lay outside of the economic infrastructure of these world systems, and even before the rumblings caused by the Evergrande debt problems there have been legitimate questions about China's financial capacity to underwrite alternative international economic structures (Balding, 2017). First, however, we will delve into the historical context of these changes in the following section.

RIVALRY AND CHANGE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

US as the Potential Disruptor

In the International Political Economy approach, some authors share the perspective that there is a congenial relation between political power and markets. Historically, this would refer to the importance of political power in guaranteeing the currency of territory even before the Westphalian Nation States in 1648, among other examples mentioned above (East India Companies, etc.).

Even 500 years later, political power and markets still have a close and interdependent relationship. This reflects all the competitiveness and rivalry in the international system. Considering Arrighi's (1996) perspective related to the systemic accumulation cycles, the last one being the US hegemonic period since 1945, it is possible to understand the relevance

of multilateral organisations as a powerful tool in leading the international system. Supposedly, adopting the multilateral approach would constrain unilateral attitudes on the part of the hegemon towards other players. On the other hand, the hegemon would have the capacity to rule the system based on a more predictable order under its control.

But economics and markets have their own dynamics over time, and since the 1990s, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of international bipolarism, the global scenery was shifting to a unipolar order, wherein the US was able to introduce its liberal platform more directly – as there was no more need to practice what Helleiner (1996) called of "benevolent hegemonic behavior" characteristic in the context of the disputed influence zones during the bipolar order.

Since then, globalisation took place, and liberal values were introduced via Washington Consensus recommendations, which were spread worldwide via multilateral organisations. The promise around globalisation was to build a 'global village' where all the countries would benefit from the liberal order and the openness of markets, which would lead the economies to less inequality and improvement in the standard of living.

Although a number of academics were researching this phenomenon in the 1990s, many of them – among them Joseph Stiglitz (who won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001), in his book "Globalization and Its Discontents" (2002) – began to address the issue of the benefits of globalisation more critically, since the effects on (but not confined to) the peripheral world were being questioned in the face of evidence of income concentration at the national and international levels. After the near-unanimous approval and diffusion of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, critics began clamouring louder in the 2000s, especially when, after the 2008 financial crisis, the international system came to experience the kind of change which could be considered a turning point in the absolute reign of the unipolar era.

At this stage, the ongoing process concerning the rise of China and its insertion into the world economy followed an ascending trajectory. The effects of the economic crisis and the possibility of the weakening of the dollar were some of the factors that pushed the emergent countries onto a common platform and towards a new agenda: rethinking what lay next to and what could be done to avoid the spread of general losses to their economies. The points under debate at that moment were related to the turning from a unipolar order to a multipolar order, raising questions such as whether a unipolar order still exists (Sanahuja, 2007), how far US hegemony is in decline, and whether China would be really interested in assuming a leading position in the prevailing US-style global hegemony.

The debate around a multipolar world brings to the scene players that, although historically relevant in the past, were not in a position of bargaining in the 1990s, such as Russia and China, for example. This has changed, and after the 2008 crisis, the Global South debate had found more space in the international arena, building a platform for emergent countries searching for more voice in the international Global Governance, an issue to be debated and revised in the current international agenda.

In this sense, regionalism and grouping agreements such as the BRICS (Hurrel et al., 2009) denote a different move considering the scenario related to the global order arena, although the frontier between national interests and grouping behavior differs dynamically depending on every round.

Nonetheless, the BRICS grouping brings to the scene something different in the regionalism scope: the member countries do not share the same geographic zone, and in terms of governance, the bloc decided to deliberate their common agenda via consensus so that each country could have similar conditions within the group and its main institution, the New Development Bank.

At this point, what can be said in general terms is that among the authors and experts on international relations, there is a common perception that although it is clear the US leadership is showing signs of decline, there is still a level of prudence and wariness when it comes to the use of the term 'hegemonic transition' to refer to the ongoing process in the international arena. Although it is clear that China is playing a relevant role in the global economy, as can be seen by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it can still be identified by ambiguous behaviour in the economic sphere which oscillates between partnership and rivalry between China and the US, the two leading world economies.

The US platform synthesised by the two slogans from Trump Administration ('America First' and 'Make America Great Again') was evidence of the internal contradiction on the US policy-making side. While 'America First' would signal more unilateral domestic measures and bilateral agreements instead of a multilateral approach, 'Make America Great Again' would point to the 'deep engagement' debate within the multilateral framework that was presented by Brooks and Wohlforth (2016a). This strategy prioritises three overlapping objectives: reducing threats to US national security, promoting a liberal economic order worldwide, and fostering international institutions (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016b).

The measure to which the US is inclined to one of these positions (or a mix of both of them) is still to be seen and depends on the capacity of the Biden Administration to accommodate the changes in the international scenario. On the other hand, if this new dynamic implies real changes in current international institutions to benefit and empower the emergent countries' platform to achieve more voice in international Global Governance, it is not clear how far it would reach. The dispute between the players to achieve different shares of wealth and power in the international arena has been and remains an ongoing process in a system that still functions in a competitive style rather than via a co-ordinated and co-operative basis.

The Geo-economic Dimension

'Geo-economics' has been defined as geostrategic use of economic power (Wigell, 2016, p. 137). Edward Luttwak, on the other hand, derives geo-economics from the fundamental realist notion about states as territorially defined political entities that are primarily interested in the welfare and safety of their own citizens. Thus, economic relations for Luttwak reproduce this source of conflict on economic issues. For example, in regulating trade through trade deals or through transnational infrastructure projects, Luttwak argues that states are primarily aspiring "to maximize benefits within their own territory". In this context, economy is not merely a source of conflict, but also the battleground and instrument of war: battles are won by the structuring of economic relations through regulatory or financial means in such a manner that yields the maximum gain for exclusive territorially bound groups or areas (Luttwak, 1990, pp. 18, 21).

As we have seen, in world economic governance, rising powers appear to stand more in support of traditional institutions of economic liberalism than, in particular, the US. Yet, even before Trump's presidency, one key problem in global governance institutions deriving their normative legitimacy from multilateralism was that the leading developed countries did not properly stand by the principles of multilateralism. Gilpin, (2001) and more recently Varoufakis (2013) have emphasised geo-economic dimensions, particularly in US foreign economic policies during the build-up of the liberal international order, as one of the problems undermining multilateralism and liberalism in general.

The problem is that geo-economically motivated foreign economic policies are not in compliance with one of the fundamental norms of liberal international order, multilateralism. According to Ruggie (1992), multilateralism can be defined as decision-making among a few countries that is not based on the particularistic interests of only the most powerful but on reciprocal benefits. In forming the core of global economic governance institutions through the WTO as well as in the Bretton Woods institutions, developed countries, and the US, in particular, sought to retain their former disproportionate influence in a world where they did not have the power to force their will. In doing this, the developed countries worked against multilateralism, and the US still does.

Various scholars have shown that the rising powers, at least China, India, and Brazil, respect the rules of economic liberalism, albeit with some modifications (Nölke et al., 2015; Robinson, 2015; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012; Scott & Wilkinson, 2013) and we also have evidence that Chinese foreign policy behaviour can be explained with a geo-economic approach (McDonald & Klasche, 2019). The two complementary hypotheses presented above about the systemic resilience of liberal economic order build upon the observation that these countries have benefitted from global capitalism and seek to keep that system in place.

However, in non-economic issues, it can be noted that emerging powers value the political sovereignty of each state (or the political sovereignty of themselves) and perhaps economic rationality over other norms that relate to political liberalism. In economic globalisation, China is a champion of openness, but concerning its closed system of governance, it seeks to remain

so. The difference between rising powers and developed countries' political values is perhaps also visible in their relation to the responsibility to protect. According to some scholars, this norm can be defined as a foundational norm of the United Nations and human rights protection (see Seppä, 2019), but in the case of, for example, the BRICS grouping, the value of state sovereignty and non-interference come first (Juutinen & Käkönen, 2016; Rached, 2019; Stuenkel, 2014).

In addition, the discrepancy in terms of political values, and in spite of the deep embeddedness with economic globalisation, the rising powers actually are already forging changes in the international economic system. This results from their regional and intra-regional initiatives. For example, China's Belt and Road Initiative causes economic dependence worldwide because it is supported by the tremendous financial power that China's state-controlled finances can muster. This number is about 3 trillion US dollars and represents one or two per cent of the world's yearly gross domestic product. The BRICS bank operates with only 100 billion, and the Norwegian and Saudi oil funds are less than 2 trillion.

This sum, combined with the political visions about the community of common destiny, launched by China's former leader Hu Jintao and advocated by Xi Jinping, indicates some of China's ambitions. China may be seeking to design a global order based on its vision of a community of common destiny, with China's communist party at its centre. This was what US slogans about the free world were designed for some half a century ago. It is surely gaining political influence. Members of the 17 plus 1 have already turned down their concerns about China's human rights situation. Moreover, support from China to the populist leaders in Eastern Europe and the Greek government suffering from the EU Council's austerity politics have caused dissonance within the European Union – the only political entity that is still in favour of both open economic globalisation and political liberalism which has a larger economy than China (McDonald, 2020).

Given these concerns, China's mega-regional trade diplomacy or the Regional Comprehensive Economic and Partnership (RCEP) also raises concerns. The problem is not in the substance of the trade deal – it is WTO compliant. It does not go as deep into the non-trade barriers and regulatory co-operation as developed country regional trade deals do. However, it still raises the influence of China and strengthens China's role and importance not only for ASEAN countries but also for Australia and India, to middle powers that, like the EU, support both economic and political liberalism.

In other words, the rise of the emerging powers, while basically taking place through and within the existing system, also seems to circulate around China, thus leveraging influence for a political entity that is not politically accountable for most people in the rising powers or elsewhere. Russia's sanctions have further increased the dependency of at least Russia on China.

Yet, this threat should not be exaggerated. While China operates with about three trillion US dollars, private capital owners in Europe own over 70 trillion. China cannot just buy everyone else. Moreover, China's regional and mega-regional initiatives are also based on some level of co-operation. If the world's leading powers like the EU would also engage in these initiatives, it would change the asymmetries of power that grant China so much influence (Juutinen, 2018). Hence, it appears that whether China will run the world and to what extent depends greatly on how other great powers relate to it, whether they engage China and other middle powers or rising powers with co-operation, or whether China is left alone to be the champion of our common destiny.

ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO THINK ABOUT CONTINUANCE AND CONFLICT

The eastward shift of economic weight and power that occurred during the last twenty years provoked an intense scholarly debate about the possible decline of the international liberal order or, as some scholars call it, the American World Order (Acharya, 2014). This dynamic was fostered by the 2008 financial crisis. During and after the crisis, the traditional Western global governance institutions proved to be effective in technically addressing all the issues related to the financial turmoil but failed in governing its political aspects. Specifically, such institutions, like the IMF, failed to consider the legitimate request by rising powers to gain more weight within existing international multilateral institutions, mainly through an extensive reform of the voting rights system.

The current international liberal order is thus increasingly being questioned in its effectiveness by emerging powers. What these powers, especially China, appear to be dissatisfied with is the American hegemonisation of the whole system, together with the specific Western legal and cultural elements on which it is built.

Some understand this dynamic as leading the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar international system. Others focus their attention on the decline, in relative terms, of American power that will be necessarily followed by a renewed arms build-up and harsh rivalries between the current (declining) hegemon and the rising 'others'. What these approaches share as a common standpoint is the understanding of the international system dynamics through the lenses of Western IR. It is important to note here that dominant theories of international relations simultaneously shape international relations (see, e.g., Agathangelou and Ling 2004) and that the US' (Western) dominance of the field has branded realist and liberalist theoretical approaches as universal. In light of this, it is not surprising that China is working on their own IR theory in the form of Tianxia with its own sets of problems (e.g., Chu 2022), but also that a world with a declining US hegemon understandably seeking other theoretical approaches.

Proof of that is the growing scholarly debate about the new regionalism(s) spreading through the East, deeply enrooted in the theoretical frameworks developed to analyse the European regional integration process. Moreover, these frameworks heavily rely on Western liberal and neo-liberal theories about co-operation, regional integration, and international institutionalism, something that is increasingly proving to be ineffective in addressing the new regional dynamics that are emerging worldwide and, in particular, the regional effort put forth by Chinese authorities in the South-Eastern Asia region.

If we are to understand the possible effects deriving from this strand of 'new regionalism', it would be worth detaching theoretical understanding from Western history and getting the main cultural and political elements inspiring the regional integration process in the East.

American hegemony came to the world stage together with an unprecedented technological, economic, and military supremacy. All these capabilities resulted in an enormous political contractual power through which the United States forged the global governance system according to its needs and interests. Those interests were partly the interests of their Western allies, namely Europe, Australia, Japan, and Canada, who were also the most industrialised countries and areas. The economic rise of China, along with the emergence of other regional powers like India, Brazil, and Russia, brought to the stage the interests and needs of new international actors who appear to be able and willing to defend and promote their political views in the wake of their legitimate aspiration to gain relevance in international relations.

Against the common view of a turn towards a multipolar world and the end of the global American Hegemony, it is instead possible to think about the transition of the current order towards a multi-centred international order. The extreme stress that is constantly posed on the 'Myth of lost hegemony" (Strange, 1987) is misleading in addressing current changes in international relations and is not conducive to significant developments in the evolution of international relations as a discipline.

Instead, an alternative approach could be to investigate the different attitudes that emerging powers are putting forth in the development of their own regional governance networks and, in the case of China, to the Tributary System that seems to be the underlying logic of Chinese behaviour across South-Eastern Asia, or in the case of India, the ancient Mandala theory of international relations (Juutinen, 2018; Pande, 2017; Puranen, 2020).

Through such a renewed approach, it would be possible to address current international transformations in terms of worldwide diffusion of power and the emergence of multiple centres of power that are pivoting around different regional aggregates, which are defined by political approaches other than the traditional Western neoliberal one.

The outcome would be then not to think about how to address the future international confusion arising from the end of the American Hegemony and the disruption of the international liberal order but to implement new ways of thinking about multiple global governance networks capable of making different regional centres of power hanging together in a renewed world order.

A renewed world order

Just as Joseph Nye (2010) used to point out, the American World Order has usually been constituted like a tri-dimensional chessboard. That chessboard has three layers: military, economic, and trans/cross border transactions among non-state actors like social movements, NGOs, etc. While the first layer defines the unipolar quality upon which the United States affirms their dominance and assures the order's stability through deterrence, the economic layer is the key to understanding how a stable world order could turn into an unstable one. The third layer works in connection with the second one to the extent that once a global economic transition dynamic is in place, conducive to a global economic shift, the hegemonic power is forced to deal with a growing and evolving complexity of the system itself.

Moreover, once changes occur on the economic layer, the layers start changing from a unipolar to a multipolar economic environment framed within a unipolar military one. As extensively reviewed by literature, this situation could uniquely lead towards systemic instability due to the well-rooted realist conception of Great Power competition. In a similar framework, the US administration could see (and currently does) the rising economic performer as a likely strategic competitor to its military primacy and, thus, to its hegemonic position in the system (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985; Schweller, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2021). This had been, basically, the main understanding of the functioning of the international system during the Cold War era.

Unlike many scholars who frame the US' approach as traditional, rising actors from Eastern Asia assert they do not apply a realist framework in their international relations. Instead, many domestic scholars in the People's Republic of China frame IR and the international system through the lens of the 'All under heaven' concept delivered by the Tianxia doctrine (Zhao, 2006). According to the triad of the Chinese IR scholars formed by Zhao, Yan Xuetong, and Qin Yaking (Shih and Shen, 2014), besides the traditional concept of State sovereignty shared with the Western polity, the Chinese political culture owns at least two more concepts that diversify itself from the Western counterpart.

First, the concept of State sovereignty implies that the 'central' state has the right to rule over its neighboring political entities pacifically. Secondly, this ruling right is dominated by the concept of political relationality, which Zhang (2015, pp. 26–30) identifies in two distinct typologies: expressive hierarchy and instrumental hierarchy. While the former is filled with moral content and ethical attachments directly deriving from the Confucian tradition, the latter resonates more with the Machiavellian principle of 'the end justifies the means'. Qin (2011, pp. 125–137) prefers expressive hierarchy to explain the Chinese way of conducting IR. Yan Xuetong (2013, p. 256) substantially agrees that the roots of contemporary Chinese foreign policy are grounded in their Confucian tradition.

From a Chinese perspective, this implies that Chinese economic growth does not necessarily mean a 'revisionist' stance for China in terms of systemic hegemony but, more simply, a 'revisionist' stance at the regional level. This has important consequences at the systemic level because, as we are experiencing these days, a misunderstanding of an actor's intentions could lead to a systemic catastrophe. What if, instead, the Chinese understanding of the ongoing systemic economic shift towards Asia implies a 'concertative' (a concert of regions) accommodation in transforming the World Order. This is, as well, the view of Acharya (2018), who sees the ongoing transformation of the current American World Order not as a transition towards a new World Order dominated by another great power but as a 'concertative' World Order within which multiple regional centres, each with its own political hegemons, interact among themselves through an inter-regional (thus global) network of international institutions.

The key to understanding the current transition is, thus, the different understandings by different political cultures of the ongoing transformations. While Western-style regionalism is a rule-based regionalism and has normally been distrusted by international liberalism, Eastern regionalism is more multidimensional, more open, and more inclusive than Western. Moreover, Western regionalism existed alone. No other regional orders could have taken place outside Europe due to the lack of non-European emerging or great powers in the past. It implies that Eastern Asia regionalism does not come with the same intra-regional security concerns that traditionally characterised the European regional order(s). Plus, today, world regionalism could benefit from inter-regional transactions that could not occur before.

However, the main point to understanding the current transition and, hence, preventing catastrophic decisions is that one must leave aside the Eurocentric point of view that has inspired the discipline of international relations so far. Today, the complexity of the international system requires global theoretical thinking to accommodate and synthesise the plural political views and shortcomings coming from a growing number of international (State) actors. This does not mean resigning from one's own political values but, at least, not rejecting political pluralism from becoming a constitutive part of the upcoming World Order. This has great implications for the stability of the future world order because the order that will come, and it will come with or without the 'consent' of the West, will not work according to lessons learned from Euro-centric unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity, simply because it will be formed by different actors located in different geographical areas and endowed with different political cultures.

CONCLUSION

These perspectives are mapping a world in transition – and as such, are not necessarily predictive nor prescriptive. What they do offer is a window to the crossroads faced in contemporary IR studies of globalisation and hegemonic continuance/transition, and as such, insight on the paths forward in the discipline.

We have sought to examine three competing ways to approach the question of hegemonic and systemic continuity. We presented two perspectives that maintain the continuity of the contemporary system of political economy, and then examined in which ways the rising powers are working on challenging the existing system. Finally, we discussed the relevance of alternative perspectives – building on the epistemic premises of global IR.

Based on the discussion above, we can establish that the rising powers have undermined the institution of liberal globalisation (at least in the political sense) and that new regional initiatives are mushrooming. Yet, we cannot assert evidence of any definite feature in the global political economy that would predict disruption before continuance. Still, what is apparent seems to be the ability of states, great and middle powers, particularly, to define whether this tips in the balance of disruption or of continuance. This we see as a key weakness in 21st-century world politics – the potential fracturing of the instruments of global governance.

For this reason, we note the need for a pluralistic understanding of world politics and welcome the development of global IR as a means for this purpose. This article is meant to contribute to offering paths for this discourse going forward in terms of both process and theory – a globalised world will require a globalised discipline to understand it, and new institutions that arise from new centres of power will require new perspectives in order for the discourse to be relevant to new orders and power structures. We cannot use the ideas of the passing era to understand the new.

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INDIA AND DECOLONISING THE WORLD ORDER

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ABSTRACT

The independence of the colonies did not mean the end of colonialism in the international system. The international institutions of political, economic, and security management remained colonial. The return of China and India as major players in world politics and their attempt to determine their place in the world politics by themselves from their own perspectives has triggered decolonisation, both in the world politics and in the study of international politics.

The role of South Asia in changing world politics is crucially influenced by Indian politics. Since independence, India's goal has been to become one of the world's leading powers, if not the leading one, at least morally. Here, India looks to its mythical past in history and the restoration of lost greatness, which defines Indian politics in its neighbouring regions of South Asia and, more broadly, throughout Asia.

India's problem, however, is China's similar efforts to restore its own mythical greatness and leading role in the world system. In pursuing it, China is seeking to limit India's influence in Asia, especially in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In this way, the tension between China and India plays a central role in the foreign and security policy of the entire South Asian region. It also challenges India to seek partners with whom it could jointly limit China's growing influence in its own neighbouring regions and, more broadly, throughout Asia.

Keywords: decolonisation, international order, India, China, South Asia, Indian Ocean.

CHANGING WORLD SYSTEM AND DECOLONISATION

The economic development of India and China in the 21st century and the loose alliance created by emerging countries together with Russia in 2008, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa) are challenging the more than 500-year-old Western-centred world order. Its latest engine and world police has been the United States, which may be losing its legitimacy to determine the rules of the game (Buzan, 2016, p. 24). The focus of the world economy and politics is shifting from the transatlantic dimension and from Europe to Asia and the Pacific Ocean. It is therefore likely that the shape of the emerging post-colonial world order will be resolved in Asia and the dominant country in Asia will also be one of the leading powers in the evolving international order (Tip, 2017, pp. 264 – 265).

In this essay, I will look at India's position and role in the above-mentioned transition. India's world politics is multi-faceted. Dealing comprehensively with it in a limited essay is impossible. To construct an overview, three factors define the perspective of this essay: (1) Dismantling the colonial system (decolonisation) as a long-term objective of Indian world politics; 2) China's role as a driving force in India's foreign and security policy, and (3) India's superpower dream and its attainment.

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Due to its economic growth, China has become a global power which is already strong enough, both economically and militarily, to challenge the United States in Asia (Sinha, 2015, pp. 4, 9). That is why the focus of US policy has shifted to Asia. Latest example about that before the war in Ukraine was the foundation of AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, and the USA) in September 2021. India, on the other hand, is the only Asian power capable, at least to some extent, of balancing China's growing influence (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 48). So far, however, China is not willing to become the leader of the world, Russia is unable to do so, and India is not able to do so either. That is why the alternative to the US domination is, at least temporarily, a multipolar system. However, the supporters of multipolarity, i.e., BRICS coalition, do not really know what they want or what it means to each of them (Buzan, 2016, pp. 24, 31).

Several theories of international politics, and in particular the theory of political realism, suggest that, as the economic and military power of a state grows, it wants to increase its influence in the institutions of global governance. At the same time, it wants to change the existing system and its standards so that they better contribute to its own interests (Pant, 2009, p. 6). This is what China and India do in increasing their influence in the institutions of global governance, the UN, WTO, IMF, and the World Bank. Contrary to the Western-centric world of the 20th century, the former developing world or the non-West is now taking its place in the system on its own terms, not satisfied with the position provided by the West (Buzan, 2016, p. 23).

From the Indian and Chinese perspective, the issue is not their rise, but the return to the top of the international system. India and China were two of the world's largest economies during 100 BC–1800. At the beginning of the 18th century, India accounted for 23% of world GDP, and in 1820, Indian and Chinese production accounted for half of world production (Ayres, 2018, p. 72; Tharoor, 2012, p. 123). Extensive trade networks covered Central Asia, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean from 2000 years ago to the beginning of the 16th century. Those networks connected the Mediterranean and East Asia. The sea route opened by Vasco da Gama around Africa to Asia and the following colonialism led to the disintegration of traditional economic and social networks in Asia and connected the region as a periphery to the Euro-centric system (Singh, 2005, pp. 242–243).

For at least the last 300 years, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been objects in world politics and economy. The so-called liberal world order, which has secured the Western dominance, has been maintained by military force (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 81). While the West built democracy and liberal social systems, it used violence to submit the South to serve its needs. In India, the British Empire and the imposed modernisation sucked up the wealth from the region. In contrast to that, empires that had flourished there including Mughal Empire increased the region's prosperity (Datta-Ray, 2015, p. 168). In the historical context, it is possible to say that civilisations humiliated by imperialism have returned to world history.

The return of India and China to the world system also means decolonisation, dismantlement of the colonial system that still continues. Colonialism did not end with the independence of the colonies, but continued as an economic, political, and cultural supremacy of the West and in custodial development co-operation. The purpose of the institutions of global governance built since the Second World War has been to safeguard the interests of the West, which have been presented as universal interests. Through the institutions of global governance, the white Christian minority has defined the terms of action for most of the humanity (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 267). The violent nature of the system is reflected, among other things, in the fact that the US population is only 4% of the world's population, but accounts for as much as 40% of the world's military spending (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 105).

Due to their economic growth, the Indians and the Chinese no longer want to act in accordance with the rules established by the West and call into question the legitimacy of the continuing supremacy of the West (Khanna, 2019, p. 10; Mahbubani, 2008, p. 130). At the same time, they ask which elements of their own civilisation and history should be revived and brought alongside the Euro-American values and rules that now prevail. It has become important for the emerging countries in dismantling the colonial system and mentality to regain themselves, the heritage that has not become Europeanised in the course of history. What is interesting about such a change is that never before has there concurrently existed a strong India, Japan, and China, each with their own dream of an Asian and global system.

In the prevailing global system, only China is currently appearing as a challenger for the United States. Thus, the confrontation between China and the United States means that the United States is a key player in Asia (Chellanaey, 2006, p. 234; Horimoto, 2015, p. 15). Alongside China and the United States, India has a vital role to play in establishing a possible global balance. However, India is linked to the reconstruction of Asia, mainly in co-operation with the United States and Japan (Horimoto, 2015, p. 20). It is a priority for India to prevent the development of a China-centric Asian and global system. On the other hand, India is unlikely to agree to function as anyone's younger partner in a system based on Western norms (Dutta-Ray, 2015, p. 97).

India's national decolonisation means that India is trying to define itself and its place in the world through its ancient pre-colonial values. Indian traditions encourage India to believe that it is destined to be a superpower and its civilisation has something to give to the rest of the world. In Indian nationalism there is a strong perception that India is a natural global leader (Pande, 2017, pp. 4, 7).

INDIA'S DREAM OF RESTORING LOST GREATNESS

In Hindu culture, Vedic literature, which is thousands of years old, plays a significant role. Hinduism as a religion or world-view is based on it. That literature as well as the epos Mahabharata form the foundations of India's mythical greatness. At the heart of that myth is the idea of a unified Hindu South Asia (Cohen, 2002, pp. 18–19; Pande, 2017, p. 5). However, throughout history, India has achieved political unity only three times: during the Mauryan Empire 322–185 BC, the Mughal Empire 1526–1707, and British India 1858–1947. However, over the course of history, the goal of many local rulers has been to politically unite the Hindu culture (Cohen, 2002, pp. 10–12). The meaning of the mythical past is reflected in the dharma wheel in the centre of the Indian flag, which refers to Ashoka, the ruler of the great Mauryan Empire.

When the British Empire collapsed, India's partition at least briefly destroyed the dream of a unified South Asia, as it broke the 'holy geography' (Saran, 2017, p. 63). However, the idea of restoring South Asian unity is just one factor behind India's foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru and many other leading politicians for India's independence believed Pakistan would rapidly collapse and return to India (Cohen, 2002, p. 131). This has not happened until now, and Pakistan has, in a way, become one of the obstacles of India's foreign policy and superpower status. In waiting Pakistan's possible return, Congress party representatives considered it important for India to restore borders of British India (Singh, 2016, pp. 164–165). The dream of a unified South Asia has therefore made neighbourhood policy a central area in India's foreign and security policy.

In the context of ancient greatness, India's objectives extended beyond the neighbourhood to global level right at the beginning. Nehru passionately believed that India was destined to play a key role in world politics because of its rich history, traditions, resources, and population (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 115; Pande, 2017, p. 49). India had to be developed into a great power that reflects its size and population, whose status would primarily be based on moral power. According to Nehru, the time had come for India to create a plural world order to replace the Euro-centric colonial system. To obtain this, India had to find other countries ready to co-operate in implementing the new order (Goswani, 2016, p. 8).

However, in Indian foreign policy, co-operation with other states has never meant alliances. Nehru considered autonomy to be the absolute basis for India's foreign policy. The alliance was seen as a threat to independent foreign policy and the alliance easily subjected to the objectives and interests of other parties. The purpose of non-alignment was to create space for India's own policy, to create a new non-European system. In this way, non-alignment was a solution dictated by political realities which freed India from the limitations of the Cold War (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 124; Mohan, 2003, p. 30; Goswami, 2016, p. 30; Saran, 2017, p. 31; Pant & Super, 2019, p. 129). In India's world view, non-alignment was not withdrawal, but active opposition to power politics and violence without participating and made it possible to construct an India-centric policy (Datta-Ray, 2015, p. 213; Goswami, 2016, p. 4).

India's non-alignment policy found a concrete expression in the Non-aligned Movement, launched at the Belgrade Meeting in 1961, of which India was a key member. Within the framework of that movement, India built co-operation with newly independent and developing countries. At the same time, the movement gave India the opportunity to become a kind of leader of the developing world and a champion of moral politics (Mohan, 2003, pp. 29–31). In the movement of non-aligned countries, India found a sounding forum for its policy to dismantle colonialism. In the movement, India's support for developing countries against colonialism also meant opposing the domination of the West and interventions in the internal affairs of other countries. It was not just a question of opposing the policy of individual Western states, but of opposing the entire international system built by Europeans and led by the United States (Mohan, 2003, p. 37; Malone, 2012, p. 49; Acharya, 2018, p. 63).

India's ambitions for great power status and the construction of a new world order were also expressed in concrete terms in its Asian policy. The idea of Asian solidarity and a common front against European imperialism was an integral part of Nehru's Pan-Asian policy. Here, the appeal to Asian values and traditions, that is, the emphasis on differences between European and Asian world-views, was noteworthy (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 79; Kalyaranamn, 2014, p. 162). Nehru's Pan-Asianism also played an important role in India-China co-operation to overturn the Euro-centric world system (Cohen, 2002, p. 25). The 1962 border war between India and China scrapped that dream and, on the other hand, it was burdened by India's dream of leadership in the new Asian order (Pande, 2017, pp. 95–96).

One hindrance to India's dream becoming a reality is the Kashmir conflict and the relationship with Pakistan. From an Indian perspective, Pakistan occupies part of Kashmir, which belongs to India. The Kashmir conflict has tied India into the South Asian neighbourhood policy. Indian great power policy would require a resolution of the conflict. But in practice, it is an almost unresolvable equation. For India, a united Kashmir as part of India would be an important proof that Muslims and Hindus can live in harmony in a secular state. For Pakistan, if parts of predominantly Muslim Kashmir belong to India, the division of South Asia is incomplete, indicating the failure of the two-nation policy (Pillai, 2005, pp. 225–226; Cohen, 2002, p. 213).

By arming and supporting the jihadists fighting against Indian rule in Kashmir, Pakistan fights a constant proxy war against India (Mahadevan, 2016, pp. 184, 186). In this way, Pakistan, on the one hand, poses a threat to Indian security and, on the other hand, serves China's ambitions to prevent India from becoming its rival for Asian leadership. In India, Pakistan's policy, on the other hand, gives Hindu nationalists the legitimacy to argue that India is threatened by forces hostile to Hinduism (Cohen, 2002, p. 45). From an Indian perspective, the Kashmir conflict also connects the United States to the South Asian conflict by supplying its ally, Pakistan, with weapons (Menon, 2005, p. 128).

Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the Cold War divisions when, in 1954, it joined SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organization). However, India never saw the US's support for Pakistan as a fight against the Soviet Union or communism in general, but as a hostile policy against India. From India's point of view, the United States banned its own values and the values shared by India and the United States in supporting Pakistan against the world's largest democracy. This fuelled the anti-West, anti-US attitudes in India, forcing India to approach the Soviet Union. At the same time, India's goal was to reduce US influence in Asia because it prevented India from achieving its goals (Cohen, 2002, pp. 231, 275; Mohan, 2003, p. xx; Stobdan, 2016, p, 86).

CHINA AS INDIA'S PROBLEM

In Asia, India is not the only country to look to the future through the past. China, too, is aiming to restore the ancient greatness stripped by the Europeans. Like India, China has a strong impression that the millennial history of its civilisation requires a great power status for it (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010, p. 149; Ishida, 2018, p. 163). When this is placed within the framework of a Confucian world-view, it is not difficult to understand that China wants to see itself as at least one of the leading global powers. In Confucian philosophy, the universe forms a unified whole, and the central goal of politics is to unite

the world. Even now, for Chinese leaders, the idea of China is equal to the idea of Asia with China as its centre (Cohen, 2002, pp. 215, 256). However, China sees itself not only as a regional power, but as a global power whose only rival is the United States (Malik, 2009, pp. 164–165).

The intensive interaction between India and China has over 2,000 years of history, and it has mainly been peaceful. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the national elites of both countries acted together against the Asian policy of imperialist powers in the spirit of Pan-Asianism. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, the leaders of both countries jointly called for the dismantling of colonialism and supported the efforts of the colonies to gain independence. They were also quite unanimous in their criticism of the Western-dominated world order. However, China is not willing to share Asia and its leadership with India and, since the 1962 border war between the two states, China's key objective has been to limit India's importance in various ways, both in Asia and in world politics (Malik, 2009, p. 170).

China's superpower ambition found its concrete expression in President Xi Jinping's report to the Chinese Communist Party meeting on March 18, 2017. It set the objective of China being the world leader in 2049 and capable of making a significant contribution to the development of all mankind (Xi, 2017). Although, at global level, China does not see itself as competing with India, China considers India to be its competitor in Asia. However, it does not perceive India as a threat to itself even if it warns India of any action that could somehow be directed against China (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 25). For China, India is mainly a South Asian power in China's periphery (Malik, 2009, p. 165).

Since the 1962 border war at the latest, India has experienced China as both an economic and, above all, a military threat. China's close relations with Pakistan and, increasingly, with other India's neighbours are a serious challenge to India's position in South Asia. China's military support to Pakistan has contributed to enabling Pakistan-backed terrorist activities in India, particularly in the Kashmir region (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 1; Ayres, 2018, p. 128). One goal of China's Pakistani policies is to bind India to South Asia, as China does not want to see India as a major player outside South Asia and, on the other hand, its aim is to prevent India to be a hegemon in South Asia (Karnad, 2014, p. 225; Malone, 2012, p. 141; Mohan, 2003, p. 155).

China's action to limit India's influence is not just related to South Asia. China's growing military power and presence in the Indian Ocean is another challenge for India (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 6). China's dream of being one of the world's leading powers includes the idea of becoming a true maritime power. This, in turn, requires a solid foothold in the Indian Ocean, for example, which India has considered to be its own Mare Nostrum. China justifies its increasing influence and presence in the Indian Ocean with history. Before Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean in the 15th century, the Chinese navy, led by Admiral Zheng He, had a strong position there (Yoon, 2018, pp. 137, 145). In the Indian Ocean, India is particularly concerned about China's so-called String of Pearls policy, which encircles India. At the heart of the policy are Gwadar port in Pakistan, the port of Humbantota in Sri Lanka, the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, and the port of Kyaoukpyu in Myanmar, all funded and built by China (Nagao, 2018, p. 221).

To bind India to South Asia, China's policy includes keeping the border issue open. From India's point of view, it is important to understand that China's Defence White Paper takes account of the possibility of border wars. It mainly concerns India, with which China has unresolved border problems (Singh & Dahiya, 2012, p. 80). India considers illegal China's possession of the Kashmir region, handed over by Pakistan. China, on the other hand, does not consider the so-called McMahon line in the Arunachal Pradesh region to be legal. In fact, China considers much of the state of Arunachal Pradesh to belong to China and calls the region South Tibet (Panda, 2017, p. 35; Chang, 2016, p. 243).

In addition to regional requirements, China is keeping India alert by constant border violations in the areas China has claims. This, in turn, binds India's military strength and resources. By exerting a strategic pressure on the borders of India, China expects India to be prepared to meet China's demands at some point. That is why India assumes that China has little interest in finding an agreement, even though negotiations to solve border problems are under way between the two countries (Singh & Dahiya, 2012, pp. 60–61). India is therefore disappointed that it has already accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet and adopted the One China policy, but in return, China has not become more flexible regarding border issues.

Relations between India and China are also influenced by a water problem affecting a few hundred million South Asians. The sources of the major rivers in Asia are in Tibet, China. The rivers important to South Asia, especially to India, i.e., Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra, have their origins in Tibet. There is no agreement between China and India, at least for the time being, on the allocation of rivers' water resources. China has plans to turn Brahmaputra's waters into China (Panda, 2017, p. 67). The implementation of such plans would have far-reaching implications for the already problematic region of North-East India and Bangladesh.

It is understandable that India is concerned about China's active policy in India's neighbourhood. In a way, China tries to eliminate India's importance by encircling India and ties it to the neighbouring areas in South Asia (Madan, 2014, pp. 331, 34)1. India's focus on Pakistan and its own interests in the neighbourhood make it a regional power, while China takes on the role of a superpower in Asia and, in fact, at a global level, too, as the importance of Asia is heightened in world politics (Pant, 2010, p. 101). Meanwhile, India is forced to work resolutely and commit resources to mitigate China's efforts to limit its influence and presence in its extended neighbourhood (Fair, 2009, p. 139). This is reflected in India's initiatives for regional co-operation in Asia.

INDIAN AND CHINESE EFFORTS FOR ASIAN REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Despite mutual tensions and competition, India and China are also working together in the emerging world's own institutions to change the system. In fact, they are building alternative global governance institutions such as BRICS, NDB (New Development Bank), and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) to make their goals and voices more audible than is possible within the framework of traditional institutions. They also seek to strengthen their weight at international negotiation tables (Ayres, 2018, pp. 164, 172; Michael, 2019, p. 157).

These alternative institutions are characterised by the fact that they promote South-South co-operation and exclude countries that traditionally dominate world economy and politics. By their actions, they embody the opposition of the West and the colonial system it has created. At the same time, they try to turn the economic potential of at least the so-called emerging countries into political potential (Jafflerot & Sidhy, 2013, p. 326). The emerging countries, particularly the BRICS coalition, have managed to criticise the prevailing Western-centred system. However, they have not been able to offer a post-colonial alternative, at least for the time being, and have not actively taken the lead for the new order (Siidhu, Mehta, & Jones, 2013, p. 10).

However, co-operation in the institutions challenging the domination of the West does not prevent India and China from fighting each other in Asia. It is quite undeniable that they are struggling for influence in South and South-East Asia. At the very least, they seek hegemony in their own regions, if not all of Asia (Wagner, 2018, p. 122; Yoon, 2018, p. 143). This struggle has found a concrete expression in the various regional co-operation initiatives by both countries. It is interesting to see how both countries are building post-colonial infrastructure or rebuilding pre-colonial economic networks. It also appears that the West is happy to support regional co-operation projects initiated by India to limit Chinese influence (Yoon, 2018, p. 143).

Xi's report at the Chinese Communist Party meeting in 2017 put Xi's 2013 initiative, now known as BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), into the centre of China's Asia and world policy. The project has two dimensions: continental connections from China via Central Asia to Western Europe and the so-called maritime Silk Road. It will help China contribute to its goal of being one of the world's leading powers, while at the same time demonstrating its responsibility for globalisation (Panda & Basu, 2018, p. 3; Szczudlik, 2018, pp. 31-32). It is noteworthy that the initiative will connect 4.4 billion people, 63% of the world's population, to China's economy and its development. At the same time, it creates demand for key Chinese products in the region's infrastructure projects and opens the doors for foreign natural resources to China (Panda & Basu, 2018, pp. 3-4, 7).

For China, the BRI project is important because it demonstrates that the country is capable of financing large-scale international joint projects and, at the same time, producing global public goods. This is a measure of global action and leadership (Yonsong, 2018, p. 74). From a historical and de-colonisation perspective, the project means restoring pre-colonial

connections and Chinese influence in Asia (Yoon, 2018, p. 138). It makes China a middle kingdom, connecting it to Central Asia and maritime South Asia and bringing it back into the Indian Ocean.

BRI consists of six infrastructure and development corridors. India finds two of them particularly problematic. BRI's biggest project is CPEC (China-Pakistan economic corridor), which connects western mainland China via the Gwadar port project to the Arabian Sea and further to the Indian Ocean. From an Indian perspective, CPEC emphasises Pakistan's importance to China in its South Asian policy (Wagner, 2018, p. 118). However, the most difficult matter for India to digest is that the development corridor goes through the Kashmir region, which India sees Pakistan is occupying illegally. In this way, China is acknowledging Pakistan's sovereignty over the disputed region.

Another problematic BRI growth corridor is BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar), whose history is older than the 2013 BRI initiative and has played a role for India, mainly for the development of North-East India. This corridor provides access to the Bay of Bengal and further to the Indian Ocean via the ports of Bangladesh's Chittagong and Myanmar's Kyaoukpyu. In its activities, the corridor covers around 40% of the world's population (Panda, 2017, pp. 98–99, 105). Since India has not supported the BRI project, India has remained a passive party in BCIM.

China's BRI together with other China-centric co-operation initiatives in Asia easily lead development towards China's growing influence and a unipolar Asia. Since India has its own goals for Asian leadership, India is naturally opposing such a development and is not part of the BRI initiative (Panda & Sarka, 2020, pp. 23–24). From India's perspective, China's maritime Silk Road aims to legitimise China's presence in the Indian Ocean. In addition, India regards the mainland Silk Road development corridors and the maritime Silk Road as binding India to South Asia (Panda, 2017, p. 84; Ishida, 2018, p. 176). In return, India develops its own co-operation projects in Asia and does not participate in Chinese-led initiatives.

India's own Asian co-operation initiatives are the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor), BIMSTEC (Bengal Bay Initiative for Multidisciplinary Technical and Economic Cooperation), and the Mausam Project. The INSTC was born at the initiative of Russia and aims to open a transport link from the Indian Ocean via Iran and Russia to the Baltic Sea and further to Western Europe. For India, the project was important at least until the Russian war in Ukraine, since it provides a gateway to Central Asia past Pakistan. From India's point of view, the Chabahar port in Iran is at the heart of the project. India has already invested at least USD 8 billion in the construction of the port (Käkönen, 2020, p, 27). In addition to ignoring Pakistan, India hopes that the project will undermine China's strong position in Central Asia.

The BIMSTEC project started in 1997 and includes in addition to India also Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The project is part of India's broader South-East Asia policy, which began as early as 1991 at the end of the Cold War. With BIMSTEC, India aims, on the one hand, to isolate Pakistan in South Asia and to circumvent SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). It is also the equivalent of China's BCIM and aims to undermine China's influence in South-East Asia (Käkönen, 2020, p. 28). For India, the project focuses on building a road link India-Myanmar-Thailand to support the development of North-East India (Nagao, 2016, p, 153).

The Mausam project aims to provide for India a key counterpart to China's maritime Silk Road. It is essentially a research project that seeks to remind the countries of the Indian Ocean about the historical past that unites them: the spice road, as well as Hindu and Buddhist culture. It is mainly a cultural project that resurrects the many influences of Indian culture in the Indian Ocean region (Käkönen, 2020, p. 28; Panda, 2017, p. 85). As a research project, the project has already produced several publications, but it is unlikely to be able to compete with China's maritime Silk Road both economically and politically.

From the point of view of decolonisation of the international system, and of the Asian system, competing projects of both countries have one common feature. They are all, in a way, based on historical networks and structures before colonialism. It is therefore possible to suggest that those projects dismantle colonial structures and try to restore pre-colonial traditional Asian networks as part of the construction of a new system. At the same time, the role of non-Asian players in the Asian

economy and politics is marginalised. It is simply possible to say that India is trying to restore the marine power of the Chola Empire (about 300 BC–1279) and China is attempting to reinstate the Ming dynasty's (1368–1644) position in the Indian Ocean (Khanna, 2019, p. 105).

INDIA SEEKING PARTNERS

Being bullied by China, India on its own is unlikely to be able to achieve its dream of being one of the world's leading powers, which would also determine what would replace the colonial or liberal international order. In the short term, India wants to have a dominant position in the Indian Ocean and a stronger role as a security provider in South-East Asia (Yoon, 2018, p. 148; Pandalai, 2016, p. 490). For this, India's resources alone are not enough. The United States remains a key player in Asia, and India wants closer relations with it. The United States, for its part, would like to see a strong India in Asia that would be able to balance China's growing influence over the Asian and Pacific regions. China, on the other hand, would like India to limit the influence of the United States in Asia (Das, 2015, pp. 8, 70).

Until the 2010s, the history of relations between India and the United States has prevented the development of meaningful co-operation between these two countries. India had strong reasons to be suspicious of the United States. In the 1962 border war, the United States did not want to help India, since it feared it would have a negative impact on the country's relations with Pakistan. In the 1971 war, in which India supported the independence of East Pakistan, or Bangladesh, the United States was determined to support Pakistan despite the genocide committed by the Pakistani army in Bangladesh. From India's perspective, the United States supported Pakistan's military dictatorship and communist China instead of democratic India (Das, 2015, p. 21; Nayar & Paul, 2003, pp. 177–178).

Since the Second World War, nuclear weapons have been one of the elements of a superpower. The relationship between India and the United States has also been abrasive by the United States' efforts to prevent India from developing into a nuclear weapon state. India saw it as a threat to its security and, above all, to its status as a superpower (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 227). India's nuclear test in 1998 forced the United States to recognise the reality, and a common understanding of the threat posed by China has brought the countries closer to each other. Their common interest is to resist China's growing influence, both in Asia and globally (Mohan, 2003, p. 25; Karnad, 2018, p. 140; Rajagopalan, 2019, pp. 26, 28).

The 2008 US-India nuclear agreement was a clear turning point in US policy to bring India to balance China's strengthened position. However, on the flip side of that agreement, China signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with Pakistan, and Pakistan's position in China's politics was strengthened. By 2011 at the latest, the United States began to consider it important that India develops as a regional superpower capable of providing stability and security in South Asia and the Indian Ocean (Das, 2015, pp. 43, 49). The convergence of relations between countries was given concrete expression in the 2015 jointly agreed Strategic Vision for Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean (Kornegay, 2016, p. 320).

India is prepared to seek relations with other major powers, especially with the United States. From the American perspective, however, India's desire to continue to maintain the prospect of independent politics and self-interests may continue to be a problem. For the United States, India has become one of the pillars of maintaining its own leadership in the Indian Ocean region and at a global level. It may be pointless for the US to expect that India is ready to promote the US interests in the world – something that the United States usually expects from its allies (Pant & Super, 2019, p. 136; Ayres, 2018, p. 212). India is not interested of being the little helper of the United States in maintaining its hegemonic position and prevailing order.

Although India and the United States have a common interest in limiting China's influence, India does not want to be an ally of the United States, but mainly just a friend. India does not want to be the pawn of the US regarding its China policy. India wants to avoid creating the impression that it is one of the factors in the policy of isolation of China, nor does it want to be part in producing factors that China could interpret as India having allied with the United States in its anti-China policy. For India, it is still a question of non-alignment and, on the other hand, a new dimension to selective partnership (Mohan, 2012, p. 244; Tharoor, 2012, pp. 218, 226, 237).

Like India, Japan sees China as a threat – but feels at home in the liberal international order and wants to maintain the US-led system. Japan, however, fears that the United States will no longer stand strictly as a guarantor of its security. In turn, India's effort to maintain strategic autonomy has brought India and Japan closer to each other during the 21st century. This is despite the fact that at a global level, India is working together with China against the Western-centric liberal order. However, neither country wants to see a China-centric system emerge (Malik, 2009, p. 186; Ishida, 2018, pp. 180, 183).

Both countries believe that co-operation between them can limit China's empowerment in Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 2014, Japan identified India as one of the key elements of the change in the international system. That is why Japan wanted to extend its co-operation with India, and this was also justified by the common values and interests shared by the countries (Khan, 2020, pp. 127–128). In 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative as a response to China's BRI. This initiative reflects the US's desire for close co-operation between India and Japan (Terada, 2020, pp. 170–171). Founded in 2017, the Act East Forum further strengthens India-Japan co-operation and is set to co-ordinate Japan's FOIP policy and the Indian Act East initiative targeting Southeast Asia (Panda & Sarka, 2020, p. 27).

The India-Japan shared vision of the world took shape in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor initiative (AAGC), launched in 2017. Its aim is to promote the common values of both countries and to balance China's marine Silk Road initiative and increasing presence in the Indian Ocean (Panda, 2018, pp. 270, 286). For India, co-operation with Japan is important because it is unable to compete with China's economic resources alone. Japan's increased activity in the Indian Ocean has brought Japanese finance into several development projects in the Bay of Bengal and India to develop North-East India.

In the Asia-Africa corridor, the port of Chabahar plays a key role. It is of strategic importance to both India and Japan in curbing China's influence. That is why Japan has contributed to the financing of the port project. However, here both countries oppose the interests of their common partner, the United States. The United States wants to isolate Iran from international co-operation and therefore is not happy to see India and Japan co-operating with Iran (Kasai, 2018, pp. 207–208; Aoki, 2020, p. 265). This is one of the paradoxes of India's foreign policy that is poorly seated within the framework of Western-centric theories of international politics, but is well explained in the context of a traditional Hindu world-view.

India and Japan counterbalance their Iran policy by following the wishes of the United States within the framework of the so-called Quad policies. Partly encouraged by the United States, Japan is interested in a multi-party democratic co-operation in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. The Quad is made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It is hoped that this co-operation will function as a counterweight to China's influence in South-East Asia. At the same time, Japan hopes to strengthen its position in the changing international system (Pant, 2010, p. 79; Kornegay, 2016, p. 332; Panda, 2020, p. 3).

In South-East Asia, India has had a strong relationship with Vietnam. India was one of the few countries that supported Vietnam's intervention in 1978 to overthrow the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. India views it as the first humanitarian intervention. The countries also share the experience of border wars with China. The countries signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2007. For Vietnam, this partnership means that India is one of its most important arms suppliers. For India, the partnership has brought the opportunity to permanently deploy its naval units in the South China Sea and to exert pressure on China in its own backyard (Vinh, 2016, pp. 115–117, 119).

Under pressure from China, India's new partnership policy may not be perfectly in line with the traditional non-alignment policy. It is possible to interpret India's policy in the 2010s as replacing non-alignment and Nehru's moral politics with a multidimensional coalition policy. In it, India, on the one hand, is working together with some powers to destabilise China's position and, on the other, challenges its partners and does not submit itself to the role of a pawn of others' policies (Pandalai, 2016, p. 490; Ayres, 2018, p. 118). It may be that India has already lost its autonomy by flirting with the United States. At the same time, it has lost its ability to independently influence the development of power relations in Asia (Karnad, 2018, pp. 155–156).

WHERE TO GO

In a changing world, China seems to be the biggest challenge to India's foreign policy and realisation of its dream. China's strategy is to create a China-centric Asia and exclude US presence in Asia. For its global leadership, China wants to be economically, politically, and militarily dominant in Asia, to be the actor that determines the rules of the system (Ishida, 2018, p. 177; Ghosh, 2020, p. 313). China's point of view is that Asia belongs to Asians, but India needs US presence in Asia (Kamerling, 2018, p. 56). Another problem is that relations between China and Pakistan prevent the settling of border disputes and therefore the normalisation of relations between India and China (Zhongying & Sapkota, 2016, p. 59).

However, tensions at the regional level in relations between China and India do not prevent them jointly opposing US hegemony. At the same time, India co-operates with the United States against Chinese domination in Asia (Mohan, 2003, p. 145; Aoki, 2020, p. 270; Raghavan, 2013, p. 64). In this context, India is pursuing its national interest in establishing itself as one of the leading powers in a possible new world order. It has not resigned itself to the role given by the US to function as a balancer against China. India does not want to be dragged into the China-US conflict because it can benefit from China's economic growth (Ayres, 2018, p. 224; Rajagopalan, 2019, p. 11).

Although the economic relations between India and China are significant for India, the same does not apply to China. That is why China is prepared to use even hard means against India if it feels they are necessary for achieving its objectives (Singh & Dahiya, 2012, p. 59). So far, China has managed to bind India strictly to regional policy, and India is not an undisputed leader even on its own territory. Thus, India is unlikely to become more important than a regional superpower until it reaches undeniable domination in its own neighbourhood, South Asia (Pant, 2010, p. 149; Tharoor, 2012, p. 120). India's neighbours fear this option and seek support from China.

For India, it is not enough to play the role of a regional power. Nor is it enough to be the leader of poor countries against colonialism and imperialism. India's message, at the latest under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been that it wants a role that equals its population, economy, and military power in managing the global system. For India, it is not enough to be a balancing factor. However, its dilemma so far has been that it is more a responsive than a creative player. To achieve its objectives and interests, India's contribution in shaping the emerging world order must be decisive (Ayres, 2018, pp. 95, 101; Malone, 2012, p. 73; Sidhu, Mehta, & Jones, 2013, p. 4).

Competition for global leadership and the struggle with China requires India to play a dominant role in the Indian Ocean. Traditionally, India and China have been continentally oriented states whose key security threats come from Central Asia. Over the course of history, however, the worst threat came from the sea in the form of Europeans. Now India, like the Chola Empire, is turning into a maritime power. It is an essential requirement to assume a superpower status, both in Asia and in the global system (Ayres, 2018, p. 102; Basu, 2018, p. 310).

In addition to the above, India must consider that it has become dependent on natural resources and markets beyond its own territory. To gain and maintain a superpower status, such an addiction means that the country must be capable of controlling and defending transport links across oceans. That is why, for both India and China, the Indian Ocean plays a key role. In India's energy security, its strategic interest stretches from the Hormuz Strait to the Malacca Strait. India cannot control sea area this vast without a so-called blue-water navy (Pardesi & Ganguly, 2009, p. 125).

India's need to control the Indian Ocean region and China's access to it have underlined the region's strategic importance. They have also strengthened arms race in the region and led to its militarisation (Ghosh, 2020, p. 309). In 2001, India established an integrated army, navy, and air force command in the Andaman and Nicobar region to secure its position in the Indian Ocean. Japan, on the other hand, has invested in the development of the infrastructure of the islands (Ghosh, 2020, p. 318). This regional arms race, together with nuclear weapon status, is transforming India from a moral superpower into a military superpower, in accordance with the principles of traditional power policy. At the same time, the threat experienced by India's neighbours and China is growing.

India and China are building their superpower image upon ancient mythical greatness, which justifies the role of a great power (Malone, 2012, p. 64). At the same time, they are trying to restore their pre-colonial positions and influence in the world. In this way, they sort of nullify the 400–500-years history of humiliation. This is the issue of the transition from a Euro-centric colonial system to a possible new system. Against this background, it is also understandable that India is unlikely to commit itself to any coalition that would serve solely the interests of the West (Cohen, 2002, p. 23).

However, India is no longer a non-aligned state in the traditional sense. It implements a multi-alliance policy that gives a strategic autonomy and serves as a tool for the dismantling of the colonial system (Panda & Sarka, 2020, p. 23). India is seeking a position of a strong state in which it can set standards for the functioning of the international system. According to some researchers, India has achieved its goal to some extent during Prime Minister Modi's governance (Gupta & Mullen, 2019, p. 4). The new standards that India is asking for are based on Hindu philosophy and are already manifested in India's foreign policy. India may co-operate with the United States or China, even when there is conflicting tensions in their relations.

In Hindu philosophy, dualism is a kind of alien concept. In Hindu universalism, differences do not constitute a confrontation, but form a complementary whole. Therefore, the other is not necessarily the enemy that must be isolated or destroyed (Datta-Ray, 2015, p. 35). Knowing this, it becomes understandable that India's foreign policy contains many paradoxes from the perspective of Western-centric theories, but they are not paradoxes in the Hindu context. Therefore, on the one hand, India supports the maintenance of the existing system and, on the other hand, acts to change it. Whether India is a status quo, or a revisionist power remains to be seen.

The fact is, however, that India is one of the key players in building regional communities and alternative global governance institutions between developing countries. The West can interpret those as a disintegration of global governance, as power is slipping away from the institutions built by the West after the Second World War. It is also evident that global governance is deteriorating, at least temporarily, and that the management of collective problems loses its importance when no one can take leadership in the international system (Buzan, 2016, p. 28). However, it seems likely that new globalisation will be managed from the East rather than from the West (Acharya, 2018, p. 205). India will play a vital role in this.

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GOVERNING TRANSNATIONALISATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

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ABSTRACT

In this article[3], we examine transnationalism and its governance with a view on the transformation of sovereignty. Transnationalism and sovereignty are in many ways conflicting but also necessarily connected. We explore these connections, more specifically, how the states (governments) govern, regulate, and utilise contexts that have developed transnational characteristics – e.g., via migration, economic transnationalisation, and meso-level trans-border cooperation. On this basis, we develop a typology of state-driven governance of transnationalism. This typology is discussed in juxtaposition to sovereignty as a multidimensional phenomenon and related to the main aspects of sovereignty: internal, external, and popular sovereignty.

We conclude that transnationalisation is governable by the states, given adequate institutional arrangements. Sovereignty, especially internal sovereignty, can also be accumulated by the governments in transnational contexts. Popular and external sovereignty become fuzzier as people move around, and so does territory, as states no longer operate confined only to their borders. Instead, the administrative state becomes more relevant as the locus of sovereignty, as transnationals are necessarily related to administrative rules and procedures governing their movement, settlement, and activities. However, to the extent popular and external sovereignty remain relevant, they act as balances to the increase in internal sovereignty.

Keywords: transnationalism, governance, the state, sovereignty, migration.

INTRODUCTION

Transnationalism and sovereignty are in many ways conflicting. The two concepts have evolved in worlds that are apart historically, disciplinarily, and in a normative sense. Whereas the roots of the modern concept of sovereignty lay in the Westphalian (and UN) world system of separated (and non-interfering) states, transnational studies tend to lecture methodological post-nationalism and criticise taking state borders as granted – asymmetric interference in territories occurs frequently. While the classical idea of sovereignty envisions a population tied to a territory, transnationalism perceives individuals as mobile. While sovereignty debates are to a great extent shaped by legal and political scholars, transnationalism remains a ground for anthropologists and sociologists, many of whom have a gist against legal predetermination.

Such a juxtaposition manifests itself in transnational studies, where several authors see state power as the source of problems, as well as in sovereignty studies that view transnationalisation as a threat to the sovereignty of states. Naturally, there is some middle ground that accommodates views that see the two as accommodating each other. Take, for instance, Stephen Krasner's concept of interdependence sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, 2009, 2012) – the ability of the state to control trans-border

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movements. This definition makes the state not only a domestic actor that controls intra-state issues (monopoly of legitimacy and violence in its own territory) and an international actor that establishes a relationship with other states and supra-state institutions, but also a transnational actor, aiming to establish control over trans-border processes, resources, and affiliations.

This is, to an extent, enabled by the more dynamic outlook on sovereignty that follows the transformationalist perspective on globalisation (see Held & McGrew, 2003). According to Heller and Sofaer (2012), sovereignty should not be seen as a set of established rules, but rather a changing list of capacities the state ought to have to manage in the current context. Sørensen (2004) has envisioned this as the new game of sovereignty, where the rules have become more flexible.

More flexible rules imply that agency becomes the determinant – whether and how do states adapt to the new environment. There are both winners and losers of globalisation (de la Dehesa, 2006) as well as transnationalisation. In this paper, we explore different dispositions of states towards transnationalisation and the ways those can be enacted via particular measures of governance. States can take a proactive stance and aim to play transnationalisation as a positive sum sovereignty game, enhancing their overall impact in their space of operation. However, states can also adopt a more conservative or restrictive stance towards the issue. The consequences are different for governments, people, and citizens.

This paper draws on our previous studies on micro-level transnationalisation (see e.g., Jakobson et al., 2012) and secondary material on the macro-level of transnationalisation. As the variety of transnationalist perspectives entails vastly different approaches and levels of ambition, we will develop our discussion based on transnationalism as practically evident in empirical studies. Thus, we will discuss the implications on sovereignty of governing the empirical transnationalism (including blurred borders and agency in multiple locations), but not the theoretical visions of a transnational (or cosmopolitan) world without states or of a single world state.

Scholarly literature on sovereignty has often addressed its relationship to globalisation, but transnationalism offers a somewhat different optic, being primarily a dynamic and open-ended phenomenon that develops from the bottom up. Unlike globalisation, the transnationalism perspective does not so much lead to a discussion about the end or endurance of the state or sovereignty, but instead opens a new empirical field with which state authorities relate. Similarly, at the heart of our discussion is the analysis of the transformation of sovereignty through the evolution of transnationalism as a field of human activity, and the ways to govern it.

This article focuses on the relations between sovereignty and the governance of transnationalism. Developing our previous research (especially Kalev et al., 2010; Kalev & Jakobson, 2012, 2013), we will examine the evolution and manifestations of transnationalism and the ways of governing transnationalism. Based on this, we develop a typology of strategies for governing transnationalism and discuss how the practices of governing transnationalism are related to the main aspects of sovereignty. We give an overview of different governance initiatives that can be understood as the extensions of domestic or internal sovereignty (or actual substance of statehood), discuss managing the asymmetry of the internal sovereignty of affected states, and then inquire the pressure the changes in domestic practices put on the other aspects of sovereignty – external sovereignty and popular sovereignty.

TRANSNATIONALISM

In the last decades, the scholarly discussion on transnationalism has been developing at accelerating speed, starting with the basic idea of the two-directional cultural and goods exchange created by migrants (Sutton & Makiesky-Barrow, 1975), having personal footage in two or more societies (Chaney, 1979, p. 209) and circulating between societies rather than migrating. This has resulted in the view of seeing embeddedness in cross-border exchange as a normal part of the contemporary social status of people, and in conceptualising transnational social spaces as relatively stable constellations building upon people in (or in-between) various national societies (Glick Schiller et al., 1992).

Transnationalisation is normally conceptualised as a structural process of blurring boundaries, coeval with globalisation, yet occurring in smaller and geographically more precise locations, and allowing for a continuing heterogeneity of developments across the world. Smith and Guarnizo (1998) have differentiated transnationalisation 'from above' – in cross-border integration, global media, financial market, or government and IGO created – and transnationalisation 'from below' – in activities merging from the grass-root level, such as migrating, maintaining border-crossing social networks, creating small-scale finance flows, transmitting cultural practices from one locality to another, etc.

Transnational social space is usually conceptualised as a border-crossing network of relationships: "combinations of ties, positions in networks and organisations and networks of organisations that reach across the borders of multiple states" (Faist, 2000, p. 191). Bauböck (2003) notes that transnational spaces (unlike inter-, multi-, and supranational ones) may theoretically constitute even overlapping polities between independent states, where external or dual citizenship is allowed.

From a systems theoretical perspective, transnational space is an autopoietic subsystem that organises itself according to the requirements of the conditions in the environment. Unequal development (as a premise for migration, the flow of remittances, etc.), cultural differences (that impede integration into the 'receiving' society, and rather result in an adaptation to its rules), relative under-representation in political and other institutions (that could result in remaining extra-institutional and peripheral or in a demand for equal rights) are some properties that shape the character of transnational political spaces.

Earlier (Kalev et al., 2010), we have analysed transnational spaces resulting from three perceptions of transnationalism: modest, multi-level, and radical. Modest tunnel-like spaces presume modern (or compatible) statehood, particularistic spaces refer to multi-level governance settings and radical overarching spaces could replace states. In practice, the most likely transnational space to develop is tunnel-like. The opportunities for multi-level type of space depend on the interest of the state institutions and the success in establishing a systemic multi-level setting of governance. The radical version of overarching transnational spaces substituting states is unlikely.

Empirical literature (e.g., Smith & Bakker, 2008; Pitkänen et al., 2012) usually studies transnationalism as individual life patterns, cross-border networks, and agency, all compatible with statehood as broadly conceptualised. Transnationalisation does not imply a total transformation, but rather, an extended or self-aware transformation of regular practices, because while engaging in transnational practices and/or spaces, one can still retain one's roles in national or local spaces or communities. This is also the basis for our subsequent analysis.

STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSNATIONALISATION

In political and governance studies, the state is broadly understood as an instrument for people to organise life amongst themselves. The state is constituted by its apparatus (political and administrative institutions) and civil society, forming the organisation of public authority in a territory characterised by functionally differentiated state institutions, sovereignty and legitimacy, a unified political space, governability, and citizen agency. The state also has certain ideational parameters: symbols or other features which are perceived important for state identity. These features are constructed and reconstructed via the ever-lasting contestation of state and society projects and actors (e.g., Pierson, 2004; Hameiri, 2010; Kalev & Roosmaa, 2012; Jessop, 2015).

The perspective of transnational studies on statehood is somewhat different. Here, we do not approach states and societies as entities taken for granted, and the critique of 'methodological nationalism' is often exercised (see e.g., Chernilo, 2008). Countries are no longer taken as containers with clear borders that differentiate organised internal affairs from external 'otherness' (Taylor, 2003; Pugh et al., 2009). They are rather seen as spheres or fields, having some coherence which is nonetheless constantly changing.

At the same time, state institutions have a proactive and largely decisive role in governance, also in governing transnationalisation (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Kalev et al., 2010). The state is based on public authorities which organise population by meaning-making (myths, identity markers, education, legal norms) and actions (application of legal norms, power practices, use of power). Applying various governing strategies and techniques (see e.g., Hood & Margetts, 2007; Howlett, 2010), they continue in central position in shaping rationales and rules in their territory and beyond.

To reconcile the ideas of states as spheres with porous borders, and the strong position of state authorities, it is useful to differentiate between the broad and narrow meaning of the term 'the state' (see Kelsen, 2006). In a broad sense, the state is a political society and power organisation in a specific geographical area. In a narrow sense, it is the public authority, the state institutions, the state apparatus. While the state in a broad sense could increasingly be embedded in cross-border frameworks, this does not necessary reduce the power of state in the narrow sense, e.g., the public governance institutions whose influence could also increase. The administrative state may gain influence while the state in broad sense fragments.

Sovereignty is a manifold concept (see i.e., Laski, 1921; Bartelson, 1995, 2014; Krasner, 1999; MacCormick, 1999; Kalmo & Skinner, 2010; Cohen, 2012; Innocencio, 2014). Very generally, it can be understood as the supreme authority in the polity (e.g., Bartelson, 2011), be it legally or politically based (e.g., MacCormick, 1999), exclusive or developed in the context of a broader setting (Bodinian vs. Althusian tradition, e.g., Inocencio, 2014), etc. Krasner (2012, p. 6) outlines seven classical elements of sovereignty: territory, population, effective domestic hierarchy of control, de jure constitutional independence, de facto absence of external authority, international recognition, and the ability to regulate trans-border flows. The conceptual evolution is continuing in the discussions on globalisation (e.g., Held & McGrew, 2003; Sorensen, 2004; Agnew, 2009), the EU (e.g., MacCormick, 1999; Innocencio, 2014), securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998; Omand, 2010; Guillaume & Huysmans, 2013), and digitalisation (e.g., Bigo et al., 2019; Susskind, 2020), amongst others, bringing with it the various and manifold approaches, analytical dimensions, and aspects of sovereignty. In this article, we focus on the aspects we regard as the most productive to discuss changes related to transnationalisation.

In conventional understanding, sovereignty means that a state is the highest locus of power on its territory concerning its residents. State institutions seek to impose themselves on other societal institutions (internal sovereignty) and relating to foreign actors (external sovereignty, including international recognition). This is functional to reach binding collective decisions and assure that these are followed by the residents on the territory of the state. State institutions provide an agreed upon mechanism for establishing public priorities, reconciling the goals and programmes, implementing policies, and monitoring policy results (Pierre & Peters, 2006, pp. 215–216). This typifies the public sector, which specialises by function and differentiates from the private sector.

The people of the state build up the locus of the body politic, or, in other words, the collective agent and arena of politics, a common political space (and people as the sovereign). The scope and intensity of political spaces can vary. The key question is defining who a citizen is, what are the accompanying rights and obligations, and how do citizens relate to people with other legal statuses. Political participation in the civil society or through intermediating democratic institutions or state authorities is also an important aspect. Citizens are the reference group for legitimacy. A state must have a sufficient foothold in society: a majority of the residents must recognise its authority, be the stance positive or neutral.

There is a well-known distinction of the three aspects of sovereignty: internal, external, and popular. Internal sovereignty denotes the ability of state authorities to control the territory and the people. External sovereignty signifies the international recognition of independence and the government's ability to freely operate in the international arena (see e.g., Inocencio, 2014). Popular sovereignty has a different reference ground – the ability of people (citizens) to define collective priorities and make decisions that is the basis of democratic statehood (see e.g., Bourke & Skinner, 2016). In more ambitious approaches, popular sovereignty can be seen as a precondition for the external (recognition) and even internal (legitimacy) sovereignty.

Table 1. Aspects of sovereignty

Aspect of sovereignty	General characterisation
Internal	The ability of state authorities to control the territory and the people. Systematic organisation of public authority, finance and force, clearly defined population, territorial integrity.
External	International recognition of independence and the government's ability to freely operate in the international arena, diplomatic contacts with other states, membership in international organisations.
Popular	The ability of people (citizens) to define collective priorities and make (and change) binding decisions. Constitution founded on the rule of the people, decision-making according to a set of rules, reasonable expectation that fellow citizens comply to decisions and share outcomes, regular possibility to change decision-makers.

Source: authors

These aspects have developed historically stepwise and are thus compatible only to an extent, even if being reconciled in a modernist setting. In political theology and feudal practices of the late Middle Ages, the supreme authority was vested in the person of the ruler (monarch), who derived his authority both from theological sources and from his relative ability to protect his subjects from internal and external enemies. Rulers operated in the context of a Medieval understanding of governance where the (Western) Christian world was seen as a broad commonwealth (Respublica Christiana) spiritually led by the pope, and secularly by the (Holy Roman) emperor, although especially the latter was also disputed. The lesser rulers were in layered personal relationships of allegiance to their feudal lords, while the rest of the world was not seen as part of the system, and could become part of it through Christianisation.

This prince-based approach to sovereignty became gradually substituted with the contemporary understanding through the developments from the early modern period until the 19th century through the four subsequent steps of territorialisation, depersonalisation, absolutisation, and popularisation (Bartelson, 1995, 2011). While the internal and external aspect of the modern understanding of state sovereignty developed relatively early in the contestation of the exclusive and nested sovereignty (e.g., Inocencio, 2014), the trajectory of popular sovereignty was heavily influenced by the English, American, and French revolutions of 17th and 18th century and consolidated only with the full development of the modern state

The conventional understanding of sovereignty has become challenged by the processes of globalisation and trans-nationalisation, which have led to questioning not only the scope of state authority, but also the usefulness of the traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty. As Saskia Sassen (1996) notes, globalisation brings about a new geography of power and leads to the realisation that systems of rule need not be territorial. A bulk of literature in the field of international relations (Keohane, 2002; Krasner, 1999, 2009, 2012; Sassen, 1996) has begun to perceive sovereignty more from the positive stance – as highest authority – rather than in its negative aspect – absence of external intervention. This conceptualisation accepts the impact of globalisation on nation states, but still conveys them as able and dominant actors in making political decisions.

To meet these analytical challenges, we proceed by understanding sovereignty as a layered concept consisting of juridical core, regulative rules, and actual substance (Sørensen, 2004). Juridical core is the constitutional independence stated and recognised (both domestically and internationally). Regulative rules include the international regime of sovereignty consisting e.g., of non-intervention and reciprocity. Actual substance is the real capacity for state action and control based on political and administrative institutions as well as the characteristics of national economy and community.

Table 2. Modern and new sovereignty game

	The modern game	**The new game**
Core of sovereignty	Constitutional independence	Constitutional independence
Regulative rules	Non-intervention	Regulated intervention
Substance of statehood	Territorially defined polity, economy, and culture	Multilevel governance, economic cross-border networks, supra-national elements in 'national' community

Source: Sørensen (2004, p. 115)

In the last decades, the juridical core has been largely intact while the number of sovereign states has risen. The actual capacity of governance has evolved adjusting to circumstances as usual. Notable changes have taken place in the regulative rules, i.e., international regime of rules and practices. This has led to the emergence of a new game of sovereignty based on factual asymmetry of power and influence or even intervention across borders.

The most known areas of the new game of sovereignty have been European Union governance, international humanitarian intervention, and conditional foreign aid, often requiring accepting external activities in the territory or not using some sovereign rights. Nevertheless, the modus operandi of a regime for governing transnationalism is similar: states making unilateral or mutual concessions to foster cross-border activities. This makes governance and international law more complex as there are cross-border rules in certain areas.

Not all national governments are eager to enter the new game. There are several reasons for that, such as a lack of governance capacity, a strong sense of nationalism or nation statehood, or the acknowledged asymmetries of opportunities in case of larger and/or capable vs smaller and/or more fragile states. However, in case of weaker states, transnational governance is perceivable not only as a threat to sovereignty but as an opportunity. Smaller states could gain operating space and influence in bigger networks, poorer or dysfunctional states could tap material or administrative resources.

FROM DIASPORA POLITICS TO GOVERNING TRANSNATIONALISM

Next, we turn to actual policies – the ways contemporary states are governing transnational spaces. To understand the tools and strategies available for this, we can utilise the inventories of policies for governing diasporas (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2004; Gamlen, 2006; Patterson, 2006) and transnationalism (e.g., Bauböck, 2003; Durand et al., 1996; Itzigsohn, 2000; Glick Schiller & Fouron, 2001; Smith & Bakker, 2008; Jakobson et al., 2012).

Differences between diaspora politics and governing transnationalism occur not much in means, but rather, in their goals and particular situations governed. Diasporas are groups of nationals abroad that have developed over time, often in generations since the original emigration (Scheffer, 2003). Transnationalism depicts a much more dynamic relationship, including shorter term migrants who return, and commuting migrants. Thus, governing transnationalism also includes managing return migration and the short-term outlook of migration.

While diaspora politics focuses on individuals and their communities, governing transnationalism also means governing meso-level bodies such as civil society organisations, transnational business, etc. Also, diaspora politics are more characteristic to peripheral states, while transnationalism may also be governed by core states.

Nevertheless, diaspora policy analyses provide a valuable basis for assessing broader transnational strategies when differences are kept in mind. For instance, Alan Gamlen's (2006) analysis of diaspora policies in 70 countries in different parts of the world has resulted in a typology proposal – he suggests that there are three kinds of diaspora policies – capacity building, extending rights to the diaspora, and extracting obligations from the diaspora.



Source: Gamlen (2006, p 9)

Figure 1. Inventory of diaspora policies

Putting this into the context of sovereignty, we can reclassify the policies into two categories: (1) extending internal/domestic sovereignty, that is, using transnational spaces to induce state capacity; and (2) extending popular sovereignty, that is, engaging with the population within the transnational space.

Supplementing Gamlen's list with policy measures from empirical literature on transnationalism, we can understand extending domestic sovereignty as including foreign direct investments (FDI), remittances, investment programmes for hometowns, knowledge transfer programmes, return and adaptation programmes for return migrants, encouraging transnational business, establishing export routes with the help of migrants, assisting unemployed people with entering the labour market abroad, establishing lobby in the host state or in international institutions (e.g., for foreign aid), extending statistics collecting to the transnational level (keeping an eye on the population abroad as well), etc.

Extending popular sovereignty entails recognition of migrants, declaring them national heroes, as happened in Mexico, or in softer forms, depicting the nationals abroad as an extra administrative district (e.g., as in Haiti), giving them political rights, more open citizenship legislation (e.g., allowing dual or external citizenship), and allowing dual nationality; building consultative bodies, expatriate parliaments, representation of expatriates in national parliaments, allowing extraterritorial voting (postal, embassy voting), encouraging participation in migrant associations or in host state politics, and applying identity politics through consulates.

Some states, however, isolate themselves from transnationalisation, e.g., by applying selective or insular citizenship legislation (Vink & Bauböck, 2013). Russia, for example, demands NGOs that receive funding from abroad (including transnational social movements) to register as foreign agents. States could also aim to secure internal domestic sovereignty from extended domestic sovereignty – for instance, in India, non-resident Indians and overseas Indian nationals get some benefits, but are

barred from some rights, e.g., rights of inheritance, acquiring arable land, etc.

Some states have opted for hybrid forms – for instance, Turkey has signed into multiple guestworker programmes, thus using its labour force as a resource and benefitting from transnational settings. Turkey also uses cultural diaspora building strategies (Icduygu & Senay, 2012), but has restricted popular sovereignty by allowing voting in elections only on the state's territory.

However, the practical problem with extending popular sovereignty is whether the transnationals (who may be engaged in extending domestic sovereignty directly or indirectly), actually are engaged in extended popular sovereignty. The issue of the intensity and limits of transnationals' engagement is also relevant to internal sovereignty as it reflects the practical opportunities for having influence over and governing the citizens by a state.

This could also be conceptualised as the problem of the possibility of substantial multiple citizenship (in contrast to formal multiple citizenship that often means holding several passports of convenience). Indeed, precisely the existence of substantial multiple citizenship is the premise to meaningfully discuss the possibilities of micro-level political transnationalism, popular engagement, and popular sovereignty.

Migrants may have a primordial identification with the original 'homeland', but this may not translate into their activities. According to the Trans-Net study (Jakobson et al., 2012), transnational participation was rather modest – both nationally as well as transnationally. Participation is often discouraged by lack of awareness (e.g., some Estonian residents in Finland were not aware of their rights to vote in local elections) and/or lack of interest. (This may also indicate low level of informing by the state.)

Also, transmigrants are passive when there is little practical incentive – when they do not have much to benefit from their participation (Jakobson, 2013). In this sense, governments have clear pathways towards increased relevance and internal sovereignty by engaging transnationals in the development initiatives and activities in the country of origin and by providing public services. However, this is balanced by the time and energy resources of the transnationals.

Being an active citizen in multiple states could be difficult for several reasons, such as shortage of time or other resources. Often people are not active even in one community. Transnational lifestyle takes up quite a lot of effort. In a way, migration is still an individualistic or small group endeavour, and thus, this group's interests are put forth. Engaging with home country politics and being part of its body politic may be of low importance in migrants' agenda (Jakobson et al., 2012).

Modest participation may also result from lack of empowerment. Some Estonian respondents even claimed that they cannot vote in Estonia because of moral reasons, since as they claimed, they don't have to live under the rules the representatives will make. This was less evident with Finnish migrants who were more embedded in Estonian society, who self-evidently voted in practically all elections they were entitled to, even if they admitted not being very interested nor very well acquainted with politics in either country. This difference may be explained with different empowerment and different democratic tradition, as Finland is a consolidated democracy with traditions.

Transnational participation is occurring mostly in the form of long-distance nationalism in states which are politically unstable or where migrants are not satisfied with political developments (or, in many cases, non-developments). The extension of popular sovereignty over the borders may result in political transformations or at least a demand for such transformation. We can maybe even talk of democratic spill-over (Perez & Armendariz-Crow, 2010). But this requires sufficient stability in the host country.

All in all, governing transnationalism leads to a possible expansion of internal sovereignty, limited by potential decrease in civic agency and popular sovereignty. The increase of such domestic sovereignty puts pressure on the conventional model of external sovereignty based on clearly defined territorial jurisdictions.

FOUR STATEHOOD STRATEGIES IN GOVERNING TRANSNATIONALISM

In order to explain the modes in which states orientate themselves towards transnationalisation, we propose a typology. An endeavour to do so is not a precedent itself, in fact, our pursuit for it was stimulated by Georg Sørensen's (2004) differentiation of the three types of contemporary states. These can be treated as three respective statehood strategies – modern, postmodern, and weak (or post-colonial), differentiating the more conventional modern states from more transnationally proactive postmodern states and the little capable weak states (see also Kalev et al., 2010). Although such a model may provide a scale for analysing state transformations, it does not directly relate to transnationalisation and its governance.

Our model (see Figure 2) is founded on two axes which play a defining role in choosing state strategies. First of all, there is the question of states' governance capacity – to what extent can states employ effective governance strategies in their jurisdiction (and beyond). In a way, this dimension is also present in Francis Fukuyama's (2004) call to analyse not only the level of development of states, but rather, also their scope and strength.

The second dimension our model follows is the attitude toward transnationalisation – a stance towards migration, economic globalisation/transnationalisation, and the like. Here, we inquire whether states see it as an opportunity and try to adapt proactive strategies to encourage modes of transnationalisation that benefit it, or remain indifferent or even hostile, and at best, be reactive toward transnationalisation – simply by condemning it, or aiming to hinder further transnationalisation.

As a result, we come up with four statehood strategies – namely, postmodern statehood strategy, featuring a rather strong governance capacity and proactive stance toward transnationalisation; modern statehood strategy, also featuring strong governance capacity, but being rather reactive towards transnationalisation; fragile statehood strategy that is characteristic to states having weak governance capacity and not much interest in transnational governance; and developmental statehood strategy, featuring states whose governance capacity is (still) rather modest, but who are proactive towards transnationalisation.

All proposed categories are ideal typical scenarios and thus do not need to accommodate all empirical statehood settings found across the globe. We acknowledge that some regimes may fall between the four categories. However, practically any state can perceive these as potential future scenarios.

The modern statehood setting is the classical centralised state where state institutions co-ordinate or steer various aspects of life. As an ahistorical type of state the modernist setting is characterised by the attempts of state institutions to build up solid, centralised, and controlled structures, if necessary, resisting globalisation trends. This is also the statehood setting in which the conventional concept of sovereignty developed and which is still taken as an ideal typical setting when sovereignty is discussed.

Migration is seen as a phenomenon that might enhance some spheres of life (e.g., economy, skills) and therefore also state-making. At the same time, the modern state is conceptualised as a nation-state which makes transnational migration problematic and unwanted. Thus, for the modern statehood setting transnationalism is a negative-sum game in terms of sovereignty.

The postmodern statehood setting could be described by diffusion and multilateralism – many of the processes that were seen as conducted by the modern state are now arranged on supra-state, local, or societal arenas. The transnational character of the world is acknowledged, as well as the inevitability of migration, and the generation of transnational communities. These issues are proactively addressed by state institutions with a focus on transforming these processes into more manageable forms (and expanding their influence).

In terms of governance capacity as well as orientation, we can distinguish between proactive and conformist strategies. The proactive strategy can generally be undertaken by large states with a lot of resources of notable global or regional importance. The institutions that have chosen the proactive strategy can even take advantage of the new situation that potentially meant a setback for the states, becoming the protagonists of transnationalisation and attempting to govern the transnational networks



Source: authors

Figure 2. Types of state (government) strategies in governing transnationalisation

themselves, 'colonising' the transnational space. Conformist states are usually less ambitious and in no such possession of resources. Rather, they play on the functional differentiation globalisation brings about and 'specialise' in particular functions, e.g., accountancy expertise, intermediating the interests of some group, or just offering stamps, citizen status, and other bonuses of statehood. Although proactivists are the ones with the largest absolute gain in sovereignty, conformists can also play a positive-sum game of sovereignty.

Fragile statehood is defined by Brock, Holm, Sørensen, and Stohl (2012, p. 16) as ineffective in planning and executing state-defined policies due to low legitimacy and administrative power, and often defectiveness in terms of economic, human, and societal development (instead of states, tribal, etc. allegiances shape individuals). Thus, fragile states are neither capable nor interested in transnational governance, and bottom-up transnationalisation (usually in the form of migration) weakens these states further, resulting in brain-drain and other problems.

However, in some cases, states that have had low governing capacity and legitimacy, have reviewed their attitude on transnationalisation and begun to perceive this as a resource for restoring their legitimacy as well as accumulating resources to (re)install (more) administrative power and effective governance over their internal territory. This has been characteristic of developmental states – often authoritarian modernising states that have focused on (economic means of) state capacity building – and post-developmental states – states that have begun to focus on nation building and are seeking for alternative development strategies to the West-centric modern state (Escobar, 1995; Ong, 1999).

While governments in fragile and modern statehood settings primarily engage with the territorial state – the former aspiring to govern its territory, establishing internal sovereignty, and the latter effectively governing it and aiming to bar external influence from its territory –postmodern and developmental states also engage with governing a transnational space (Faist, 2000) or a transnational field (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004). In the latter case, sovereignty can be better discussed as the possession of power resources rather than just having the highest authority in a territory.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we examined transnationalism and the ways it can be governed, and developed a typology of strategies for governing transnationalism. We have seen that transnationalisation may turn sovereignty into a positive-sum game for the states given that adequate institutional arrangements are developed. Positive-sum game emerges primarily due to the expansion of domestic type sovereignty (the aspect of internal sovereignty and the layer of actual substance of statehood).

Of course, the strategies in governing transnationalism vary across states, but this corresponds well to the understanding of transnationalism as a multifaceted phenomenon. This results in pressures in the international (legal) system of states and in popular sovereignty.

It can easily be concluded that in case states no longer operate only confined to their borders it is quite possible for governments (the state in the narrow sense) to expand their influence (the third layer of sovereignty in Sørensen's terms) over transnational areas and people (beyond their state in the broad sense). The expansion of domestic (internal) sovereignty leads to an increasing tension with the other layers and aspects of sovereignty and possible transformations. Sovereignty is not a monolithic entity, but a resource that can be accumulated by state governments. However, there are logical limits to this if we want to keep a system of governance based on multiple states and modern style international law.

If some governments succeed in considerably expanding their influence over transnational settings, they create tensions in the international regime of sovereignty (regulative rules or second layer in Sørensen's terms). It leads to a situation that could be metaphorically characterised as patches of external sovereignty in the earlier intact container of another state. While the asymmetry can to an extent be mended in developing more flexible rules (e.g., negotiated intervention), this nevertheless leads practice (and regulation) farther away from the premise of equality of states in international law. Pooling sovereignty (e.g., in the European Union) or creating multi-level arrangements (nested sovereignty) has similar implications. These developments hollow out the practical content and relevance of the external aspect of sovereignty in its conventional sense.

This could be met by a shift from conceptualising sovereignty not as exclusive right of final decision-making but as possession of power resources (well-compatible with the Foucauldian understanding of power, for example). Such relational understanding of sovereignty as an indeterminate resource can allow us to conceptually meet the increase of asymmetries of governments (and other institutions).

This may lead us to more imperial or federal style settings, resembling an earlier phase of sovereignty under feudalism and in the context of high medieval German Holy Roman Empire (see e.g., Wilson, 2016; Parker, 2013). Finding new arrangements capable of overcoming the problems made explicit by the then modern criticism of medieval settings is crucial in developing a more viable system of nested sovereignty. Here, determining sovereignty has its own challenges, such as overlapping, opacity of long decision-making chains, translation, and enforcement difficulties – and an ambiguous relation to citizens.

Concerning popular sovereignty, we can differentiate between two logics of political citizenship: the civil and the democratic. According to the civil logic, the emancipation of a citizen is primarily enacted through the practice of individual rights and is guaranteed by the rule of law. The democratic logic has the key interest in the ways citizen agency can be performed in practice. It cannot be demonstrated that meaningful citizen political agency could be set up based on civil logic (see Kalev et al., 2010). As is well captured by Erman (2012), democratic agents need not necessarily be agents of democracy. Democratic polities must be based on the democratic logic of political citizenship. Also in this case, citizenship can be globally sensitive or globally oriented (see Parekh, 2003; Axtmann, 2010).

If sovereignty becomes nested, a person may be a part of different communities of sovereignty (in a multi-layered setting). This means more challenges in transparency and capacity for civic agency but also more fundamentally for conceptualising the people as an integrated political community and for the interdependence of citizens as part of the community establishing and limiting governance, i.e., the very fundamentals of popular sovereignty (see e.g., Chandler, 2012; Chwaszcza, 2012). However, empirical accounts refer to more national or even bi-national rather than transnational practice (see e.g., Jakobson & Kalev, 2013).

The movement towards non-modern setting most likely increases the relevance of public governance institutions as the basis of sovereignty, and not that of citizen bodies (at least their de facto capacity will be limited). This will be further strengthened by the ICT-driven transformation of surveillance and governance capacities (e.g., Bigo et al., 2019; Susskind, 2020). These processes may render popular sovereignty marginal even in case there is a system of democratic governance. Thus, the locus of sovereignty is transforming – while state sovereignty develops, popular sovereignty becomes fuzzier.

Table 3. Implications of governing of transnationalism to the layers and aspects of sovereignty.

	Inactive in governing transnationalism	**Proactive in governing transnationalism**
Aspect		
Internal	Based on the idea of modern government	Based on governance utilising various techniques (if needed across borders)
External	Part of the family of states in modern international law	Position in a multi-layered arrangement based on capacity
Popular	Popular sovereignty as a basis of national representative democracy	Marginalising, tensions in democratic citizen agency and public accountability
Layer		
Juridical core	Declared sovereignty	Intact (but less relevant)
Regulative rules	Procedural equality	Asymmetry (negotiated or regulated, multi-layered or imperial)
Actual substance	Full modern statehood (ideally)	Asymmetry (in capacity and authority)
	Inactive in governing transnationalism	**Proactive in governing transnationalism**
Aspect		
Internal	Based on the idea of modern government	Based on governance utilising various techniques (if needed across borders)
External	Part of the family of states in modern international law	Position in a multi-layered arrangement based on capacity
Popular	Popular sovereignty as a basis of national representative democracy	Marginalising, tensions in democratic citizen agency and public accountability
Layer		
Juridical core	Declared sovereignty	Intact (but less relevant)
Regulative rules	Procedural equality	Asymmetry (negotiated or regulated, multi-layered or imperial)
Actual substance	Full modern statehood (ideally)	Asymmetry (in capacity and authority)

Source: authors

Based on previous discussion, we can conclude that the most likely practical parameters triggering transformations of conventional sovereignty are territory and population (people). The most likely developments are the increase of the importance of the administrative state as locus of sovereignty, contested popular sovereignty, and the growth of asymmetry in international system pressurising external sovereignty.

All in all, governing transnationalism clearly influences sovereignty. The growth of the relevance of (extended) domestic sovereignty and the increase of asymmetry puts pressure on other levels and aspects of sovereignty. The question is where the new balance will emerge or be established. Unilateral overexpansion of domestic sovereignty leads to imperial expansion but possibly also overstretch. A moderate balancing solution needs the evolution and reflexive use of the techniques for governing transnationalisation, self-limitation of stronger governments, and balancing domestic sovereignty by an intergovernmental enactment of the regime on transnational people.

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EXPLORING 'OVERDEVELOPED' POST-COMMUNIST AUTOCRACIES

ALO RAUN[1]

ABSTRACT

This review article focuses on the phenomenon where some countries do not follow the general pattern suggested by the modernisation theory – the more developed, the more democratic. Former Soviet states like Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus appear as anomalies displaying very high level of human development, despite being fully authoritarian. Considering that divergence, this article reviews main theoretical approaches used to explain democratisation and autocratic resilience of post-communist regimes. In addition, a preliminary test is conducted to evaluate the potential of these theoretical approaches to address the fact that such countries outperform both more open neighbouring non-democracies and some democracies. While some theories imply possible explanations (patronal politics, conditional approach to resource dependence, and market social contract), none of them sufficiently discloses the hidden mechanism behind such an anomaly, implying the need for more in-depth studies.

Keywords: modernisation theory, neopatrimonialism, patronal politics, rentier state theory, market social contract.

INTRODUCTION

This review article examines theories that are employed to explain democratisation, development, and autocratic resilience. Ever since Seymour Martin Lipset's (1959, p. 75) famous postulation "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" the idea that socioeconomic development significantly increases the chances of a country being or becoming a democracy has been one of the most prominent approaches in political science. Although such correlation, proposed by the modernisation theory, has been confirmed by dozens of studies over decades, the causation is still challenged (Teorell, 2010; Przeworski, Cheibub, Limongi, & Alvarez, 2000). Furthermore, there are several autocracies among the top economic performers of the world, including Singapore, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates (UNDP, n.d.-a).[2] This contradiction is based not only on (oil) wealth; Human Development Index (HDI) by UNDP shows that several autocracies display substantial social development as well. As many as 18 out of 66 countries with very high human development are autocracies (UNDP, n.d.-b).[3] Additionally, such regimes are often categorised not as hybrid, but as fully authoritarian (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Russia) (Freedom House, n.d.-a).

This is not just a question of regimes that have been autocratic for decades, as several post-communist countries have followed a similar path. In their case, such contradiction is especially evident. Excluding the democratic Baltic States, the countries delivering highest level of human development in the former Soviet Union area are some of the most closed autocracies of the region: Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (see Table 1). According to their level of HDI, they outperform not only more open

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[2] According to per capita GNI PPP.

[3] Following Alan Siaroff (2005), in this article I use 'autocracy' as an umbrella term referring to all non-democratic regimes, encompassing both hybrid cases and full autocracies, both 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free' according to Freedom House. Countries belonging to the 'Not Free' category are also called as 'full authoritarianism' and 'closed autocracy' in the article to differentiate them from more open cases. These are regimes where no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power. See also Freedom House (n.d.-b) and Levitsky and Way (2010).

Table 1. HDI, GNI, and Democracy in former Soviet Union

Country	HDI[a]	GNI[b]	FIW status[c]
Estonia	0.892	36 019	F
Lithuania	0.882	35 799	F
Latvia	0.866	30 282	F
Kazakhstan	0.825	22 857	**NF**
Russian Federation	0.824	26 157	**NF**
Belarus	0.823	18 546	**NF**
Georgia	0.812	14 429	PF
Ukraine	0.779	13 216	PF
Armenia	0.776	13 894	PF
Azerbaijan	0.756	13 784	NF
Moldova	0.750	13 664	PF
Uzbekistan	0.720	7 142	NF
Turkmenistan	0.715	14 909	NF
Kyrgyzstan	0.697	4 864	PF
Tajikistan	0.668	3 954	NF

Sources:

[a] *Human Development Index value for year 2019 (UNDP, n.d.-a)*

[b] *Gross national income per capita for year 2019 (2017 PPP $; UNDP, n.d.-a)*

[c] *Freedom in the World country ranking (F = Free; PF = Partly Free; NF = Not Free. Note that Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus are NF) (Freedom House, n.d.-c)*

post-communist autocracies like Ukraine and Georgia, but also the democratic Bulgaria (UNDP, n.d.-b). This challenges approaches claiming that more open autocracies (e.g., competitive authoritarian regimes) deliver better human development than closed autocracies.[4]

Such outliers seem to have found the secret to the game, as they are able to undermine both international pressure and public appeal for democratisation and thus prevent regime change.[5] The fact that such a trend continues and possibly extends, challenges not only the modernisation theory but also the prospect of further democratisation in the world and in the post-communist realm in particular, strengthening the claims of an era of standstill and reversal (Alizada et al., 2021; Diamond, 2020; Repucci, 2020). Besides affecting the daily lives of the people in these countries, such regimes may be role models for others in the future.

What are the mechanisms behind the relative success of some fully authoritarian regimes? This review article surveys and synthesises prior relevant research and provides input for future research.[6] Its aim is to examine main theoretical approaches employed to explain democratisation, development, and autocratic resilience of post-communist regimes with a focus on addressing the fact that some fully authoritarian regimes deliver better human development than several more open states. Since modernisation theory appears problematic in explaining the mechanism that enables these regimes to remain fully authoritarian and deliver very high level of human development, several regime theories (neopatrimonialism, patronal

[4] E.g., Cassani (2021).

[5] About high social security supporting political status quo also in autocracies, see Dimitrov (2009); Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, & Stephens (1992); Cutright & Wiley (1969).

[6] About review articles, see, e.g., Webster & Watson (2002).

politics, rentier state theory, popular autocrats, etc) are studied. However, this is not a classic review article, as theories are briefly evaluated against empirics using research synthesis.[7]

In this article, mostly data on the year 2019 is used since this was the latest available during the preparatory phase of the article. It is also the year Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down as the President of Kazakhstan, a symbolic starting point of a set of important changes in countries in focus in this article.[8] This review article explores theoretical approaches based on how they describe a specific anomaly in the relationship between democracy and development: it is not a normative assessment of the policies of authoritarian regimes.

The article is structured as follows: first, a brief overview of literature on main schools of comparative democratisation studies and the relationship between democratisation and development is given. Next, theories with the ambition to explain autocratic resilience in post-communist countries in the 21st century will be reviewed. Finally, a preliminary test of the applicability of these theories on explaining very high level of human development under some post-communist closed autocracies is conducted.

MAIN TRADITIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT-DEMOCRACY NEXUS

The following section reviews literature focusing on the main schools of comparative democratisation studies and the role of socioeconomic development in fostering democratisation (and *vice versa*), with an emphasis on the modernisation theory. Comparative democratisation studies have been dominated by four main traditions: the modernisation theory, the historical sociologist approach, the transitionalist school, and, more recently, a 'new structuralist' game-theoretical economic approach. While the first two are structuralist in their epistemological-methodological approach, transitionalists are on the other side of the axis of structure and agency, and the fourth approach, although rooted in structuralism, combines, in a way, all the above, and thus represents the wider trend of synthesising different approaches.

In many countries, democratisation followed modernisation, tempting scholars to link these two and develop an approach known as the modernisation school. Since Seymour Martin Lipset's famous postulation, mentioned at the beginning of this article, economic development has been considered the dominant explanatory variable for democracy, based on a vast number of (usually) quantitative studies. Be it measured in GNI/GDP per capita, energy consumption per capita, or other similar measures, the correlation has almost always been evident.[9] Larry Diamond, one of the leading scholars in the field of democracy studies, infers: "given the considerable variation in quantitative methods, in countries and years tested, in the measures of democracy employed, and in the vast array of different regression equations /…/ this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative national development" (Diamond, 1992, p. 468). The majority of studies show, as Todd Landman summarises, that socioeconomic development progressively accumulates the kind of social changes that make a society ready for democratisation (Landman, 2003).

In opposition to the modernisation theory, historical sociologist (or social forces) and agency-based transitionalist approaches have also gained momentum in the study of democratisation. Barrington Moore, founder of the historical sociologist tradition, related democratisation to the rise of the middle class and the terms of its political incorporation (Moore, 1966), a result later upheld by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) as other prominent contributors of that school. The latter found that the working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force with middle class sometimes as their allies or in the leading role. Historical sociologist studies about few countries and single-country studies claim other important factors mediate the relationship between economic development and democracy, be they class structures, the nature of economic

[7] See Cooper (2010).

[8] It was followed by, *inter alia*, the 2020 Belarus presidential election and protests, 2022 Kazakh unrest and Russia's attack on Ukraine the same year with unprecedented sanctions imposed on President Putin's regime. Combined, these events can be considered as signs of partial retreat from the political phenomenon in focus in this article (or even signalling an end of an era). Thus, the analysis in this article may not entirely reflect the situation at the time this article is published.

[9] Examples include Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Halloran (2006); Boix & Stokes (2003); Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994); Bollen & Jackman (1985); Bollen (1983, 1979); Cutright & Wiley (1969); Cutright, (1963).

development, the role of the state, important historical events, political culture, or international factors (Landman, 2003). According to Jean Grugel (2002), such approaches had lost their appeal by the turn of the century, mostly because of their inability to explain the sudden democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These events supported, in contrast to structuralist approaches, the transitionalists or the strategic approach, situated on the other side of the epistemological-methodological axis of structure and agency. They claim democracy can be created independent of structural context, based on the interplay of individual actors. Skilful leadership, aided by luck, is considered key to outcomes which lead to the establishment of democratic procedures for government (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Rustow, 1970).

Recent decades have faced new approaches combining different schools, and the structuralist approach has also returned to the debates, with Levitsky and Way (2010), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and Boix (2003) as some of the most prominent authors. This approach is well represented by the tradition based on the formal game-theoretic models of economics. Although they are sometimes titled as 'new structuralists' (Pengl, 2013), they also integrate other main traditions by providing structural conditions explaining preferences and actions of ordinary citizens (social forces), in turn affecting the strategic choices made by political elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003).[10] They often model regime transitions in a game-theoretic framework, where the rich (or the elites) may choose to repress at a certain cost, in response to which the poor (the citizens) may choose to revolt against the regime or acquiesce, or they may choose not to repress, in which case democracy ensues. However, despite similar premises, Boix, on one hand, and Acemoglu and Robinson, on the other hand, arrive at fundamentally different conjectures when it comes to the impact of inequality on democratisation. Whereas according to Boix the best chances for transition to democracy are associated with lower levels of inequality, Acemoglu and Robinson conclude that democracy has the best chance to emerge in societies with middle levels of inequality. Pengl, however, shows that both approaches have found only limited support in quantitative empirical studies and additionally face theoretical problems (Pengl, 2013).

All these different schools provide some valuable input to the study of democratisation. Teorell (2010) tests several determinants of democratisation, and his results confirm the continued importance of all the first three theoretically disparate intellectual traditions. As he concludes, structural conditions do matter, particularly in the long run; but so do elite actors, particularly in the short run. Moreover, the mass of the citizens themselves matter when able to organise peaceful insurrections against the regime. Since the fourth (economic) approach also incorporates aspects from the three previous schools, Teorell (2010) sees the possibility of his approach further theoretically integrating with Boix's.

Modernisation, Human Development and Democracy

Debates concerning the linkage between democracy and development are ongoing and besides criticism there have been attempts to advance the modernisation theory. As a fruitful example, Larry Diamond (1992) proposed Human Development Index (HDI) to be a better development variable to associate with democracy (juxtaposed with national income). HDI has grown out of dissatisfaction with comparisons of countries employing GDP/GNI per capita, even when purchasing power parity (PPP) is considered. According to its leitmotif, the decisive factor is not the amount of money produced by the society but the way it is converted into the well-being of its citizens. The authors have tried to keep HDI as simple as possible, using only three aspects (proxies) that show the potential of representing social development as a whole – income, health, and education (UNDP, n.d.-c). Diamond (1992) upheld his idea statistically, comparing HDI with an index of democracy, Freedom in the World (FIW), and finding strong statistical correlations. HDI showed substantially stronger correlation with the index of democracy (0.71 significance at the 0.0001 level) than per capita Gross National Income (GNI; 0.51 at 0.0001). This finding advanced the modernisation approach by introducing HDI as the possible predictor of democracy and made Diamond reformulate Lipset's famous thesis, "The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country" (Diamond, 1992, p. 468). Following Diamond, in this article, HDI is employed as the main indicator of development.

[10] See discussion in Teorell (2010).

Modernisation theory has also faced criticism and the debate continues. Comparing 40 years of data, Przeworski, Cheibub, Limongi, and Alvarez (2000) found that although there is a correlation between development and democracy, there may be no causation. In other words, political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise; rather such a movement is random. They claim the correlation exists since rich democracies tend not to collapse. However, Epstein et al. (2006) retested the findings of Przeworski et al., using new data, new techniques, and a three-way classification of regimes, and found that increase in GDP per capita is a causal factor in the process of democratisation. This question is still up to debate with Przeworski and his co-authors facing similar criticism, e.g., from Boix and Stokes (2003), but support from Persson and Tabellini (2009), and Teorell (2010).

The role of political regime and its institutions in fostering human development is in focus of several studies, with most of them addressing the comparison between democracies and autocracies. An extensive literature finds that democracy improves quality of life (Gerring, Knutsen, Maguire, Skaaning, Teorell, & Coppedge, 2021; Wang, Mechkova, & Andersson, 2019; Kudamatsu, 2012; Gerring, Thacker, & Alfaro, 2012; Navia & Zweifel, 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001; Brown, 1999). Others dispute this approach (Truex, 2017; Miller, 2015; Rothstein, 2015; Jacobsen, 2015; Halleröd, Rothstein, Daoud, & Nandy, 2013; Ross, 2006).

On the other hand, relatively limited attention has been devoted to studying differences in human development performance in different forms of autocracy – an important aspect in explaining the anomaly in focus in this study. Cassani (2021) suggests that competitive authoritarian regimes which hold elections and allow for some degree of contestation face stronger pressures to improve citizen living conditions.[11] As a response, they employ mostly performance-based legitimation (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). Using data on school enrolment and child mortality, Cassani finds that competitive authoritarian regimes outperform other non-democracies, apart from hereditary autocracies. Miller (2015) argues that, among autocracies, those holding elections obtain better results in education and healthcare than other (closed regimes). Cassani and Carbone (2016) find that, concerning human development performance, competitive authoritarian regimes (in sub-Saharan Africa) lie in-between democracies and other (non-competitive) autocracies. Other authors challenge these conclusions, with Kim and Kroeger (2018) asserting that autocratic multiparty elections have no effect on infant mortality. In addition, Wang et al. (2019) find that electoral competition needs to be of relatively good quality, arguing that democratisation has a threshold effect on health outcomes.

Thus, this is by no means a settled question, and further research is necessary. However, all the theories reviewed in this section, to a larger or lesser extent, fail to address the cases of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. These three countries represent a phenomenon that contradicts the logic proposed by the modernisation theory. They are more developed than other post-Soviet autocracies, but at the same time their regimes are some of the most closed in the region. Authors more sensitive to different forms of autocracy (Cassani, 2021) claim that more open cases (competitive authoritarian regimes) display better results of human development. However, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Russia – contrastingly – are at the other side of the democracy–dictatorship axis.[12] Thus, in conclusion, these studies establish several significant statistical relationships but do not explain in sufficient detail the reasons why some (hegemonic party) autocracies are able to sustain and advance a very high human development index score. As a more fruitful approach, several regime theories that focus more on the operating mechanisms of autocratic regimes will be reviewed next.

FROM REGIME THEORIES TO AUTOCRATIC RESILIENCE

This section reviews literature on autocratic resilience in the 21st century, with the focus on post-communist countries and regime types. Since modernisation theory and most related approaches appeared problematic in explaining the mechanisms that enable or motivate closed autocratic regimes to sustain very high level of human development, as a more promising

[11] About competitive authoritarianism, see Levitsky & Way (2010).

[12] Cassani finds that hereditary autocracies also display a better human development score. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, however, are not examples of such regime type; see Cassani (2021).

avenue, more attention will be given to several regime theories (neopatrimonialism, patronal politics, rentier state theory, popular autocrats, etc).

Organisational Power, Linkage and Leverage

Various authors have focused on analysing autocratic resilience and the phenomenon of hybridisation after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The most prominent authors coping with the aforementioned aspects, Levitsky and Way (2010), propose a 'mixed approach'. They combine structural domestic variables and international variables in explaining why some countries that had democratic openings or a regime change (at the beginning of 1990s), democratised, while others became hybrid or fully authoritarian regimes. They develop the currently most prominent regime type in the grey zone between democracy and authoritarianism, the concept of 'competitive authoritarianism' – a hybrid regime where competition for power is real, but unfair. In the context of the current article, the most relevant part of their theory concerns the variables explaining trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes: linkage to the West, organisational power of the regime, and Western leverage. For Levitsky and Way (2010), regime change and stability are the interplay of domestic and external factors, with the latter being more decisive and divided into two parts. The regime outcome of competitive authoritarian systems is primarily defined by linkage to the West. The authors show that almost all competitive authoritarian countries with high linkage have democratised, regardless of other aspects. Second, according to their theory, if the organisational power of the regime and the party in power is high, the regime will not fall easily and is likely to stabilise. The third aspect, Western leverage, mostly consisting of democracy promotion from the outside (and aspects related to it), comes as a less influential factor. Thus, it empirically appears that high linkage to the West tends to cause democratisation, high organisational power brings authoritarian stabilisation, and in the case of contradictory powers at play, the result will often be unstable authoritarianism.

Levitsky and Way (2010) measure organisational power based on three components: state coercive capacity, party strength, and state economic control. Efficient party and state organisations (e.g., army, police forces, domestic intelligence) increase the capacity of those in power to anticipate defection, co-opt or repress opponents, stifle or crush protests, and win (or steal) elections. State economic control, on the other hand, occasionally serves as a substitute for a coercive and party organisation, and helps the ruler prevent or counter challenges posed by the opposition. A ruler's economic power is high when resources (production, finances, oil rents) are concentrated into the hands of the state, and governments are free to distribute these resources to a considerable extent at their discretion.

The approach of Levitsky and Way is in accordance with Teorell's analysis (2010), according to which regional democratic organisations and neighbour diffusion affect regime stability. In addition, since these characteristics are rather universal in nature, it can be suggested that they can be used in explaining modern regime transitions and resilience in general.

According to the research by Levitsky and Way (2010), post-communist Eastern Europe (excluding the former Soviet Republics) was a region where linkage-based pressure from Western Europe was so intense that democratisation occurred in the face of significant domestic obstacles (with only Albania as an exception). The former Soviet Union region, on the other hand, was characterised by lower linkage. External democratising pressure was weaker, the cases lacked strong domestic push for democracy, and the main difference was authoritarian stability. Where state and party structures were strong, and/or where Western leverage was medium or low, autocrats were able to hold onto power even in the face of highly mobilised opposition. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), Russia and Belarus also started out as competitive authoritarian after the dissolution of Soviet Union, but in the course of time they transformed into full authoritarianism (Belarus in 1994 and Russia in 2008). They describe these countries as examples of how low leverage and high organisational power contribute to authoritarian stability.

The conclusions by Levitsky and Way are in accordance with the analysis of Bunce (2015). When explaining the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe, she stressed the importance of geography (the long history of connections to Western Europe, the influence of European Union, diffusion effects within the region) and the development of oppositions already during

communism. As disadvantages of former Soviet Union countries, she emphasised their longer history of communist rule and, in the case of Russia and Central Asia, the fact that dominant international powers must choose between security concerns and democracy promotion. The influence of communist past is also reflected in the clientelist relations and corruption present in post-communist societies. As Cerami (2015) notes, such phenomena have not usually disappeared even with democratisation, since they have become rooted in the culture of these societies. Following similar logic, Pop-Eleches (2014) emphasises that post-communist countries are less democratic than their socio-economic levels predicted. He claims that it is due to the distorted nature of communist development. The latter helped, on the one hand, the pro-democratic middle-class to remain passive, and on the other hand mobilised the lower class, which is less likely to subscribe to democratic values than their counterparts in non-communist countries.

Popular Autocrats and Market Social Contract

The *modus operandi* of Levitsky and Way is partly challenged and partly advanced by Martin K. Dimitrov (2009), who gives them recognition for considering the influence of the West and organisational power of the regime as crucial components. He complements this list with an even more prominent component – the authoritarian ruler's popularity. According to Dimitrov (2009), this factor helps understand why several authoritarian regimes prevail in the post-Soviet space. Unlike their unpopular counterparts, such rulers possess the support of the populace, and they seldom need to resort to using brute force. He adds that popular autocrats use three strategies to ensure their popularity: economic populism, anti-Western nationalism, and muzzling the media. Cumulatively these three strategies produce a high level of legitimacy and stability. It is extremely difficult for competitors to overthrow an authoritarian regime which is enjoying strong support, regardless of whether it is natural or partly created by the media. Economic populism includes substantial investments in social projects and redistributing policies. These are easiest to achieve in countries like Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, where income from natural resources accelerates economic growth and generates money that can be used for redistribution. Elements of organisational power continue to be important in Dimitrov's opinion, but this holds especially true in the context of a different type of regimes – those with unpopular rulers. It is also noteworthy that when giving examples of popular autocrats, Dimitrov (2009) points, contrary to common logic, not to competitive authoritarian, but to fully authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia and Kazakhstan). The ideal types of totalitarianism and sultanism let one expect that the more closed an autocracy is, the more it resorts to repression in securing social stability.[13] However, in an era where the cost of open repression is high, it is useful to employ other mechanisms to secure regime resilience, including, for instance, state dictated Soviet-style 'social contract', which was used in post-communist regimes in the 1980s. Cook and Dimitrov (2017) find that such contracts are still present: the post-communist regimes of reform-era China and Putin's Russia have created distinctive 'market social contracts' where authoritarian leaders cater to the consumption needs of the population in a strategic effort to remain in office. They also highlight the centrality of mass co-optation in explaining durable autocratic rule.

Neopatrimonialism and the Selectorate Theory

When looking at the region in focus in this article, the other prominent approaches to democratisation are the (partly connected) neopatrimonialist and rentier state schools. Authors who favour the neopatrimonialist approach (Paiziev, 2014; Peyrouse, 2012; Kunysz, 2012; Isaacs, 2011; Fisun, 2003; Ishiyama, 2002) claim that most or many former Soviet Union countries are ruled on other grounds than legal-rational bureaucratic regimes and propose that this also explains their failure to democratise. They admit, though, that these countries are not governed entirely on traditional grounds either, that is, two methods of domination have become combined – hence the prefix 'neo-'. Formally bureaucratic governance has become mixed with informal governance that follows patrimonial logic. Neopatrimonialism has been considered as a distinct regime type (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, 1994), but later scholars have reduced it to constitute only one component of a regime – the operation mechanism of bureaucracy or state authority structure (Guliyev, 2011; Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Nevertheless, at the heart of this model is a patron-client relationship where the ruler directs public resources to benefit his cronies in the

[13] Cf. Raun (2012); Linz & Stepan (1996).

form of private goods in exchange for loyalty, and at the expense of the public, securing the survival of his regime in doing so. Paiziev (2014) analyses key elements contributing to the persistence of neopatrimonialism in Central Asian countries and finds that it prevails because in these countries the relationship between the executive and legislative power is presidential (superpresidentalism), and their political culture is characterised by clan politics. According to Paiziev (2014), the secret of the longevity of Kazakhstan's and Uzbekistan's authoritarian regimes is the fact that they manage to profit from formal as well as non-formal, traditional as well as non-traditional institutions and practices, and the mixture of all these can be described as neopatrimonialism.

Such an approach comes close to the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011), a prominent scholar representing the game-theoretic approach, although authors elaborating about neopatrimonialism often do not refer to his work. This approach is more open to other coalitions than the simple patron-client relationship. According to his theory, rulers, to remain in power, do not focus on the well-being of the electorate (as expected in democracy), but of 'the selectorate' that under authoritarian conditions is usually the elite (but not always). The selectorate is a set of people who have a say in choosing leaders with a prospect of gaining access to special privileges allocated by leaders, and the winning coalition is the subgroup of the selectorate who maintain incumbents in office and in exchange receive special privileges (such as business oligarchs and senior figures in the security forces, as in the case of Russia)[14] (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).

Patronal Politics

In addition, a concept close to both the neopatrimonialist and selectorate theory approach, the patronal politics theory developed by Henry E. Hale (2015) deserves attention. Similarly, he defines patronal politics through the personalised exchange of concrete rewards and punishments via networks of actual acquaintance. However, he acknowledges that scholars (also from both aforementioned approaches) tend to underestimate the power of public opinion in autocracies with contested elections. Besides patron-client networks, authoritarian leaders employ public politics aimed at creating mass support for the regime/leader. Public opinion shapes, in turn, not only the expectations of the people, but even more importantly of the elite, thus either facilitating or hindering leadership change. His analysis shows that post-Soviet patronal presidents fell primarily as they simultaneously suffered from the lame-duck syndrome and low popular support. The lame-duck syndrome is reflected in a situation where elites come to expect a patronal president's imminent departure from power, and the value of presidential promises and the gravity of their threats start to dissipate. Potential reasons include serious illness (or old age), term limits (together with credible plans to leave office), and massive drop in popularity (economic crises, etc). However, experiencing such a syndrome per se does not mean losing power, especially in case presidents or their handpicked successors are popular enough to win the competition (Hale, 2015). While in part resembling Dimitrov's approaches, Hale shows how post-Soviet patronal presidential systems feature a significant and powerful accountability mechanism forcing their leaders to cultivate and cater to public opinion.

Rentier State School and Conditional Approaches

In relation to defining neopatrimonialism and regimes in former Soviet Union countries, the concept of rentierism also needs to be examined. While neopatrimonialism was used to explain the underdevelopment of countries (and problems of democratisation allegedly related to the same phenomenon), some countries with a similar political system became rich but did not democratise. It was found that a large proportion of them had a common denominator – dependence on profit earned to the state budget from the export of oil and other natural resources, oil transit taxes, or external aid (Schlumberger, 2006). The most important element is not the fact that the country exports predominantly one type of raw material, but the fact that the income earned from this plays such a crucial role in the state budget (and in financing the leader and the elite) that there is no motivation to collect and raise taxes. Thus, the regime does not need to provide political representation to the people

[14] About Russia see Dawisha (2014).

in exchange for rising taxes (Raun, 2007; Herb, 2005; Moore, 2004; Zakaria, 2003; Ross, 2001; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). If skilfully implemented, such a system gives rulers a lot of resources for redistribution via clientelism and patronage, that is, to ensure the survival and popularity of the regime – in addition to the opportunity for personal enrichment. According to Luciani (1987), the threshold for considering a country as a rentier state is whether oil export and similar aspects form at least 40 percent of total government revenues. Another aspect is that general government expenditure is expected to form a significant share of GDP (e.g., one half). However, one could argue that rentierism is not a political regime type, but a set of (economic) conditions that hinders democratisation. In addition, as Okruhlik (1999) puts it, oil wealth is just a resource – what matters is how politicians exploit it.

However, since several resource-abundant countries (including post-communist cases) do not easily fit the above-mentioned criteria, a conditional approach to the resource curse and rentierism has emerged, claiming other aspects mediate (or enforce) the relationship between mineral wealth and the efficiency of political institutions (Jones Luong & Weinthal, 2010; Gel'man, 2010; Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009; Dunning, 2008; Raun, 2007). For example, Thad Dunning (2008), one of the most prominent representatives of this perspective, shows that under favourable conditions, resource rents may even promote democracy, the two most important factors being the extent of private inequality outside the mineral sector and the degree of resource dependence. According to him, three levels of relationship can be distinguished: resource-abundant, rentier, and resource dependent states. While export of natural resources does not constitute a significant amount of state budget in resource-abundant states, in rentier states it is a definitive feature. This, however, does not necessarily imply e.g., that a country cannot be democratic (cf., Venezuela for decades and Norway). Resource-dependent states, in which the export of natural resources makes up a significant share of GDP, provide most favourable conditions for authoritarianism (Dunning, 2008).

In the same vein, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2010) assert that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth per se but rather by the ownership structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth. Secondly, they claim that weak institutions (particularly fiscal regimes) are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. They show that the best choice for building state capacity and achieving long-term economic growth is private foreign ownership of mineral sector, and that the most problematic case is such where state both owns and controls the petroleum sector. The other two strategies are state ownership without control and private domestic ownership. Vladimir Gel'man (2010) mixes the approach by Jones Luong and Weinthal with the model of interactions of state and big business proposed by David Kang (2002). Gel'man (2010) describes the dynamics observed in Russia as a pendulum-like swing from a predatory state with state ownership and control of mineral sector (in the 1980s) to private domestic ownership with rent-seeking business actors having captured the state (at the end of the 1990s) back to predatory state that has captured business and (partly) owns and controls mineral sector. Thus, Gel'man claims that besides the resource curse, inefficient political regimes and their institutions (cf. crony capitalism) impose major barriers to economic and political reforms (Gel'man, 2010). Such conditional approaches display more potential in explaining post-Soviet realities, especially the concept proposed by Jones Luong and Weinthal.

To sum up, even though this section does not review all the theories concerning democratisation and autocratic resilience, it shows the diversity of concepts and the difficulties of preferring one approach over others. Since the modernisation theory and related approaches do not explain the mechanism that makes closed post-communist autocracies deliver high level of development, several regime theories were reviewed with the expectation that they give an idea of what the mechanism could be. Next, based on the mapping in this section, a preliminary test is conducted to evaluate the potential of these theories to explain the anomaly.

OUTLINING THE POTENTIAL OF THEORIES IN EXPLAINING THE ANOMALY

This section briefly analyses the potential of theoretical approaches reviewed in previous section in explaining the empirical phenomenon where a group of outlying post-communist countries has not democratised despite their relative success in delivering remarkably high level of human development. Due to the limitations that a single scientific article faces and the

overall focus on reviewing theories, this chapter shortly outlines only prominent approaches that explain the resilience of post-communist autocracies as possible avenues for more in-depth future research on the phenomenon.

From Levitsky and Way to Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Politics

The approach by Levitsky and Way (2010), the authors of one of the most widely renowned and elaborated work on authoritarianism in the modern world, helps to explain the authoritarian resilience of Belarus and Russia (and probably Kazakhstan). According to their analysis, in Russia and Belarus, linkage to the West and Western leverage are low to medium, and organisational power is medium to high, which leads to expect autocratic consolidation. Such a scenario has materialised in these countries: while at the beginning of the 1990s both countries were categorised as hybrid regimes ('competitive authoritarian') by Levitsky and Way (2010), by the year 2008, both had regressed to 'full authoritarianism'. The authors do not analyse Kazakhstan, considering it as fully authoritarian since the beginning of the 1990s. It is thus reasonable to expect that their scores of the three indicators are similar to Belarus and Russia. However, since the study by Levitsky and Way focuses on explaining 'competitive authoritarianism', i.e., the way several autocratic incumbents 'mitigated' the democratising pressure of the third wave, they do not analyse and differentiate the 'fully authoritarian' group of countries in more detail, thus placing under one umbrella countries as diverse as Kazakhstan delivering very high level of human development, the extremely closed North Korea, and the poor Ethiopia. Therefore, their theory is insufficient in describing the distinctive features of the anomaly mapped in this article, but it contains aspects that could be employed in the search for a more general theory of modern autocratic resilience (e.g., the importance of organisational power).

Another prominent concept used in explaining the autocratic resilience of Central Asia and other post-communist countries is the neopatrimonialist approach. This is, however, often applied to these countries rather loosely, without much theoretical elaboration – as a deus ex machina. Based on the 'undermodernised' African countries of the 1960s where strongmen captured formally modern states and ruled them following patriarchal logic, this concept is especially problematic in explaining the anomaly where autocracies display 'too much' human development. A prominent feature of this theory is the patron-client relationship where the ruler remains in power by using state resources to ensure the loyalty of the elite at the expense of the populace. Under such circumstances, however, one would expect that national income is poorly converted to benefit social development, and such countries do not display particularly high level of human development.

However, such scores of human development can be better explained using the selectorate theory. It could be reasoned that in a more modern society with (at least formally) multi-party elections, a successful survival strategy also encompasses the incorporation of (segments of) the wider populace (voters) as part of the selectorate and the winning coalition, resulting in larger investments into public goods and patronage favouring targeted groups, which in turn may help to explain higher level of human development in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.[15] As Cook and Dimitrov (2017) imply, the ruler may base his power not only on the elite, but also on the people, which may have a balancing effect.

Another propitious approach, the concept of patronal politics by Henry E. Hale (2015), supplements the neopatrimonialist approach, with public support as a crucial factor for explaining regime survival, accompanied by the need to avoid the lame duck syndrome. Hale describes Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia as cases of 'nonrevolution'. In the first two, presidents had never become lame ducks (by the time of publishing his book in 2015), despite allowing at least some opposition to compete in the elections. Kremlin, on the other hand, experienced a lame duck period and even a dramatic competing-pyramid situation (serious coordinated challenge by opposition in 1999) but had presidents and handpicked successors who were popular enough to win the competition (in 2000, 2008 and 2012). In sum, these three cases could be categorised as the 'success stories' of patronal politics (Hale, 2015). In the context of elections with real opposition candidates (as in all three cases in focus), authoritarian leaders become interested in securing mass support. This, however, motivates patronal presidents to invest

[15] Following Erdmann and Engel (2007, p. 107) a distinction is made between clientelism and patronage based on the recipients. Clientelism is about individual benefits (land, office services) and patronage of collective benefits to a bigger group (e.g., roads, schools). In both cases, the distribution of benefits follows personal or particularistic interests by violating universalistic rules.

in economic growth and living standards of ordinary citizens (e.g., wages and social transfers, the four Priority National Projects in Russia [education, agriculture, housing, and health], etc.). It seems plausible that as a by-product, this trend could be reflected in the growth of HDI. Thus, the concept of patronal politics appears as one of the more promising explanations to the dilemmas mapped in this article.

Rentier State Theory and Ownership Structure

When compared to 'traditional' rentier state theory (Luciani, 1987) and the data on Gulf countries (Kuwait, Qatar, etc.), Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus fail to meet the expected requirements to be categorised as rentier states: oil exports at least 40% of total government revenues, general government expenditure as a significant share of GDP, and (extremely) low taxation. In a typical rentier state (Kuwait), the share of government expenditure is 51.2% (in 2021), whereas even in Kazakhstan it is merely 21.1%. The tax burden as a percentage of GDP in Kuwait is 1.4, compared to 11.7 in Kazakhstan. Even the third criterion is not met in Kazakhstan – the share of oil export fluctuates between 19 to 35% of total government revenues (below 40%) (IMF, 2022; Heritage Foundation, 2021).

However, one could successfully elaborate that a smaller 'rentier effect' exists in Kazakhstan and Russia: the ruler has more resources to appease both the elite and the populace and to use them as a buffer during economic crises. In addition, a more encouraging avenue is the conditional approach to resource dependence, claiming other aspects mediate (or enforce) the relationship between mineral wealth and the efficiency of political institutions. As Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010), prominent authors representing this way of reasoning, assert, mineral-rich countries are not cursed by their wealth per se, but rather by the ownership structure they choose to manage the wealth. The decisive question is who owns and controls the mineral reserves – state or private companies – and whether the latter are of domestic or foreign origin. According to the authors, strong fiscal regimes are most likely to emerge in case of private domestic ownership of mineral sector, as was the situation in Russia until 2005. The second-best scenario is considered private foreign ownership, as in Kazakhstan until the same year. The other three main mineral-rich post-communist countries started as examples of more problematic structures – state ownership with control (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) or state ownership without control (Azerbaijan) (Jones Luong & Weinthal, 2010).

This distinction between ownership structures could help explain the different developmental trajectories of these regimes, especially the more positive structural outcomes of Kazakhstan and Russia. As the authors show, comparatively strong fiscal regimes were present in these countries at least until 2005 (with functioning National Resource Fund of Russia as a prominent example). It could also be reasoned that a more responsible and predictable fiscal regime facilitates more efficient translation of economic growth into human development. For example, Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) assert that Kazakhstan has managed to redistribute the benefits of foreign investment from petroleum-rich to petroleum-poor regions and spend more on education and health sectors, including shifting some funding to primary and secondary education. However, in 2005 (over 15 years ago), both countries in focus retreated from their ownership structures, with Russia opting for the scenario regarded worst in terms of state capacity and long-term economic growth – state ownership with control –, and Kazakhstan establishing state ownership without control. Though it could be argued that the initial reforms still influence the results, the relationship between (previous) ownership structure of the mineral sector and measure of human development needs further in-depth analysis, and it seems reasonable to expect that other factors mediate this relationship. For example, Gel'man (2010) describes the emergence of 'crony capitalism' in Russia as interplay between 'big oil' and political institutions (the rise of the predatory state), partly basing his reasoning on the workings of Jones Luong and Weinthal.[16]

Considering Belarus, the third anomalous case, the discussion about rentierism is problematic since Belarus lacks major oil or natural gas reserves. However, Balmaceda (2014) describes a somewhat twisted rentier effect, where President Alexander Lukashenko has exploited the revenues of the energy sector to secure the loyalty of his political base and the country's elites. Belarus has a valuable energy infrastructure (pipelines and refineries) inherited from the Soviet period, and subsidised

[16] About predatory state see Kang (2002).

commodity imports from Russia. This has helped Lukashenko take advantage of price differentials, transit fees, taxes, and re-exports to generate rents that are then redistributed among domestic actors, enhancing his popularity (see also discussion about economic populism in next paragraph).[17]

Popular Autocrats and Market Social Contract

Another partly promising approach is proposed by Dimitrov who developed the concept of 'popular autocrats', describing rulers that secure their power using three strategies: economic populism, anti-Western nationalism and muzzling the media. As Dimitrov (2009) shows, all of the three conditions are met in Russia, with Kazakhstan and Belarus as significant examples of economic populism. While all three countries show low media freedom (Freedom House, 2017), in Kazakhstan, ethnic aspects were employed to benefit the regime in a different way with president Nazarbayev acting as the guarantor of inter-ethnic peace in a multi-ethnic society (Toleukhanova, 2016).[18] The first strategy, economic populism with high levels of social spending and consistent redistributionist policies, could help explain significant human development. However, analysis by Dimitrov suggests that other natural resource-abundant regimes such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan could be considered belonging to that group, thus this theory alone may not differentiate the three countries in focus in this article to a sufficient degree.

Economic populism is to a large share consistent with the concept of 'market social contract' defined by Cook and Dimitrov (2017). Elements of such a tacit contract are observable in all the three cases. In Russia, for example, financial benefits are targeted for social groups like pensioners and workers in the metallurgy sector. Belarus and Kazakhstan show a remarkably low level of inequality: according to World Bank, the Gini index for Kazakhstan is 27.8 and for Belarus 25.2 (in Russia it is 37.5) (World Bank, n.d.).[19] However, in Russia, public money worth 20 percent of GDP is spent on social system, compared to the more moderate 10.1 in Kazakhstan (which is still higher than the 6.4 percent in the third main oil exporter in the region, Azerbaijan) (McCullaugh, 2013). In addition, Kazakhstan reduced its rate of poverty from 50% in 2000 to 5% in 2012 (UNDP, 2016). Although these demonstration effects of social spending and redistribution are not indicators of HDI, they depict a similar trend – we see autocratic regimes that invest into popular support more than expected (based on e.g., neopatrimonial logic).

The preliminary analysis in this section shows that besides the modernisation approach, several regime theories also struggle with explaining the anomaly of very high human development under three post-communist closed autocracies, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As the analysis indicates, Western linkage and leverage in conjunction with the organisational power of the regime as indicators proposed by Levitsky and Way, the neopatrimonialist approach, the concept of 'popular autocrats', the selectorate, and the 'traditional' rentier state theories only partly help explain the remarkably high level of development in these states. The concepts of 'market social contract' (Cook & Dimitrov, 2017), 'patronal politics' (Hale, 2015) as well as conditional approach to resource dependence emerge as more promising avenues for further research on the anomaly. The theory asserting the central role of different ownership structures of mineral wealth by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) could help explain why Russia and Kazakhstan diverge from other (oil-rich) countries in the region (with the twisted rentier effect possibly partly explaining the case of Belarus) (Balmaceda, 2014). The motivation behind autocratic rulers investing in human development can, to a degree, be explained by employing the approach of patronal politics (Hale, 2015). To remain in power, in the context of elections with real opposition candidates, incumbents are interested in securing mass support and, as a by-product, also in investing in projects that enhance human development in the country. The concept of 'market social contract' also focuses on regimes that (e.g., considering the high cost of open repression) invest into popular support (Cook & Dimitrov, 2017). The ruler invests more in social welfare in exchange for denying democratic freedom, and human development ensues as one of the results.

[17] As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis in this article is limited to the year 2019. Thus, it is not reflecting the 2020 Belarusian presidential election and protests.

[18] The analysis in this article is limited to year 2019, thus it is not focusing on politics of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

[19] Data on year 2018.

Thus, based on this preliminary analysis, existing theories tend to provide only general or insufficient explanations of the relationship between state and relevant actors, serving mostly as guidelines for more in-depth studies. Three concepts emerged as more promising. Although they do not concentrate on the phenomenon in focus in this article per se, they could provide initial framework for future analysis and possibly be combined in the process. One possible avenue to better evaluate the applicability of different theoretical approaches would be to further analyse the relationship between human development, economic growth, and democracy in the countries in focus in this article. We could evaluate whether Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus appeared more developed than other autocracies in the region already 'initially' (in the 1990s). Alternatively, their notable level of human development must be in large part achieved later, and thus we are witnessing the demonstration effects of the current regimes. If the latter is the case, another explanation deserves attention: it could be argued that their high human development is the result of absolute economic growth (since – the faster it is, the more resources are available for investments in health and education sectors). For example, hypothetically, since both Kazakhstan and Russia are major oil exporters (cf. rentier state approach), the export of natural resources may fuel their economic growth so intensively that human development follows almost incidentally. Therefore, even if the growth of the national income of these countries is remarkable, their efficiency in converting it into human development could remain poor, implying a more ordinary case of 'bad-governance-cum-oil-wealth' (e.g., as the neopatrimonialism approach presumes).

In sum, this review article provided only very preliminary test of the theories. Several fundamental questions regarding high human development in autocratic states are not yet settled and further inquiry into the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon is necessary. Several aspects may have cumulative explanatory effect and could therefore be combined in further study on the anomaly.

CONCLUSION

In this review article, main theoretical approaches in explaining democratisation, development, and autocratic resilience were examined, focusing on post-communist regimes (including modernisation theory, neopatrimonialist approach, rentier state theory, concept of patronal politics, etc). Theories were reviewed based on the way they explain the operating mechanisms of some of the most closed autocracies in the region that – at the same time – manage to deliver high level of human development. Based on the Human Development Index (excluding the democratic Baltic States) Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan appear as the flagships of human development in the former Soviet Union region – they outperform not only more open post-communist autocracies but also democracies.

It occurred that several concepts appear deficient in explaining the operating mechanism of such regimes, contradicted each other, or needed to be developed further. First, the democracy–development nexus was given more attention. The most problematic case was the modernisation theory, according to which socioeconomic development should progressively accumulate the kind of social changes that make a society ready for democratisation. These three countries, however, are remarkable examples of the opposite trend. Authors more sensitive to different forms of autocracy (e.g., Cassani) claimed that more open autocratic regimes display better results of human development. Nevertheless, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are at the other side of the democracy–dictatorship axis.

As a more fruitful approach, next several regime theories that focus more on the operating mechanisms of autocratic regimes were reviewed, and a preliminary test of their applicability in future research was conducted. As a result, it appeared that several regime theories struggle with explaining the anomaly. The analysis indicated that Western linkage and leverage, in conjunction with the organisational power of the regime (as indicators proposed by Levitsky and Way), the neopatrimonialist approach, the concept of 'popular autocrats', the selectorate, and the 'traditional' rentier state theories only partly help to explain high level of human development under full autocracy. Three approaches appeared as more promising. First, the theory asserting the central role of different ownership structures of mineral wealth by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) could help explain why Russia and Kazakhstan diverge from other (oil-rich) countries in the region (with the twisted rentier effect possibly partly explaining the case of Belarus) (Balmaceda, 2014). Second, the motivation behind autocratic rulers

investing in human development can, to a degree, be explained by employing the approach of patronal politics (Hale, 2015). To remain in power, in the context of elections with real opposition candidates, incumbents are interested in securing mass support, and, as a by-product, also in investing in projects that enhance human development in the country. Finally, the concept of 'market social contract' focuses on regimes that (e.g., considering the high cost of open repression) invest into popular support (Cook & Dimitrov, 2017). The ruler invests more in social welfare (in exchange for denying democratic freedoms) and human development ensues as one of the results.

Based on this preliminary analysis, existing theories tend to provide only general or insufficient explanations of the relationship between state and relevant actors, serving mostly as guidelines for more in-depth studies. In sum, the mechanisms for the relative success of the authoritarian regimes deserve further investigation. Several aspects may have cumulative explanatory effect and could therefore be combined in further studies on the anomaly.

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CO-CREATING COMMUNITY-BASED SOLUTIONS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA IN ESTONIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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ABSTRACT

In this study, we aimed to explore and describe the prosocial behaviour of the community during the COVID-19 crisis in Estonia on Facebook, using mixed-method content analysis.

This article focuses on the role of social media in co-creation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the use of Facebook (FB) as a modern communication technology in times of crisis. Our goal was to learn how Facebook as a social media channel can be a tool and accelerator that allows people to find solutions to social problems in communities experiencing crises. The focus of the research is on finding solutions in co-creation for vulnerable target groups, including the elderly, people with disabilities, and other people who need support. This research expands on the role and potential of using FB as a communication platform to enhance co-creation.

We used Kaun and Uldam's (2018) model as a theoretical framework for this study. The study is characterised by a descriptive and exploratory research design. We studied the prosocial behaviour of the community on Facebook through a three-stage mixed method content analysis of existing data, including posts and comments on FB pages, using both quantitative (descriptive statistics) and qualitative (thematic analysis) data analysis methods. Our findings suggest that Facebook as a social media channel could be successfully utilised as a tool for sharing calls to action, activating citizens to co-create solutions, and disseminating results.

Keywords: prosocial behaviour; co-creation; community support; Facebook; COVID-19.

INTRODUCTION

States and communities throughout the world are facing the extensive spread of the novel coronavirus disease of 2019, known as COVID-19, and its intensive pressures on the economic, healthcare, welfare, and educational sectors (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2021; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has entailed numerous restrictions, such as those on mobility and in catering, on educational and cultural institutions, as well as radical reorganisation of the daily management of healthcare and social care. In addition to the closure of educational institutions, social isolation, and the transition to distance learning, the pandemic has required the reprofiling

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of jobs using remote methods. In all these restructurings, more attention must be paid to the vulnerable groups in society to ensure their access to daily care and food, and to provide the resources needed for both educational and occupational restructuring in various fields and in everyday life. Banks et al. (2020) noted that in the conditions of social isolation, the necessity to support people with subsistence needs increases, therefore communities must adapt and innovate to meet new needs.

This article presents a study framed by the need for social isolation and self-isolation that have become important in the context of the epidemiological crisis, and hence challenge citizens to organise community activities and support vulnerable people. These are issues related to prosocial behaviour within the community and its adaptation to the crisis, touching on the topics of community responsibility, solidarity, and caring for each other. In this article, we investigate how the community has activated and organised support of the daily lives of vulnerable groups through social media (SM) during the crisis caused by COVID-19 in Estonia.

This article emphasises the role of social media in co-creation and the use of modern communication technologies in times of crisis in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. In his research, Klasche (2021) pointed out that the role of social media cannot be underestimated, because social media platforms have helped a large part of the population in preparing measures that societies must take if crises are to be resolved by reducing social contact. Klasche emphasises that all kinds of state and non-state actors must achieve the same sense of responsibility, in order to contribute to the successful management of the problems associated with crises.

This study focuses on Estonia, a country with 1.3 million inhabitants, situated at an intersection of Nordic, Eastern, and Western European countries. Named the 'most advanced digital society in the world', Estonia conducts 99% of governmental services online (European Commission, 2021). While 57% of the world's population and 86% of Europe's population use the Internet, the rate is higher in Estonia – 98% of Estonians regularly use social media, and more than 50% of Estonians have an active Facebook account (Hootsuite, 2021). Therefore, Estonia can be viewed as a good example of a country with a high-tech rich ecosystem for conducting a study focused on the utilisation of social media for co-creating community-based solutions for vulnerable groups. We consider the primary risk group of the COVID-19 to be vulnerable groups, including the elderly, the disabled, and other target groups in need of support.

In Western European countries, though declining, local communities are still much stronger than those in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, organic support networks, neighbourhoods, religious groups, and civil initiatives were mobilised during the pandemic, while in Eastern Europe, we couldn't rely on these traditional communities, especially in post-Soviet countries. Nevertheless, Estonia had an advantage in the form of its very advanced digital society, in which new types of (online) networks could be recognised, emerging from the crisis. These were especially important during the strictest periods of lockdowns, when physical encounters were restricted, making online solutions the main means of communication.

Our goal was to learn how Facebook can be used as a tool and accelerator in a crisis, enabling people to find solutions to social problems in the community. Our main research question is as follows: How did the residents of Estonia use FB in co-creating solutions for vulnerable target groups under the conditions of social distancing and radical self-isolation, and which common solutions were found? Furthermore, the term 'caring citizen', who helps others, especially in times of crisis, was adopted as an analytical lens to offer design recommendations for extending the capacity of FB to address this response. This research expands the role and potential of using FB as a communication platform to empower co-creation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this theoretical overview, we try to conceptualise community prosocial behaviour and describe the process of community co-creation in times of crisis to conceptualise solutions created with the support of social media to assist vulnerable target groups in Estonia during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Community prosocial behaviour and co-creation. We have based our understanding of community prosocial behaviour on Kendra Cherry's (2010) definition, according to which prosocial behaviour is described as actions aimed at helping other people, and characterised by a sense of empathy, concern for other people's rights, feelings, and well-being. Prosocial behaviour includes activities such as helping, sharing, comforting, and co-operating.

The term 'co-creation' is often used in the context of the creation of services. Co-creation of (public) services is a process in which citizens as the end-users of services, communities, public authorities, and other stakeholders work together in a balanced way to find sustainable solutions to societal issues. During co-creation, citizens are not merely consumers, but are actively engaged in different stages of service innovation through meaningful involvement, trust, and partnership with stakeholders (Oertzen, Odekernen-Schröder, Brax, & Mager, 2018; Osborne, 2018; Voorberg et al., 2017).

A community's response to a crisis can be seen as prosocial behaviour that seeks to bring the crisis under control through the involvement and co-operation of organisations and individuals. According to Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, and Schroeder (2005), prosocial behaviour represents a broad category of activities that some important groups in society or a smaller social group generally identify as beneficial to other people. Examples of prosocial behaviour in Estonia during the COVID-19 pandemic include helping different target groups cope at home, informing each other on how to behave better in a crisis, and organising supportive campaigns to provide help and attention to certain target groups.

In this context, Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Carpini (2006) noted that civic engagement includes actions citizens take to pursue common concerns and address problems in the communities they belong to. In crisis situations, people concerned about changes and those affected in surrounding areas engage in largely prosocial behaviour – they care for others, volunteer, donate money, and otherwise support those who are struggling (Dynes, 2006). In turn, several academics have noted that social media enables users to intensify interactions with their online and offline contacts, expanding through their social networks (Hampton & Wellman, 2005; Sessions, 2010; Campbell & Kwak, 2011). Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe (2011) suggested that Facebook is particularly useful in facilitating the conversion of casual connections or latent ties into weak ties that can be considered bridging social capital.

Simultaneously, communication within the community must consider the mutual trust of the community members, which is the basis and precondition for co-creation in the community. Without trust, it is impossible to work together or achieve results. Putnam (2000) pointed out that trust and civic engagement are mutually reinforcing, because people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer and participate more often in community and political activities.

The role of social media in the co-creation process. Social media can be defined as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content" (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). According to Boyd and Ellison (2007), social media is about sharing information through networking. We can consider the content creation by the contributors to be a co-creation process in which both the content and the resulting solutions can change. Couldry et al. (2017) pointed out that developments in digital technologies over the past 30 years have massively expanded humans' capacity to communicate across time and space, and more people can now connect and make meaning through media, providing an important resource for new movements for justice and social progress.

Martini, Massa, and Testa (2012) noted that social media has a crucial role in creating values with customers and changing citizens' behaviour to better meet societal norms and expectations, and digital technologies can significantly influence behaviour change and the implementation of activities in the co-creation of citizens and public service professionals. The use of social media requires that users know and want to use this communication channel for co-creation. Tiidenberg and Siibak (2018) have argued that social media platforms allow people interested in particular issues to receive and share information instantly in large populations.

This article focuses on FB because social media power has largely concentrated into FB in Estonia. On the one hand, FB is a highly effective communication and integration tool that fulfils the desired functionalities on individual, group, and societal levels (Appel, Grewal, Hadi, & Stephen, 2020). In the national context, Kalmus, Realo, and Siibak (2011) found that Estonians trust FB, and they tend to use a narrow selection of social media platforms. This is the reason why FB has developed several new functionalities, such as closed groups (Tiidenberg, 2020). If all users have gathered on one platform, this provides a theoretical opportunity to realise risks but also a practical opportunity to reach many.

Saxton and Wang (2014) have emphasised that social network members can initiate petitions for donations to charities, re-circulate solicitations from civic organisations, as well as crowdsource funding for their own needs, thus creating a social norm of giving to charity.

Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) elaborated that social norms are particularly effective in networks where people know each other and care about their reputation. As such, FB and other social media networks can be particularly effective in creating norms of giving. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) observed that social media has changed interactions between citizens so that they no longer require significant organisational resources. This aspect is also important in the context of the prosocial crisis response in the community.

Several researchers found that social media (SM) also provides opportunities to advertise one's donation, adds to reputation and validates an identity of a good, 'caring citizen' who helps others, especially in times of crisis, when the need for support is greater than normally (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Saxton & Wang, 2014; van Leeuwen & Wiepking, 2013).

Social media supporting civic participation and social behaviour of the community. To study co-creation and civic participation in social media during the COVID-19 crisis, we adopted Kaun and Uldam's (2018) model, which is based on Couldry's (2004, 2012) socially-oriented media theory that conceptualises media in the context of other social institutions, and describes civic participation in social media on the basis of four dimensions: power relations, affordances, practices, and discourses.

Couldry et al. (2017) indicate that support and spaces to encourage media should become an essential component of struggles for social progress and social justice. If progress is to be made towards these wider goals, major efforts are needed by civil society, governments, and international organisations to promote and sustain media that exist outside market forces. Couldry et al. (2017) also point out affordances, saying that media is an important resource for movements that promote social progress, and effective access to media is a necessary component of social justice. All individuals and communities should be able to use media infrastructures to produce content, access information and knowledge, and actively participate in the realms of politics, culture, and governance. Issues of accessibility, as well as the potential affordances of these platforms, are particularly salient for disadvantaged people. Kang (2014) indicates that organisational efforts can be most valuable when they are focused on increasing public engagement by fostering positive feelings, affective commitment, and a sense of empowerment via participation. When trust is present in the interactions between organisations and the public, organisations must work to develop a sense of a community that is centred on feelings such as affection and pride. Couldry et al. (2017) noted that equally, processes for the design of digital platforms and other means of accessing the Internet should recognise and effectively include representation from the full range of human communities. Access to media infrastructures as consumers, receivers, or audiences of content and information is not enough; individuals and communities need access as content creators. Hence, issues of language, affordability, user competencies, and technology design become fundamental. Couldry (2012) further details that media practices are concerned with the need for coordination, interaction, community, trust, and freedom. He emphasises the focus on political participation in media practice and the consideration of how social media supports political participation.

Our focus in using this model was on learning how Facebook as a channel of social media can be a tool and accelerator in a crisis that enables people to find solutions to social problems in their community under the conditions of social distancing and radical self-isolation. Based on the thought development of the above model, we focus our analysis on all aspects – power

relations, practices, affordances, and discourses. As we have indicated in relation to the four dimensions, they each play a key role for possibilities in prosocial behaviour within the community and in co-creating solutions for vulnerable target groups during the conditions of social distancing and radical self-isolation.

METHOD

Aim and research questions. An emergency in the administrative territory of the Republic of Estonia was declared on March 12, 2020 (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2020), ending on May 17, 2020 (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2020). Communities were invited to protect the elderly and people with special needs as the groups at the greatest risk from COVID-19 during lockdown period.

Our study aims to explore and describe prosocial behaviour and co-creation of the community on Facebook during the COVID-19 crisis in Estonia. Based on the main research question, we investigate - how the residents of Estonia used FB in co-creating solutions for vulnerable target groups under the conditions of social distancing and radical self-isolation? We sought answers to the following sub-questions:

1) Did the number of posts related to prosocial activities towards vulnerable groups at the community level increase during the lockdown period compared to the 3-months period before and after?

2) Which, if any, of the following four dimensions – power relations, practices, affordances, and discourses – identified by Kaun and Uldam's (2018) model were evident in the cases?

Study design. The study is characterised by a descriptive and exploratory study design. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) stated that the aim of an exploratory study is not to determine the nature of the problem and provide convincing evidence but rather to help us understand the problem better. We explore prosocial behaviour within the community in Facebook through mixed-method three-step content analysis of existing data, including posts and comments on FB pages. The content analysis method is a commonly used method of analysing a wide range of textual data, including interview transcripts, postings, and media such as drawings, photographs, and video (Given, 2008). In the process of the content analysis, we used both quantitative methods (descriptive statistics – e.g., number of comments and number of views) and qualitative data analysis methods, precisely theory driven thematic analysis framed with approaches by Kaun and Uldam.

Data collection and the sample of the study. For the data collection from December 15, 2019, to May 18, 2020, we used two web-based platforms for social media monitoring – Social Searcher (2019) and Export Comments (2019). In addition, we used manual data searches and data input. We defined search words (codes) both deductively and inductively, which aligns with the current standard of social media research (Creswell, 2009). The keywords determined deductively by researchers were (a) descriptive of the target group ('elderly people', 'people with disabilities', 'problems', 'difficulty in coping', and 'unemployment') and (b) related to community activities to help each other, such as 'citizens' initiatives', 'calls to action', 'on a voluntary basis', 'the community', 'inclusion', 'co-creation', and 'development of services' (See Tables 1 and 2). Also, we expanded the keywords to slang that people used to ensure maximal content coverage.

The search in the first step of the sampling process covered publicly available posts, expressions, hashtags (#), and acronyms that were immediately anonymised and transferred to the database. In total, 1,169 posts and comments were found and coded manually based on the main content of the post (see Appendix 1). In the second step of the sampling, we selected 31 cases with the following criteria: the characteristics of the target group, the involvement of the community, volunteers and organisations involved in the activities, their role in the follow-up activities, and finally, the results of the activities. During this, four cases were selected for the analysis to answer sub-question 2 (See Table 1).

In this paper, thematic coding is used. When analysing the selected cases, Kaun and Uldam's model (2018) was used as a theoretical framework, which is based on Couldry's (2004, 2012) socially oriented media theory that describes citizen

Table 1. Cases analyzed

No	Case name	Case description
1	A hospital's request for volunteers	A hospital's request for volunteers to support hospitals and care homes led to a healthcare provider, citizens, and a voluntary organisation communicating and exchanging data with each other, ultimately resulting in co-creation of a solution to help the community.
2	A false rumor	A false rumor of the state intention to cut funding for organisations that assist people with special needs during the crisis led an advocacy organisation to respond that this should not be the case.
3	A computer for every schoolchild	The citizens' initiative 'A computer for every schoolchild' grew out of a closed group and quickly expanded into a nationwide campaign and movement of co-creation involving citizens, public authorities, and businesses, who provided working computers or tablets for students to use. The further direction of the campaign was taken over by a children's advocacy organisation that invited entrepreneurs to participate in the charity project.
4	Help for people with special needs	People with special needs felt that they were not trusted, and their opinions were not considered. In FB posts, people with special needs discussed and shared their stories about coping with everyday life and its challenges and informed the public how to better understand them and how to trust and involve their community in co-creation.

participation in social media, in the context of other social institutions using four dimensions: power relations, opportunities, practices, and discourses. The FB posts in Estonian analysed during the research are presented in the article translated into English by the authors.

Ethical considerations. At the sampling stage, as well as during data collection, processing, and analysis, special attention was paid to the vulnerability of the target groups and the potential sensitivity of the data (Tiidenberg, 2018). We followed the Estonian Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (2017), the scientific ethical principles of the European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities (2017), and the Ethics approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu No 275/T-6, 2020. All posts and comments in this article have been used in the coded form (the data were encoded before storing in the database). Informed consent of the post writers was not requested, as the comments were immediately encoded in the database to ensure the anonymity of their authors. When choosing whether to present a comment in the survey results, we checked whether searching for it on Google led back to the original post, and if possible, we changed the wording in such a way that such searches did not lead back to the original post.

In this article, all comments related to the posts about these 4 cases are accompanied by the codes given to the corresponding text in the database. 'KA' means the code in the database. The letters 'ÜG', 'VG', 'PIG', 'ÜH', 'KAG', and 'KKG' are case identifiers. The number added to the case identifier indicates the number of the corresponding comments in the database. All case-related posts with responses are provided in Appendix 2.

FINDINGS

The number of posts related with prosocial activities towards vulnerable groups at the community level during the lockdown period and the 3-month period before and after (RQ1)

The present study indicated that in a crisis, the number of posts related to our search terms increased significantly. As can be seen in Table 2, posts written before the emergency accounted for only 3.9% of our sample for the 6-month study period, with an average of less than one post or comment per search term per day. During the lockdown, the number of posts containing

Table 2. Frequency and share of topics on Facebook before, during, and after the emergency

Search Words	Posts 3 months before lockdown		Posts during lockdown		Posts after lockdown		Total posts	
	12.15.19–03.14.20		03.15.20–05.18.20		05.19.20–06.15.20		12.15.19–06.15.20	
	n	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**
Call to action	1	2	359	32	43	54	403	34
Elderly people	1	2	263	23	20	25	284	24
Citizens' initiative	34	69	63	6	5	6	102	9
People with disabilities	1	2	98	9	2	3	101	9
On a voluntary basis	1	2	85	8	1	1	87	7
Community	0	0	74	7	3	4	77	7
Problems	0	0	39	3	0	0	39	3
Difficulty in coping	3	6	16	1	0	0	19	2
Unemployment	0	0	19	2	6	8	25	2
Inclusion	1	2	22	2	0	0	23	2
Co-creation	6	12	1	0	0	0	7	1
Development of services	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	0
Posts per day	0.8		16.3		2.9		7.7	
Total posts	**49**	**100%**	**1040**	**100%**	**80**	**100%**	**1169**	**100%**

search terms increased exponentially (averaging 89% of the total sample or 16 per day), indicating that the community became more active in its prosocial behaviour during the crisis and actively interacted, asked for, and received help.

The data indicates that in the pre-lockdown period, most posts were related to civic initiatives in general (69% of the posts during this period). The crisis period brought a change in topics, increasing call-to-action posts (34%) and posts by seniors (24%), which may have been related to the government's appeal to support the coping of the elderly who have been a risk group during this crisis both in Estonia and around the world. During this period, the focus of the public sector was on helping the elderly and people with special needs by providing home delivery services, home care, and other services. In the 28 days following the lockdown, the average number of posts per day quickly fell from 16 to pre-crisis levels, but the focus on calls to action and elderly people remained the same.

As mentioned above, Estonian Facebook is a common way of communicating with each other in the community, and it can be successfully used to study prosocial behaviour within the community.

Characteristics of these cases from Kaun and Uldam's (2018) model (RQ2)

Power relations. The analysed FB posts indicated that during times of crisis, civil society can receive and disseminate information through social media. For example, in Case 3, the campaign '*A computer for every schoolchild*' was initiated by a private individual but was quickly picked up by an organisation that carried it out as a campaign, inviting both citizens and other organisations to work together.

This initiative started on a Sunday, when people had their first problems related to the crisis and children's home-schooling (KA: ÜH266, 03.15.2020). On March 20, the campaign was in full swing, and both citizens and state agencies had joined the campaign.

Within the framework of the social media initiative, '*A computer for every schoolchild*', more than 1,200 computers changed hands in a month. The initiator of the campaign received recognition by the President of the Republic of Estonia (KA: KAG105, 06.1.2020). On the other hand, the misinformation case (Case 2) during the same period revealed unequal positions in prosocial co-operation in Estonian social media posts during the crisis, where people and organisations felt that they were not considered equal partners for providing assistance in the community. This was a situation in which people with disabilities, who traditionally need help and receive the necessary resources from the state, panicked and felt excluded because they misinterpreted the information sent out by the Ministry of Social Affairs, on reducing funding for disabled people's organisations and posted an emergency signal on social media: "The state wants to cut funding for organizations for people with special needs" (KA: PIG4, 04.18.2020).

The trigger was a request by the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia to negotiate a reduction in funding for disabled people's organisations due to decreased tax receipts during the crisis situation, and a possible reduction in the amount of support paid to these organisations. Organisations advocating for people with disabilities responded immediately, posting a press release at 15:41 on April 18, 2020, saying "the reduction of funding clearly means a struggle for survival for all" (KA: PIG4, 04.18.2020).

The Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia responded to this post publicly via FB on the same day, stating there were no plans to cut funding for disabled people:

> *People with disabilities and their representative organisations are the last area where the Ministry of Social Affairs and the state would like to make any cuts. I am very sorry that claims to the contrary have been made in the media today, as if a 50% reduction in funding for these organisations had been decided. I confirm that this is not true.* (KA: PIG21, 04.18.2020)

A more detailed investigation revealed that the letter had been sent out of the Ministry by an official and the Minister was not aware of it. It was a communication problem. In the misinformation case, people felt pressure from the authorities for cuts, prompted by rumours, and immediately responded through advocacy organisations. As a representative of the authorities, the Minister of Social Affairs perceived the seriousness of the situation and tried to explain it, and restore trust through immediate social media posts. (KA: PIG4, 04.20.2020)

We can see from the analysis that this case was indirectly induced by the crisis. There was a communication problem in which incorrect information was circulating among the public, which was later explained by the Minister personally. An example of the circumstances of the Estonian COVID-19 response can be found in the case of a hospital's request for help (Case 1). On March 21, 2020, a hospital posted a call to action regarding the need for additional doctors and nurses:

> *We have sent a call for help to the medical students of this academic year who have had an internship or work as an assistant doctor, and we hope that someone will be able to respond to our request throughout the country, despite the already difficult situation.* (KA: ÜG390, 03.21.2020)

The non-governmental organisation "Voluntary Online Platform for Healthcare Professionals" responded to the call on April 12, by providing support to address the problem with an additional call to healthcare professionals, stating:

> *COVID-19 infections are on the rise and hospitals lack competent help. We all have the power to help hospitals find medically trained volunteers! If you have medical training or education, register in our database, and join volunteer or paid challenges in hospitals. By working together, we can do more!* (KA: VG4, 04.12.2020)

Developments on Facebook in connection with the above posts were effective and supported the resolution of the crisis by involving volunteer healthcare professionals in the X county hospital and nursing homes. Even this case eventually led to the positioning of power. On May 7, it became public that the doctors of the hospital in question had collected signatures to dismiss the hospital's manager, after which the residents of that county submitted a petition entitled "Community support for [redacted] continuing as a manager" that stated the following:

> *Dr. … needs our community support so that he could continue as a hospital manager! What has happened in recent months has been difficult for all of us, but Dr. … helped the county to cope with all of it.* (KA: KKG79, 05.09.2020)

The above situation suggests that in a crisis situation, trust increases between individuals and in the community as a whole. Such power relations can also be seen in the trust case (Case 4). On May 15, 2020, Helpific – a volunteer organisation that provides services to people with special needs – posted the question, 'Are people with special needs trusted?' and invited people to comment on its post (KA: PIG33, 05.15.2020). Commenting on the post was lively. For example, one person in the comments pointed out, "It often seems to people with special needs that involvement is only an apparent illusion." An artist with special physical needs continued:

> *In authorities and institutions, people believe that a person with special needs may provide advice, but he or she is still in need of help and cannot be an actor or any kind of decision-maker. If a person with special needs must trust officials, such as social workers, why not trust people with special needs more, since they know their own lives best.* (KA: PIG33, 05.15.2020)

Affordances. This analysis of social media indicated that Facebook has established a code of conduct that its users must follow. The rules cover issues of security, authenticity, confidentiality, intellectual property, and non-violence. Separate rules have been formulated for behaviour during the COVID-19 crisis. We found no hate speech, disturbing activities and anomalies, or violent content in the cases we analysed. The communication style used by all social media participants supported the achievement of common results, and it can be said that the established rules supported calls to action and co-creation activities on Facebook.

Facebook also encourages users to communicate, respect, trust, and accept each other by stating, that as the situation evolves, we need to continue to look at content on the platform, assess speech trends, and engage with experts, and will provide additional policy guidance when appropriate to keep the members of community safe during this crisis (OECD 2020).Our analysis indicated that in the crisis situation in focus in this study, all those who posted the initiatives were primarily relying on the fact that posting on FB is a way to quickly inform people about a situation and involve the community in resolving it. All the initiatives analysed in this article achieved a relatively large spread on Facebook in a very short time. For example, the post '*Hospital call for all doctors*' (Case 1) was distributed up to 1.1 thousand times in the week after March 21. For example, in Case 1 – A hospital's request for volunteers (KA: ÜG390) – the number of Facebook page views reached 6,546 in a week, and the number of likes for the page reached 6,207. A post related to Case 2 – "The state wants to halve the funding of organizations of people with disabilities in the context of crisis cuts" – was followed 1,884 times on Facebook since the press release was published on April 18, 2020, and by May 18, 2020, it had received 1,771 likes. In Case 3 ('*A computer for every schoolchild*'), a Facebook group was created on March 20 and grew rapidly to 3,800 members. Regarding Case 4, Helpific now has 6,605 followers who are active in discussions about the need for services and equal opportunities for disabled people.

When analysing affordability, we must consider the algorithm of FB. The algorithm allows only some posts to reach users, as it determines what, how, and in what order users see content as they browse their feeds. According to Cooper (2020), "The algorithm currently ranks the posts each user sees in the order that they're likely to enjoy them, based on a variety of factors, a.k.a. ranking signals." For example, regarding Case 1 (the hospital case), FB may not have shown its users the entire content of the posts created by the hospital because of their size and the topics raised.

Our analysis shows that FB was actively used in Estonia during the crisis because information could be transmitted and received quickly through this channel, and its use was convenient and affordable for every user. The fact that more than half of Estonian citizens have FB accounts could also have been a factor that contributed to the flow of information through FB.

Practices. This analysis indicated that it is customary for Estonian citizens and organisations to use the Facebook in a rapidly changing situation, because its rules meet the needs of ordinary citizens, it can be used quickly, and the visibility of information shared on FB is ensured. People on social media can initiate petitions, ask for donations, or organise crowdfunding campaigns. Their actual practice of using FB shows that it worked well. For example, in the hospital case (Case 1), multiple stakeholders, including a healthcare provider, a volunteer organisation, and a volunteer specialist, responded to the call for the same purpose. Co-creation achieved results and helped solve the problem. The same can be said about the case of obtaining computers for children (Case 3), where active citizens, entrepreneurs, volunteer organisations, and both schools and students (as end-users) came together and participated in remote learning.

During the period under review, extensive linking was found on FB so that users could read and discuss the topic further. In practice, a significant amount of information was shared, such as the transmission of posts, press releases, media links, and users' sharing others' posts, adding their own comments. As an example, in a case related to people with disabilities, after the press release of the head of the organization Helpific, information was shared by members of the organization with comments and suggestions on how to support people with special needs and how to solve trust problems between officials and people with special needs. (ALSO: PIG4, 18.04.2020) (KA: PIG4, 04.18.2020).

FB has restrictions, such as volume or text removal for hate speech, etc., but our study did not reveal the direct impact of FB restrictions on the crisis response. In practice, both organisations and citizens were free to post calls for information and assistance, and found active response. Our analysis of Facebook communications indicated that when a group reached actual activities, the group was closed for public communication, but the activities likely continued (for example, in the case of school computers collected for children or in the case of the hospital's call for volunteer health professionals). Specific activities that continued after the group was closed related to confidential information, such as email addresses, telephone numbers, and personal information that was not to be shared publicly. This highlights the fact that, in a crisis situation, social media is suitable for conveying primary information, posting calls, and generating ideas in the initial phase of the crisis. When co-creation reaches specific activities that may involve sensitive data, trade secrets, and other confidential information, the use of closed social media groups ensues.

Discourses. All initiatives in the four cases analysed described the involvement of stakeholders in aid-delivery processes, co-creation, and finding common solutions, thus highlighting different aspects of involvement based on policies, traditions, and practices. Cross-cutting topics in social media discussions focused on the involvement and trust of community members. We noticed this involvement and trust in our study. In the case of the hospital (Case 1), the help desk of healthcare volunteers joined the call, inviting specialists to help control the COVID-19 outbreak (KA: ÜG390, 03.21.2020). This can be considered one of the important co-created solutions for supporting the Estonian population during the crisis. The purpose of the volunteer database was to identify volunteers with medical and healthcare training who were ready to help colleagues during the crisis situation, including doctors, nurses, and laboratory specialists. (KA: ÜG406, 04.13.2020). As of October 22, 2020, there were more than 1,350 volunteers with medical training listed in this database (Volunteer Database of Health Professionals [VAAB], 2020).

We also identified the issue of trust in the misinformation case (Case 2). The task of advocacy organisations was to mediate the information provided by the state by inviting authorities and officials to think about the needs of people and ways of supporting their subsistence, and to be a partner in restoring trust and protecting the interests of people with special needs. It can be said that, with the timely intervention of the advocacy organisations for people with special needs, and because of the explanations of the Minister of Social Affairs, the situation was quickly resolved and confidence in the state was restored.

One of the biggest solutions for helping families in times of crisis appeared in Case 3, '*A computer for every schoolchild*', which grew out of a citizens' social media initiative and received feedback from organisations and citizens. It was a process of mutual need for help and assistance, which was created by the crisis situation.

The trust case (Case 4) involved the volunteer platform Helpific, which was designed to help people with special needs. Helpific's online support environment combines voluntary and paid services to meet the needs of everyday life, such as transport, attending events, and doing household chores (Helpific, 2020). Through the organisation, those in need can communicate their wishes for help, and helpers can provide assistance.

DISCUSSION

As Penner et al. (2005) pointed out, prosocial behaviour includes a broad category of activities that some important groups in society or one's own social group generally identify as beneficial to other people. The results of the research show that the Estonian community reacted actively in a crisis under the conditions of social isolation, using FB as a social media channel. The study indicated that community members' motivation to participate in both seeking and providing help was high, and calls were responded within hours or days. As Putnam (2000) argued, trust and civic engagement are mutually necessary to strengthen a community, as people who trust each other volunteer and participate more often in community and political activities. In this study, we have seen an increase in collectivism and concern for well-being for the benefit of the community as the main motives for co-creation in the community. Social media posts show that ways to support each other are quickly found, and in times of crisis, efforts are made to resolve problems through co-creation.

Penner et al. (2005) pointed out that a collaboration that involved two or more individuals or organisations, who came together as partners to work interdependently for a common goal, benefitted all involved. Our research results show that prosocial behaviour within the community was characterised by community members actively assisting each other during crisis situations to solve problems. Entrepreneurs, service providers, active citizens, voluntary organisations, and state institutions all communicated and exchanged information.

In the social media posts we analysed, we noticed that some co-creation parties, including organisations dealing with interest groups of people with special needs, felt that they were not considered equal partners in providing targeted aid. Those feelings are usually more evident in a crisis situation. If such problems arise, the communication issues must be resolved and trust between the partners must be restored before moving on to co-creation. We can speak of equal partnership on the condition that both parties are helping, and both are receiving help.

Our study shows that to be an open and active partner, it is necessary to feel that you are trusted and welcome in the communication process, and, as Fledderus and Honingh (2016), van Eijk and Steen (2014), and Fledderus (2018) pointed out, having trust in fellow citizens is likely to be an important precondition for effective solutions. Our study shows that gaining trust is an important early task for involving people in co-creation at the community level. The issue of trusting "other" participants on SM is also important here. For example, the fear that a proposal will receive unconstructive criticism may hinder the presentation of ideas on SM.

Based on this study, we can highlight important aspects of the four dimensions of the analysis model that must be addressed in the actual process of prosocial co-creation and civic participation on social media (see Figure 1).

Using the Kaun and Uldam model (2018), and based on the present study, we have shown that the latter is theoretically possible, but the actual behaviour of communities and people in crisis depends on very different, though related aspects, such as speed of reactions, needs of communities, and different ways to finding a solution, all which require further investigation over longer periods and in various situations (in the SM environment). For example, our study shows that various methods



Figure 1. Social media as an enabler in community co-creation (Based on Kaun & Uldam, 2018)

of communicating on FB were used, including posting calls and sharing information. At the same time, our analysis of the timing of the posts has confirmed that SM is a communication channel used to elicit quick responses and reach many people, rather than a communication channel used to facilitate deep and multi-stakeholder co-operation.

This study highlights the limitations of the use of social media in the public sector and their impact on crisis response. It is more difficult for the public sector to launch various co-creation campaigns in the community, because it is their responsibility to stand up for people's well-being, and the involvement of the population and organisations comes into play only after the local government's resources are exhausted. Our results also support design recommendations for increasing the capacity of social media in co-creation processes.

Our analysis on the rules of Facebook shows the limitations of social media communication, such as that sharing information is easier for organisations and individuals who have better financial resources to pay to share information with more people. In the event of a crisis, it is necessary and possible to co-operate with institutions to share community-focused information and use the assistance of FB professionals. It is possible for volunteer organisations and citizens to share information from friend to friend or in public or private groups, and thus make themselves visible and find partners.

CONCLUSION

This study revealed that the Estonian people prefer to use FB to exchange information. Calls to action and requests for help can be posted, ideas can be brainstormed, and knowledge and experience can be shared. The COVID-19 crisis highlighted calls for donations to vulnerable groups as a positive result of the co-creation process.

The content analysis of social media posts revealed that in prosocial behaviour within the community, both conscious and unconscious co-creation can be distinguished. There may be other processes that people are involved in that are not directly perceived as co-creation, but that may have useful results. For example, social media can be used in collaboration with other platforms to develop services that are not normally provided in the community but are necessary for community members. A more informed use of social media would contribute to the effectiveness of co-creation.

A definite advantage of social media-based communication is networking – social media provides opportunities to participate in networks where information flows quickly, and this in turn encourages co-creation. These aspects highlight that FB allows people interested in particular issues to attract the attention of the public in real time, as events happen, and respond to breaking news with great speed. Content creation by social media users allows them to find and focus on certain discourses that are specific and necessary to the community and that describe their beliefs and values (ideologies). We evidenced taking the responsibility on a broader level, where every person can participate as an equal partner to solve problems, care for those in need, or preserve valuable activities, conventions, and/or institutions in the community.

In conclusion, the results of this study contribute to a better understanding of community prosocial behaviour in crisis situations, community members' motivation, opportunities for mutual support, co-creation activities, and efforts to address crisis issues, as well as ways to interact through social media.

An important limitation of this study is its very short observation period. We observed projects that were implemented very fast because a quick solution was necessary and could be found and implemented. Future studies should focus on long-term projects that require long-term content monitoring (e.g., 24 months). Future studies should also utilise other active methods (including interviews with co-creators). The topic of equality of co-creation partners would need more investigation in the future.

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APPENDIX 1. FINAL SAMPLE OF SELECTED CASES

Case no. and nickname	Posts	Number of total emoticons, reactions, and post comments	Number of total shares
Case 1. 'Hospital request'	Hospital call for all medical personnel (KA: ÜG390, 03.21.2020)	Like 600 Heart 91 Sad 9 Comments 15	1100
	Web platform of voluntary healthcare employees (KA: VG4, 04.12.2020)	Like 5	7
	Health Department's call for web platform of voluntary healthcare employees (KA: ÜG406, 04.13.2020)	Like 55 Comments 1	100
	Petition (KA: KKG76, 05.09.2020)	Like 21 Happy 2 Comments 7	5
Case 2. 'Mis-information'	ELIL and EPL about the possibility of decreasing funding (KA: PIG4, 04.18.2020)	Like 9 Surprised 3 Sad 15 Angry 17 Comments 16	5
	The Minister of Social Affairs refutes false information (KA: PIG21, 04.18.2020)	Like 77 Heart 9 Sad 2 Comments 12	39
Case 3. 'Citizen initiative'	A woman's post on her page 'A computer for every schoolchild' (KA: ÜH266, 03.15.2020)	Like 12	9
	Post 'A computer for every schoolchild' (KA: ÜH268, 03.20.2020)	Like 3	3
	Children's advocacy organization LKL 'A computer for every schoolchild' (KA: KAG7, 05.28.2020)	Like 8	6
	The school recognizes the parent (KA: KAG105, 06.01.2020)	Like 78 Heart 7 Happy 1 Comments 1	2
Case 4. 'Trust'	Are people with special needs trusted? Posted by NGO Helpific (KA: PIG33, 05.15.2020)	Like 13 Sad 1 Angry 1 Comments 26	12
	Discussion of the post about the possibility of decreasing funding (KA: PIG49, 05.15.2020)	Comments 4	
	Helpific's support platform's call for finding volunteers (KA: PIG104, 06.13.2020)	Like 10 Heart 1 Comments 1	102

* The analysis uses comments related to the posts, which have separate codes in the database.